At 06:26 AM 12/7/00 -0500, Crumrine, Gary L wrote:
>I agree that pointing a finger at the ISP may be the easy way out, but it
>may not be all their fault.  Both the ISP and NAI are victims... not the
>criminals.

Generally, this is the same as: Well, it's an outside web server and it 
doesn't have any secret stuff on it, so it is a sacrificial lamb 
system.  As I've mentioned before, the term "sacrificial lamb" has less to 
do with the system and more to do with you and your job if you're supposed 
to secure it.

If it has your company name on it, you suffer. Years ago, before the web, 
there was an FBI machine on the UUCP network. It was basically a PC that 
sat in a back room. Not connected to anything else. But... it had the name 
fbi.gov associated with it. So whatever happened to it reflected on the 
FBI. When the CIA web site was hacked, it didn't matter that it wasn't 
connected to any secure system. It was a site that had "cia.gov" in its name.

Blame doesn't imply criminal behavior.

Is the attacker to blame. Of course, and it was criminal behavior (in some 
places).

Is the ISP to blame? Sure. Anyone offering web site space and support 
should also provide the best security possible. Most ISPs are clueless 
about security. And their customers are more interested in speed and 
connectivity and up-time than they are about how the web server is secured. 
So, the customers are to blame, also, for not demanding something better.

Is NAI to blame? Sure. As a customer, as I said in the previous paragraph, 
if they did not demand to see a security architecture and monthly audit 
reports (anyone do that with their web site provider?). Also, as a 
supposedly clueful security company, if they did not require hardening of 
the NT server, and installation of their fine IDS tools. Also, they should 
be doing periodic verification of all of their systems exposed to the 
outside, including those hosted by others. Would their vulnerability 
scanner have detected an unpatched IIS? It should.

Could NAI have done everything possible, done it almost flawlessly, and 
still had this happen?  Yes. But they still bear part of the blame. They 
are still responsible. It's their site and they are a security company.

It doesn't mean that they should pack it in and they no longer have any 
credibility. If that were the case, where would Microsoft, Cisco, and Check 
Point be? But, as I said yesterday in a post, it should at least be a 
warning to other such companies, especially the small to medium sized 
security vendors, to be aware of the pitfalls and to not get so sloppy.


Fred
Avolio Consulting, Inc.
16228 Frederick Road, PO Box 609, Lisbon, MD 21765, US
+1 410-309-6910 (voice) +1 410-309-6911 (fax)
http://www.avolio.com/

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