Dear Plamen and colleagues, What you propose is an excellent initiative, besides the multidisciplinary nature of that compilation may inspire a genuine dialog on today's sciences and phenomenology.
As for Marcos' response, he is quite right (my hurried message was not very accurate with some wordings). Best vacations to all, --Pedro BlackBerry de movistar, allí donde estés está tu oficin@ -----Original Message----- From: "Dr. Plamen L. Simeonov" <plamen.l.simeo...@gmail.com> Sender: Fis <fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es> Date: Sun, 2 Aug 2015 09:54:44 To: Loet Leydesdorff<l...@leydesdorff.net> Cc: fis<fis@listas.unizar.es> Subject: Re: [Fis] Answer to Mark. Phenomenology and Speculative Realism Dear colleagues, I think that this discussion about phenomenology, or better said "phenomenological philosophy", is essential, but may go in the wrong direction. As for the common grounds that Loet addressed in his note, I assume that some of us are continuing the path of Varela’s naturalisation of phenomenology. If you are a bit patient, you can see the results of our effort in this direction by the end of the year: http://www.journals.elsevier.com/progress-in-biophysics-and-molecular-biology/call-for-papers/special-theme-issue-on-integral-biomathics-life-sciences-mat/ This special volume is a collection of 41 papers discussing the aspects of phenomenological philosophy in mathematics, physics, biology and biosemiotics, incl. FIS contributors (Marijuan, Matsuno, Marchal, Goranson) and other prominent scientists representing their fields. I suggest to continue this discussion next year on the grounds of this volume. Best wishes, Plamen On Sun, Aug 2, 2015 at 9:09 AM, Loet Leydesdorff <l...@leydesdorff.net> wrote: > Dear colleagues, > > > > Without wishing to defend Husserl, let me try to formulate what is > according to my knowledge core to his contribution. The message is that the > transcendental intersubjectivity is phenomenologically present in our > reality. He therefore returns to Descartes' (much rejected) distinction > between *res extensa* and *res cogitans*. Intersubjectivity is *res > cogitans*. It is not "being" like in the Latin *esse*, but it remains > reflexively available. Thus, we cannot test it. The philosophy of science > which follows (in "*The Crisis*") is anti-positivistic. The > intersubjectivity is constructed and we live in these constructions. > > > > Descartes focused on the subjective *Cogito*. According to him, we meet > in the doubting, the Other as not limited and biologically constrained, > that is, God or the Transcendency. Husserl shifts the attention to the > *cogitatum*: that about what we are in doubt. We no longer find a hold in > Transcendency, but we find the other as other persons. Persons relate to > one another not only in "being", but also in terms of expectations. This > was elaborated as "dual contingency" (among others, by Parsons). The > dynamics of inter-personal expectations, for example, drive scholarly > discourses, but also stock exchanges. > > > > Alfred Schutz was a student and admirer of Husserl, but he did not accept > the Cartesian duality implied. He writes: "As long as we are born from > mothers ..." He then developed sociological phenomenology (Luckmann and > others), which begins with the meta-individual phenomena. This is close to > Mannheim's position: one cannot analyze the content of the sciences > sociologically, but only the manifestations. The strong program in the > sociology of science (SSK: sociology of scientific knowledge) positioned > that socio-cognitive interests can explain the substantive development of > the sciences (Bloor, Barnes, and others) in the 1970s. It returns to a kind > of materialism. > > > > Luhmann "criticized" Husserl for not taking the next step and to consider > meaning ("*Sinn*") as constructed in and by communication. In my opinion, > this is an important step because it opens the realm of a communication > theory based on interhuman interactions as different from basing theories > (micro-foundationally) on human agency (e.g., the *homo economicus* or > agent-based modelling). The communications can be considered as first-order > attributes to agents; the analysis of communications is in terms of > second-order attributes; for example, codes of communication. This is very > much the domain of the information sciences (although Luhmann did not see > this connection). > > > > In sum, “phenomenological” is sometimes used as an appeal to return to the > phenomena without invoking explaining principles *a priori*. The > question, however, remains whether our intuitions, imaginations, etc. are > also part of this “reality”. Are they limited (constrained; enabled?) by > material conditions or epi-phenomenological consequences of them? Husserl’s > critique of the modern sciences was the reduction of the very concept of > “reality” to *res extensa* (that what “is”). Derivatives of *esse* such > as ontology dominate the scene. Shannon-type information, however, is the > *expected* uncertainty in a distribution. Thus, we stand on common ground > that does not exist. J > > > > Note that this discussion is different from the one about “being” versus > “becoming” (Prigogine), but also shares some aspects with it. Is > “life”/biology considered as a monad different from physics that studies > “nature” as a given? How can one perhaps distinguish scientific domains in > these terms? > > > > Best, > > Loet > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Robert E. > Ulanowicz > Sent: Sunday, August 02, 2015 1:04 AM > To: Joseph Brenner > Cc: fis > Subject: Re: [Fis] Answer to Mark. Phenomenology and Speculative Realism > > > > Dear Joseph et al., > > > > I'm afraid I can't comment on the adequacy Husserlian phenomenology, as I > never could get very far into Hursserl. I would just add that there is also > a variety of phenomenology associated with thermodynamics and engineering. > > > > The generic meaning of phenomenology is the study of phenomena in > abstraction of their eliciting causes. This applies to almost all of > classical thermodynamics and much of engineering. The idea is to describe > the behavior of systems in quantitative fashion. If the resulting > mathematical description proves reliable, it becomes a phenomenological > description. PV=nRT is such a description. Too often physicists try to > identify thermodynamics with statistical mechanics, an action that is > vigorously eschewed by engineers, who claim the field as their own. > > > > I have spent most of my career with the phenomenology of quantified > networks, where phenomena such as intersubjectivity (if I correctly > understand what is meant by the term) thoroughly pervades events. > > > > Of course, I'm feathering my own nest when I say that I believe that the > only *current* fruitful way to approach systems biology is via such > phenomenology! (See Section 3 in > > <http://people.clas.ufl.edu/ulan/files/Reckon.pdf>.) > > > > The best, > > Bob > > > > > Dear Mark, > > > > > > Thank you for this note, which points correctly to the fact that there > > > was something missing in the debate. Intersubjectivity is a good word > > > for it, but phenomenology in general is probably no longer the answer, > > > if it ever was. Check out the new book by Tom Sparrow, The End of > > > Phenomenology, Edinburgh, 2014; Sparrow is a key player in a new > > > 'movement' called Speculative Realism which is proposed as a replacement. > > > > > > What does this have to do with information? I think a great deal and > > > worth a new debate, even in extremis. The problem with Husserlian > > > phenomenology is that it fails to deliver an adequate picture of > > > reality, but speculative realism is too anti-scientific to do any > > > better. What I think is possible, however, is to reconcile the key > > > insights of Heidegger with science, especially, with information > > > science. This places information science in a proper intersubjective > context where its utility can be seen. > > > For discussion, I hope. > > > > > > Best, > > > > > > Joseph > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Fis mailing list > > Fis@listas.unizar.es > > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > > _______________________________________________ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > >
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