Dear colleagues,
In my opinion, a word like "agency" (or "action") is provided with
meaning within a sentence/statement which is theoretically informed.
Only in a context, a word can become a concept.
The common ground that is assumed in this discussion is the claim that
the generation of agency can be expressed in terms of a non-linear
dynamics of entropy; for example, in computer simulations. The genesis,
however, is not the validity. For the latter, one needs specific
theorizing at each systems level. Specification of the differentia
specifica of each theoretical perspective is important particularly in
the case of the difference between biology and sociology. Otherwise, one
risks a return to "general systems theory", "sociobiology", etc.
I agree (with Stan and others) that "intentionality" is then a second
dimension. Intentional action cannot be equated with a whirl. The
concepts are not scale-free :-( In the case of information, for example,
one can clearly distinguish between mathematical theory of communication
or non-linear dynamics enabling is to carry metaphors from one systems
level to another (as a heuristics) and substantive theories of
communication such as when molecules are exchanged. The exchange of
molecules, however, is very different from the exchange of ideas in
scholarly communication.
Best,
Loet
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Loet Leydesdorff
Professor emeritus, University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR)
l...@leydesdorff.net <mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net>;
http://www.leydesdorff.net/
Associate Faculty, SPRU, <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/>University of
Sussex;
Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ. <http://www.zju.edu.cn/english/>,
Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC,
<http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.html>Beijing;
Visiting Fellow, Birkbeck <http://www.bbk.ac.uk/>, University of London;
http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYAAAAJ&hl=en
------ Original Message ------
From: "Christophe Menant" <christophe.men...@hotmail.fr>
To: "gordana.dodig-crnko...@mdh.se" <gordana.dodig-crnko...@mdh.se>
Cc: "Foundation of Information Science" <fis@listas.unizar.es>
Sent: 10/22/2017 2:59:10 PM
Subject: [Fis] TR: What is ³Agent²?
Dear Gordana,
Your proposal for elementary particles and social institutions as two
limit cases for agency is interesting as it also positions limit cases
for normative/teleological properties
highlighted as implicit parts of agency by Terry. And it brings in
perspectives on your subject.
Social institutions clearly have final causes (a long and complex
list..) but associating agency and teleology to elementary particles
may be problematic as it introduces final causes in a material
universe. This looks close to an "intelligent design" option that we
prefer to avoid.
Why not introduce a possible "trend to increasing complexity" (TIC) in
our universe, with steps since the big bang:
energy => elementary particles=> atoms=>molecules=> life=>humans=>....
(perhaps pan-computationalism has a say there?).
Agency and normative/teleological properties can then be looked at as
emerging during the TIC at the molecules=>life transition (Terry's
morphodynamics).
Rather than being a limit case for agency, elementary particles are
then part of the thread leading to teleology/agency via the TIC.
How would you feel about such wording?
Best
Christophe
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
De : Fis <fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es> de la part de Gordana
Dodig-Crnkovic <gordana.dodig-crnko...@mdh.se>
Envoyé : vendredi 20 octobre 2017 11:02
À : Terrence W. DEACON; 'Bob Logan'; l...@leydesdorff.net; 'fis'
Objet : Re: [Fis] What is ³Agent²?
Dear Terry, Bob, Loet
Thank you for sharing those important thoughts about possible choices
for the definition of agency.
I would like to add one more perspective that I find in Pedro’s article
which makes a distinction between matter-energy aspects and
informational aspects of the same physical reality. I believe that on
the fundamental level of information physics we have a good ND simplest
example how those two entangled aspects can be formally framed.
As far as I can tell, Terrys definition covers chemical and biological
agency.
Do we want to include apart from fundamental physics also full
cognitive and social agency which are very much dominated by
informational aspects (symbols and language)?
Obviously there is no information without physical implementation, but
when we think about epistemology and the ways we know the world, for us
and other biological agents there is no physical interaction without
informational aspects.
Can we somehow think in terms those two faces of agency?
Without matter/energy nothing will happen, nothing can act in the world
but that which happens and anyone registers it, has informational side
to it.
For human agency (given that matter/energy side is functioning)
information is what to a high degree drives agency.
Do you think this would be a fruitful path to pursue, with “agency” of
elementary particles and agency of social institutions as two limit
cases?
All the best,
Gordana
______________________________________________
Gordana Dodig Crnkovic, Professor of Computer Science
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
Chalmers University of Technology
School of Innovation, Design and Engineering, Mälardalen University
http://www.mrtc.mdh.se/~gdc/
Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic <http://www.mrtc.mdh.se/~gdc>
www.mrtc.mdh.se
GORDANA DODIG-CRNKOVIC Professor of Computer Science.
gordana.dodig-crnkovic@mdh.segordana.dodig-crnko...@chalmers.se. Mobile
MDH: +46 73 662 05 11
General Chair of is4si summit 2017
http://is4si-2017.org <http://is4si-2017.org/>
<http://is4si-2017.org/>
IS4SI-2017 - International Society for Information Studies
<http://is4si-2017.org/>
is4si-2017.org
IS4SI-2017 Summit - International Society for Information Studies -
DIGITALISATION FOR A SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY Embodied, Embedded, Networked,
Empowered...
From: Fis <fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es> on behalf of Loet Leydesdorff
<l...@leydesdorff.net>
Organization: University of Amsterdam
Reply-To: "l...@leydesdorff.net" <l...@leydesdorff.net>
Date: Friday, 20 October 2017 at 08:40
To: 'Bob Logan' <lo...@physics.utoronto.ca>, 'fis'
<fis@listas.unizar.es>
Subject: Re: [Fis] What is “Agent”?
Dear Bob and colleagues,
I agree with the choice element. From a sociological perspective,
agency is usually defined in relation to structure. For example, in
terms of structure/actor contingencies. The structures provide the
background that bind us. Remarkably, Mark, we no longer define these
communalities philosophically, but sociologically (e.g., Merton, 1942,
about the institutional norms of science). An interesting extension is
that we nowadays not only perceive communality is our biological
origins (as species), but also in terms of communicative layers that we
construct and reproduce as inter-agency (interactions).
The relation with the information issue is not obvious. I worked on
this a bit in the first half of the 90s:
"Structure"/"Action" Contingencies and the Model of Parallel
Distributed Processing,
<http://www.leydesdorff.net/jtsb93/index.htm>Journal for the Theory of
Social Behaviour 23 (1993) 47-77.The Production of Probabilistic
Entropy in Structure/Action Contingency Relations,
<http://www.leydesdorff.net/jses95/jses95.pdf>Journal of Social and
Evolutionary Systems 18 (1995) 339-56.
Best,
Loet
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Loet Leydesdorff
Professor emeritus, University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR)
l...@leydesdorff.net <mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net>;
http://www.leydesdorff.net/
Associate Faculty, SPRU, <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/>University of
Sussex;
Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ. <http://www.zju.edu.cn/english/>,
Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC,
<http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.html>Beijing;
Visiting Fellow, Birkbeck <http://www.bbk.ac.uk/>, University of
London;
http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYAAAAJ&hl=en
From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Bob Logan
Sent: Friday, October 20, 2017 6:11 AM
To: Terrence W. DEACON <dea...@berkeley.edu>
Cc: fis <Fis@listas.unizar.es>
Subject: Re: [Fis] What is “Agent”?
Dear Terry and FIS friends - I agree with all that Terry has said about
agency. I do wish to however to point out that an agent has choice and
a non-agent has no choice. I would suggest that the defining
characteristic of an agent is choice and therefore an agent must be a
living organism and all living organisms are agents. Agents/living
organisms have choice or are capable of choice or agency and they are
the only things that have choice or can interpret information. Abiotic
non-agents do not have information because they have no choice. We
humans can have information about abiotic objects but those objects
themselves do not have that information as they have no mind to be
informed. That includes this email post, it is abiotic an has no
agency. It has information by virtue of you reading it because you are
able to interpret the visual signs with which I have recorded my
thoughts. Marshall McLuhan would add to my comments that “the user is
the content” as well as saying that Shannon’s work was not a theory of
information but a "theory of transportation”. I think of Shannon’s work
in a similar light. I also do not regard Shannon’s work as a theory of
information but it is a theory of signals. Shannon himself said his
theory was not about meaning and I say what is information without
meaning and that therefore Shannon only had a theory of signals.
Another insight of McLuhan’s that of figure and ground is useful to
understand why we have so many different definitions of information.
McLuhan maintained that one could not understand a figure unless one
understood the ground in which it operates in. (McLuhan might have
gotten this idea from his professor at Cambridge, I. A. Richards, who
said that in order to communicate one needs to feedforward [he coined
the term btw] the context of what one is communicating.) The different
definitions of information we have considered are a result of the
different contexts in which the term information is used. We should
also keep in mind that all words are metaphors and metaphor literally
means to carry across, derived from the Greek meta (literally ‘across')
and phorein (literally 'to carry'). So the word information has been
carried across from one domain or area of interest to another. It
entered the English language as the noun associated with the verb 'to
inform', i.e. to form the mind. Here is an excerpt from my book What Is
Information? (available for free at demopublishing.com):
"Origins of the Concept of Information - We begin our historic survey
of the development of the concept of information with its etymology.
The English word information according to the Oxford English Dictionary
(OED) first appears in the written record in 1386 by Chaucer: 'Whanne
Melibee hadde herd the grete skiles and resons of Dame Prudence, and
hire wise informacions and techynges.' The word is derived from Latin
through French by combining the word inform meaning giving a form to
the mind with the ending “ation” denoting a noun of action. This
earliest definition refers to an item of training or molding of the
mind.” This is why abiotic objects have no information as I claimed
above because they have no mind that can be informed.
I hope that by informing you of the origin of the word information I
have shed some light on our confusion about what is information and why
we have so many definitions of it. It might even shed some light for
that matter as to what is an agent. Got the ticket? If so that makes me
a ticket agent. I hope you get the joke. all the best - Bob
______________________
Robert K. Logan
Prof. Emeritus - Physics - U. of Toronto
Fellow University of St. Michael's College
Chief Scientist - sLab at OCAD
http://utoronto.academia.edu/RobertKLogan
www.researchgate.net/profile/Robert_Logan5/publications
https://www.physics.utoronto.ca/people/homepages/logan/
On Oct 19, 2017, at 7:11 PM, Terrence W. DEACON <dea...@berkeley.edu>
wrote:
AUTONOMOUS AGENCY: The definition I propose for autonomous agency It is
open to challenge. Of course, there are many ways that we use the term
'agent' in more general and metaphoric ways. I am, however, interested
in the more fundamental conception that these derived uses stem from. I
do not claim that this definition is original, but rather that it is
what we implicitly understand by the concept. So if this is not your
understanding I am open to suggestions for modification.
I should add that it has been a recent goal of my work to describe an
empirically testable simplest model system that satisfies this
definition. Those of you who are familiar with my work will recognize
that this is what I call an autogenic or teleodynamic system. In this
context, however, it is only the adequacy of the definition that I am
interested in exploring. As in many of the remarks of others on this
topic it is characterized by strange-loop recursivity, self-reference,
and physicality. And it may be worth while describing how this concept
is defined by e.g. Hofstadter, von Foerster, Luhmann, Moreno, Kauffman,
Barad, and others, to be sure that we have covered the critical
features and haven't snuck in any "demons". In my definition, I have
attempted to avoid any cryptic appeal to observers or unexamined
teleological properties, because my purpose is instead to provide a
constructive definition of what these properties entail and why they
are essential to a full conception of information.
CENTRALITY OF NORMATIVE PROPERTIES: A critical factor when discussing
agency is that it is typically defined with respect to "satisfaction
conditions" or "functions" or "goals" or other NORMATIVE properties.
Normative properties are all implicitly teleological. They are
irrelevant to chemistry and physics. The concept of an "artificial
agent" may not require intrinsic teleology (e.g. consider thermostats
or guidance systems - often described as teleonomic systems) but the
agentive properties of such artifacts are then implicitly parasitic on
imposed teleology provided by some extrinsic agency. This is of course
implicit also in the concepts of 'signal' and 'noise' which are central
to most information concepts. These are not intrinsic properties of
information, but are extrinsically imposed distinctions (e.g. noise as
signal to the repair person). So I consider the analysis of agency and
its implicit normativity to be a fundamental issue to be resolved in
our analysis of information. Though we can still bracket any
consideration of agency from many analyses my simply assuming it (e.g.
assumed users, interpreters, organisms and their functions, etc.), but
this explicitly leaves a critical defining criterion outside the
analysis. In these cases, we should just be clear that in doing so we
have imported unexplained boundary conditions into the analysis by
fiat. Depending on the goal of the analysis (also a teleological
factor) this may be unimportant. But the nature and origin of agency
and normativity remain foundational questions for any full theory of
information.
On Thu, Oct 19, 2017 at 12:47 PM, Stanley N Salthe
<ssal...@binghamton.edu> wrote:
Here is an interesting recent treatment of autonomy.
Alvaro Moreno and Matteo Mossio: Biological Autonomy: A Philosophical
and Theoretical Enquiry (History, Philosophy and Theory of the Life
Sciences 12);
Springer, Dordrecht, 2015, xxxiv + 221 pp., $129 hbk, ISBN
978-94-017-9836-5
STAN
On Thu, Oct 19, 2017 at 11:44 AM, Terrence W. DEACON
<dea...@berkeley.edu> wrote:
AN AUTONOMOUS AGENT IS A DYNAMICAL SYSTEM ORGANIZED TO BE CAPABLE OF
INITIATING PHYSICAL WORK TO FURTHER PRESERVE THIS SAME CAPACITY IN
THE CONTEXT OF INCESSANT EXTRINSIC AND/OR INTRINSIC TENDENCIES FOR
THIS SYSTEM CAPACITY TO DEGRADE.
THIS ENTAILS A CAPACITY TO ORGANIZE WORK THAT IS SPECIFICALLY
CONTRAGRADE TO THE FORM OF THIS DEGRADATIONAL INFLUENCE, AND THUS
ENTAILS A CAPACITY TO BE INFORMED BY THE EFFECTS OF THAT INFLUENCE
WITH RESPECT TO THE AGENT’S CRITICAL ORGANIZATIONAL CONSTRAINTS.
On Wed, Oct 18, 2017 at 6:00 PM, Koichiro Matsuno
<cxq02...@nifty.com> wrote:
On 19 Oct 2017 at 6:42 AM, Alex Hankey wrote:
the actual subject has to be non-reducible and fundamental to our
universe.
This view is also supported by Conway-Kochen’s free will theorem
(2006). If (a big IF, surely) we admit that our fellows can freely
exercise their free will, it must be impossible to imagine that the
atoms and molecules lack their share of the similar capacity. For
our bodies eventually consist of those atoms and molecules.
Moreover, the exercise of free will on the part of the
constituent atoms and molecules could come to implement the
centripetality of Bob Ulanowicz at long last under the guise of
chemical affinity unless the case would have to forcibly be
dismissed.
This has been my second post this week.
Koichiro Matsuno
From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Alex
Hankey
Sent: Thursday, October 19, 2017 6:42 AM
To: Arthur Wist <arthur.w...@gmail.com>; FIS Webinar
<Fis@listas.unizar.es>
Subject: Re: [Fis] What is “Agent”?
David Chalmers's analysis made it clear that if agents exist, then
they are as fundamental to the universe as electrons or
gravitational mass.
Certain kinds of physiological structure support 'agents' - those
emphasized by complexity biology. But the actual subject has to be
non-reducible and fundamental to our universe.
Alex
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--
Professor Terrence W. Deacon
University of California, Berkeley
_______________________________________________
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--
Professor Terrence W. Deacon
University of California, Berkeley
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