Caro Terry estensibile a tutti, è sempre un piacere leggerTi e capirTi. La general theory of information è preceduta da un sistema (o semiotica) di significazione e seguita da un sistema (o semiotica ) di comunicazione. Tranne che quando si ha un processo comunicativo come il passaggio di un Segnale (che non significa necessariamente 'un segno') da una Fonte, attraverso un Trasmettitore, lungo un Canale, a un Destinatario. In un processo tra macchina e macchina il segnale non ha alcun potere 'significante'. In tal caso non si ha significazione anche se si può dire che si ha passaggio di informazione. Quando il destinatario è un essere umano (e non è necessario che la fonte sia anch'essa un essere umano) si è in presenza di un processo di significazione. Un sistema di significazione è una costruzione semiotica autonoma, indipendente da ogni possibile atto di comunicazione che l'attualizzi. Invece ogni processo di comunicazione tra esseri umani -- o tra ogni tipo di apparato o struttura 'intelligente, sia meccanico che biologico, -- presuppone un sistema di significazione come propria o specifica condizione. In conclusione, è possibile avere una semiotica della significazione indipendente da una semiotica della comunicazione; ma è impossibile stabilire una semiotica della comunicazione indipendente da una semiotica della significazione. Ho appreso molto da Umberto Eco a cui ho dedicato il capitolo 10. Umberto Eco e il processo di re-interpretazione e re-incantamento della scienza economica (pp. 175-217) di "Valore e valutazioni. La scienza dell'economia o l'economia della scienza" (FrancoAngeli, Milano, 1997). Nello mio stesso libro si trovano: - il capitolo 15. Semiotica economico-estimativa (pp. 327-361) che si colloca nel quadro di una teoria globale di tutti i sistemi di significazione e i processi di comunicazione; - il sottoparagrafo 5.3.3 La psicologia genetica di Jean Piaget e la neurobiologia di Humberto Maturana e Francesco Varela. una nuova epistemologia sperimentale della qualità e dell'unicità (pp. 120-130). Chiedo scusa a Tutti se Vi ho stancati o se ancora una volta il mio scrivere in lingua italiana Vi crea qualche problema. Penso che il dono che mi fate è, a proposito della QUALITA' e dell'UNICITA', molto più grande del (per)dono che Vi chiedo. Grazie. Un saluto affettuoso. Francecso
2018-02-07 23:02 GMT+01:00 Terrence W. DEACON <dea...@berkeley.edu>: > Dear FISers, > > In previous posts I have disparaged using language as the base model for > building a general theory of information. > Though I realize that this may seem almost heretical, it is not a claim > that all those who use linguistic analogies are wrong, only that it can be > causally misleading. > I came to this view decades back in my research into the neurology and > evolution of the human language capacity. > And it became an orgnizing theme in my 1997 book The Symbolic Species. > Early in the book I describe what I (and now other evolutionary > biologists) have come to refer to as a "porcupine fallacy" in evolutionary > thinking. > Though I use it to critique a misleading evolutionary taxonomizing > tendency, I think it also applies to biosemiotic and information theoretic > thinking as well. > So to exemplify my reasoning (with apologies for quoting myself) I append > the following excerpt from the book. > > "But there is a serious problem with using language as the model for > analyzing other > > species’ communication in hindsight. It leads us to treat every other form > of communication as > > exceptions to a rule based on the one most exceptional and divergent case. > No analytic method > > could be more perverse. Social communication has been around for as long > as animals have > > interacted and reproduced sexually. Vocal communication has been around at > least as long as frogs > > have croaked out their mating calls in the night air. Linguistic > communication was an afterthought, > > so to speak, a very recent and very idiosyncratic deviation from an > ancient and well-established > > mode of communicating. It cannot possibly provide an appropriate model > against which to assess > > other forms of communication. It is the rare exception, not the rule, and > a quite anomalous > > exception at that. It is a bit like categorizing birds’ wings with respect > to the extent they possess or > > lack the characteristics of penguins’ wings, or like analyzing the types > of hair on different mammals > > with respect to their degree of resemblance to porcupine quills. It is an > understandable > > anthropocentric bias—perhaps if we were penguins or porcupines we might > see more typical wings > > and hair as primitive stages compared to our own more advanced > adaptations—but it does more to > > obfuscate than clarify. Language is a derived characteristic and so should > be analyzed as an > > exception to a more general rule, not vice versa." > > > Of course there will be analogies to linguistic forms. > > This is inevitable, since language emerged from and is supported by a vast > nonlinguistic semiotic infrastructure. > > So of course it will inherit much from less elaborated more fundamental > precursors. > > And our familiarity with language will naturally lead us to draw insight > from this more familiar realm. > > I just worry that it provides an elaborate procrustean model that assumes > what it endeavors to explain. > > > Regards to all, Terry > > > > On Wed, Feb 7, 2018 at 11:04 AM, Jose Javier Blanco Rivero < > javierwe...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> In principle I agree with Terry. I have been thinking of this, though I >> am still not able to make a sound formulation of the idea. Still I am >> afraid that if I miss the chance to make at least a brief formulation of it >> I will lose the opportunity to make a brainstorming with you. So, here it >> comes: >> >> I have been thinking that a proper way to distinguish the contexts in >> which the concept of information acquires a fixed meaning or the many >> contexts on which information can be somehow observed, is to make use of >> the distinction between medium and form as developed by N. Luhmann, D. >> Baecker and E. Esposito. I have already expressed my opinion in this group >> that what information is depends on the system we are talking about. But >> the concept of medium is more especific since a complex system ussualy has >> many sources and types of information. >> So the authors just mentioned, a medium can be broadly defined as a set >> of loosely coupled elements. No matter what they are. While a Form is a >> temporary fixed coupling of a limited configuration of those elements. >> Accordingly, we can be talking about DNA sequences which are selected by >> RNA to form proteins or to codify a especific instruction to a determinate >> cell. We can think of atoms forming a specific kind of matter and a >> specific kind of molecular structure. We can also think of a vocabulary or >> a set of linguistic conventions making possible a meaningful utterance or >> discourse. >> The idea is that the medium conditions what can be treated as >> information. Or even better, each type of medium produces information of >> its own kind. >> According to this point of view, information cannot be transmitted. It >> can only be produced and "interpreted" out of the specific difference that >> a medium begets between itself and the forms that take shape from it. A >> medium can only be a source of noise to other mediums. Still, media can >> couple among them. This means that media can selforganize in a synergetic >> manner, where they depend on each others outputs or complexity reductions. >> And this also mean that they do this by translating noise into information. >> For instance, language is coupled to writing, and language and writing to >> print. Still oral communication is noisy to written communication. Let us >> say that the gestures, emotions, entonations, that we make when talking >> cannot be copied as such into writing. In a similar way, all the social >> practices and habits made by handwriting were distorted by the introduction >> of print. From a technical point of view you can codify the same message >> orally, by writing and by print. Still information and meaning are not the >> same. You can tell your girlfriend you love her. That interaction face to >> face where the lovers look into each others eye, where they can see if the >> other is nervous, is trembling or whatever. Meaning (declaring love and >> what that implies: marriage, children, and so on) and information (he is >> being sincere, she can see it in his eye; he brought her to a special >> place, so he planned it, and so on) take a very singular and untranslatable >> configuration. If you write a letter you just can say "I love you". You >> shall write a poem or a love letter. Your beloved would read it alone in >> her room and she would have to imagine everything you say. And imagination >> makes information and meaning to articulate quite differently as in oral >> communication. It is not the same if you buy a love card in the kiosk and >> send it to her. Maybe you compensate the simplicity of your message by >> adding some chocolates and flowers. Again, information (jumm, lets see what >> he bought her) and meaning are not the same. I use examples of social >> sciences because that is my research field, although I have the intuition >> that it could also work for natural sciences. >> >> Best, >> >> JJ >> El feb 7, 2018 10:47 AM, "Sungchul Ji" <s...@pharmacy.rutgers.edu> >> escribió: >> >>> Hi FISers, >>> >>> >>> On 10/8/2017, Terry wrote: >>> >>> >>> " So basically, I am advocating an effort to broaden our discussions >>> and recognize that the term information applies in diverse ways to many >>> different contexts. And because of this it is important to indicate the >>> framing, whether physical, formal, biological, phenomenological, >>> linguistic, etc. >>> . . . . . . The classic syntax-semantics-pragmatics distinction >>> introduced by Charles Morris has often been cited in this respect, though >>> it too is in my opinion too limited to the linguistic paradigm, and may be >>> misleading when applied more broadly. I have suggested a parallel, less >>> linguistic (and nested in Stan's subsumption sense) way of making the >>> division: i.e. into intrinsic, referential, and normative >>> analyses/properties of information." >>> >>> I agree with Terry's concern about the often overused linguistic >>> metaphor in defining "information". Although the linguistic metaphor has >>> its limitations (as all metaphors do), it nevertheless offers a unique >>> advantage as well, for example, its well-established categories of >>> functions (see the last column in *Table 1*.) >>> >>> The main purpose of this post is to suggest that all the varied theories >>> of information discussed on this list may be viewed as belonging to the >>> same category of ITR (Irreducible Triadic Relation) diagrammatically >>> represented as the 3-node closed network in the first column of *Table >>> 1*. >>> >>> *Table 1.* The postulated universality of ITR (Irreducible Triadic >>> Relation) as manifested in information theory, semiotics, cell language >>> theory, and linguistics. >>> >>> *Category Theory* >>> >>> >>> * f g* >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> * A -----> B ------> C | ^ >>> | | |______________| ** h* >>> >>> >>> >>> *ITR (Irreducible Triadic Relation**)* >>> >>> *Deacon’s theory of information* >>> >>> *Shannon’s* >>> >>> *Theory of* >>> >>> *information* >>> >>> *Peirce’s theory of signs* >>> >>> *Cell language theory* >>> >>> >>> *Human language (Function)* >>> >>> A >>> >>> *Intrinsic *information >>> >>> Source >>> >>> Object >>> >>> Nucleotides*/ >>> Amion acids >>> >>> Letters >>> (Building blocks) >>> >>> B >>> >>> *Referential *information >>> >>> Message >>> >>> Sign >>> >>> Proteins >>> >>> Words >>> (Denotation) >>> >>> C >>> >>> *Normative *information >>> >>> Receiver >>> >>> Interpretant >>> >>> Metabolomes >>> (Totality of cell metabolism) >>> >>> Systems of words >>> (Decision making & Reasoning) >>> >>> f >>> >>> ? >>> >>> Encoding >>> >>> Sign production >>> >>> Physical laws >>> >>> Second articulation >>> >>> g >>> >>> ? >>> >>> Decoding >>> >>> Sign interpretation >>> >>> Evoutionary selection >>> >>> First and Third articulation >>> >>> h >>> >>> ? >>> >>> Information flow >>> >>> Information flow >>> >>> Inheritance >>> >>> Grounding/ >>> >>> Habit >>> *Scale* *Micro-Macro?* *Macro* *Macro* *Micro* *Macro* >>> >>> *There may be more than one genetic alphabet of 4 nucleotides. >>> According to the "multiple genetic alphabet hypothesis', there are n >>> genetic alphabets, each consisting of 4^n letters, each of which in >>> turn consisting of n nucleotides. In this view, the classical genetic >>> alphabet is just one example of the n alphabets, i.e., the one with n = 1. >>> When n = 3, for example, we have the so-called 3rd-order genetic alphabet >>> with 4^3 = 64 letters each consisting of 3 nucleotides, resulting in the >>> familiar codon table. Thus, the 64 genetic codons are not words as widely >>> thought (including myself until recently) but letters! It then follows >>> that proteins are words and metabolic pathways are sentences. >>> Finally, the transient network of metbolic pathways (referred to as >>> "hyperstructures" by V. Norris in 1999 and as "hypermetabolic pathways" by >>> me more recently) correspond to texts essential to represent >>> arguement/reasoning/computing. What is most exciting is the recent >>> discovery in my lab at Rutgers that the so-called "Planck-Shannon plots" of >>> mRNA levels in living cells can identify function-dependent "hypermetabolic >>> pathways" underlying breast cancer before and after drug >>> treatment (manuscript under review). >>> >>> Any comments, questions, or suggestions would be welcome. >>> >>> Sung >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Fis mailing list >>> Fis@listas.unizar.es >>> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis >>> >>> >> _______________________________________________ >> Fis mailing list >> Fis@listas.unizar.es >> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis >> >> > > > -- > Professor Terrence W. Deacon > University of California, Berkeley > > _______________________________________________ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > >
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