On Thu, May 27, 1999 at 02:11:05PM -0400, Andy wrote:
| > The _Next_ question -- the one people _Need_ to ask -- is
| > "Why is this software I am using so braindamaged it needs to be
| > firewalled?"
| >
| > That's the _Real_ question. Not "how do I make DCOM work with
| > Gauntlet" but rather "why is DCOM not designed to work in a
| > hostile environment?" I read Jen's mail and thought, "hmm, why
| > is this person complaining about Gauntlet? They should be complaining
| > about braindamaged protocols from vendors!"
|
| Hello!
|
| I'm even less than a security novice, but I have been tasked to build a
| client-server application with a custom protocol that will need to
| traverse various firewalls at the client's LAN's. Of course the LAN
| admins will get the bends when I tell them I need a hole, but I have
| been reading this thread, and much other security stuff over the past
| months, and I have asked this question on this forum and others: why do
| applications have so many holes? I keep my protocols as simple as
| possible, and I make sure I can handle buffer overflow attacks. Why does
| my application need a firewall? I'm much more afraid of someone
| trojan-ing my client apps to re-direct data, or keyboard sniffers and
| the like. If one of the clients is compromised in this way, the whole
| application could be compromised. I'm at the mercy of the security
| practices (or lack thereof) at each LAN. What do I do?
Does your application log?
Does it have a macro language?
Can it open arbitrary files?
Does it have debug commands?
Where is the crypto provision for end to end authentication,
authorization, and confidentiality?
If these are all answered correctly and implemented correctly, a
firewall probably doesn't make a lot of difference.
Adam
--
"It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once."
-Hume
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