The transcript of the oral arguments in the Parker D.C. case has been posted at:
http://www.alangura.com/transcript/PARK1014.V1 It's a very interesting read. The judge was unusually active and engaged. And he seems to me to be an equal-opportunity griller. For example, he asks plaintiffs' counsel why he shouldn't follow the rationale of the D.C. appellate court, even though he's not bound by it. Then he asks counsel for the city why he *should* follow that rationale when he's not bound by it. It's very hard to get a read on what the judge is really thinking, versus what he's saying as devil's advocate to test the strength of the attorneys' arguments--and that's a good thing. I recognize that I have a bias in how I'd like the case to turn out. Nevertheless, my impression is that Mr. Gura did a fine job at being able to provide substantive answers to every question put. On the other hand, the attorney for the city kept dodging a key question the judge asked her: What's the best authority you can cite me for the position you want me to adopt? Finally her answer is "all the cases in our brief." Here's one interesting statement from her: MS. MULLEN: WELL, HISTORICALLY, IT'S INCORRECT. I 12 THINK YOU HAVE -- CONSTITUTIONAL SCHOLARS HAVE DEBATED THIS 13 QUESTION AND THEY'VE ALWAYS COME DOWN TO THE FINDING THAT IT 14 DOES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT REFERS TO A COLLECTIVE RIGHT, NOT AN 15 INDIVIDUAL RIGHT, TO BEAR ARMS. Perhaps members of this list will be surprised to learn that constitutional scholars have "always come down to the finding that...the second amendment refers to a collective right, not an individual right, to bear arms." But she said it, so it must be true. She wouldn't lie to the court, after all, and couldn't be so incompetent and ill-prepared as to speak so definitively on something she didn't know about. Here's an exchange that includes what I think is a crucial concession by the attorney for the city: 6 THE COURT: SUPPOSE THE PLAINTIFFS WERE MEMBERS OF 7 THIS STATE-SANCTIONED MILITIA. WOULD THEY BE ENTITLED TO 8 POSSESS HANDGUNS? 9 MS. MULLEN: IF THEY WERE PART OF A MILITIA. 10 THE COURT: WELL, WHAT IS A MILITIA, ACCORDING TO THE 11 CITY? 12 MS. MULLEN: THE MILITIA IS AN ORGANIZED GROUP BY, 13 THROUGH THE GOVERNMENT, IF YOU'RE SPEAKING OF THE NATIONAL 14 GUARD, OR ANY OTHER SORT OF ORGANIZED -- 15 THE COURT: NO, I WANT YOUR POSITION. 16 MS. MULLEN: NO, I'M SPEAKING ABOUT AN ORGANIZED GROUP 17 OF PEOPLE WHO ARE NOT -- 18 THE COURT: IS THAT WHAT THE D. C. CODE SAYS? 19 MS. MULLEN: I DON'T KNOW SPECIFICALLY HOW IT'S 20 DEFINED. I KNOW PLAINTIFF WAS MENTIONING THE CODE. It seems to me that since the parties were then to provide supplemental briefing on the question of standing, well, I hope that the plaintiffs took advantage of this concession. If the D.C. Code's definition of who is in the militia encompasses all or some of the plaintiffs, then the defendants have, with this concession, handed not only the standing issue, but the entirety of the merits, to the plaintiffs. Or am I reading too much into this point? -- Bob Woolley St. Paul, MN [EMAIL PROTECTED] The ultimate result of shielding men from the effects of folly is to fill the world with fools. --Herbert Spencer
