On Thu, 10 Jun 1999, John Wiltshire wrote:

> Let's have a look at some really prejudiced, unfounded NT bashing...

Followed by some really prejudiced, unfounded NT advocacy...

> No.  Physically protecting the network is required because TCP/IP is
> vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks and other denial of service attacks.

Dockmaster II seems to be under evaluation for a *network* B2 rating with 
the intent of NSA placing the beast on the Internet with classified 
information resident on the box.  Perhaps you can cite a reference in 
the evaluation that says why physically protecting the network is felt 
necessary by this particular evaluation team or vendor instead of 
spreading the same type of conjecture that you accuse the person you're 
responding of?  Are you implying that a lowly C2 *host* evaluation places 
more emphasis on the insecurity of IP than a *network* B2 one?

> > "What slays me about Microsoft is how badly their software can coexist
> > with other products, *including their own*.  A classic example is
> > their aforementioned Proxy Server.  When you set up NT with the Option
> > Pack and Service Pack 3, it installs Internet Information Server 4.0
> > by default.  Which is fine, except for one small detail: it *breaks*
> > Proxy Server.  We had to back IIS 4.0 out of the system and install
> > IIS 3.0, which has no trouble working with Proxy Server.  AFAIK, there
> > is still no fix to get Proxy Server working properly with IIS 4.0."
> 
> Except this comment is just plain wrong.  We have had Proxy server working
> with IIS4 just fine for over a year now.

"If it works for some people and not others, it's a specious argument, 
and has nothing to do with the order of fixes applied, or the vendor's 
fix strategy?"  Some people put a lot of work into trying to get some fix 
and patch ordering mechanisms done because it wasn't designed into the 
product or its upgrade mechanism.  That's a failing, if you choose not to 
recognise it as such or not.

> Did you bother to check your facts before you went public, or just posted
> rhetoric that you heard about for your own unfounded prejudices?

Tried to implement the software and failed, seems pretty founded to me.  
Also seems indicitive of the "moving target" syndrome I listed in the 
list that none of the NT advocates seems to want to talk about.

> Yeah.  Just like those Unix systems that passed with no apps.  Get a
> freaking clue!!

With the caveat that it's under evaluation (or was last time I looked - 
I've not checked to see where it is in the cycle recently), and there's 
been no FER yet, DG/UX at _network_ B2 with DOCKMASTER II includes an Apache 
derrivative, Sendmail and Cybershield in the configuration.  As a part of the 
TCB, they carry the rating configured and in-use on the system.  Now, I've not 
looked at any of the CMW or other *nix validations, so I'll ask-  are 
*you* sure no applications were included in the TCB, or is this conjecture?

> NT *is* secure if you want to make it secure.  Its bigots like you that
> don't have a clue about the whole thing and just post rhetoric about a

Rhetoric like "It works for me so you're lying?"  Security systems need 
to be predictable.  Every single NT installation I've done, and 
almost every one that my company has done has been on vendor-certified 
hardware.  We've had many of the same problems that others (which would seem 
to be most of the world excluding you) have had.  We've had systems that 
function fine too - that unpredictability is the root of a *lot* of the 
distrust.  Most of the rest are outlined in my first post on this topic.  Feel 
free to debate *any* of those points rationally, or all of them if you think 
you can.  Note that we're talking security engineering principles and design 
principles. 

> system they don't understand because they don't want to understand it that
> really make me glad I use NT.

I'd gladly compare my clue with your clue on the OS of your choice and 
any of the several OS' of mine.  I've worked professionally on a few (~20) 
operating systems back through DOS on an IBM System/360 (Yes, there was 
another OS named DOS before the PC was a gleam in anyone's eye) and going 
forward *including* NT.  I've written security front ends in assembler for 
minicomputers, and transaction and command processors in assembler for 
mainframes.  I've had RACF special and class A-Z on VM/CMS.  I've 
extended secure networks carrying classified data to hotel rooms in 
foreign countries with an active intellegence threat.  In short, my 
comments are based on quite a significant history of computing and 
security practice and a deep understanding.

I doubt that you have a greater level of understanding of NT than I do 
(though there are people on this list who most definitely do), and I'll bet 
that you have a lesser level of understanding of most *any* OS that 
doesn't run on an octal-based system (I flirted only briefly with VAXen) than 
I do.  Given that, I'd say that it's pretty specious of you to argue that 
something else isn't a better security choice.  Oh, but you're not taking a 
bigoted position or arguing based on advocacy, right?

I based my list of "Why not NT" on a large ammount of real-world experience, 
historicly good security design principles, etc.  The same people 
saying "NT is secure" were saying the same thing before LANMan hashes 
were broken, before hidden shares had been discovered, were deploying the 
original PPTP and saying "nobody's broken into my site so it's secure," etc.  

So, let's strip away the OS religion and talk about good design, security 
properties, and trust management.  Drag out the original list I posted 
and refute "Why not NT" on a point by point basis.  My points apply not 
only to NT, but to some Unicies and a lot of other OS' as well.  

If you can't refute the technical points, all the name-calling and 
advocacy in the world means squat.


Paul  -- Security bigot      
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Paul D. Robertson      "My statements in this message are personal opinions
[EMAIL PROTECTED]      which may have no basis whatsoever in fact."
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