Kebetulan di perjalanan kemaren saya membaca tanggapan dari Romo Magnis di koran yang sama atas tulisan ini. Saya coba tuliskan lagi bagain-bagian yang penting:
Pemerintah Timor Leste menyadari bahwa sejak kemerdekaannya diakui dunia, tidak sekalipun pemerintah RI maupun TNI mengganggu atau memprovokasi tetangganya yang mini itu, biarpun aneka kekacauan yang terjadi di sana sebenarnya bisa dijadikan alasan untuk menduduki Timor Leste kembali. Buat pemerintah Timor Leste tindakan (atau tidak adanya tindakan) TNI tersebut adalah bukti tanggung jawab yang luar biasa; "a remarkable act of responsibility", kata Romo Magnis. Selama 24 tahun korban maupun janda korban perang di Timor Timur "terhibur" dengan perlakuan pemerintah terhadap mereka sebagai pahlawan yang gugur demi nusa dan bangsa. Nah, setelah kemerdekaan Timor Leste, tiba-tiba para korban perang tersebut hendak diubah statusnya dari pahlawan menjadi tentara pendudukan ataupun sebagai penjahat perang. Akan banyak bagian dari Bangsa Indonesia maupun TNI khususnya yang tersakiti kalau KKP berjalan seperti maunya bapak Aboeprijadi ini. Karena itu, pemerintah Timor Leste juga berusaha agar Indonesia maupun TNI jangan sampai kehilangan muka lagi, merusak hubungan baik kedua negara dan mengekspos Timor Leste ke aneka provokasi maupun pembalasan dari TNI di masa depan. Butuh waktu lama untuk mengakui semua kejahatan yang kita lakukan. Bangsa Jepang pun sesudah 60 tahun lebih berlalu masih belum bisa mengakui kejahatannya di PD II. **Akhir ringkasan Ini tentunya bukan pembenaran terhadap impunitas, tapi lebih ke gambaran alangkah rumitnya masalah ini. Andi --- In [email protected], "tossi20" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > http://www.thejakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp? fileid=20070501.F05 > > > Timor Leste 1999 or, how to sell lies > > > The Jakarta Post, Opinion and Editorial - May 01, 2007 > > Aboeprijadi Santoso, Amsterdam > > > > The horrendous crimes committed in East Timor in 1999 continue to > haunt Indonesia. Just as the third round of the Joint Indonesia- Timor > Leste Commission for Truth and Friendship (CTF) was about to begin, > the United Nations sent a message of disapproval about the CTF's idea > of offering amnesty in exchange of the revealing of the truth by the > perpetrators. > > That was the reason the UN chose not to send the former head of > UNAMET, Ian Martins, to testify before the commission; earlier, the > UN > has proposed that a commission of experts review the case. The sense > of injustice and troubled conscience about the lies surrounding the > matter has long been shared by victims, journalists and observers, > who > suffered or witnessed the carnage. > > Asked about the meaning of the UN's letter, the CTF co-chairman, > Benjamin Mangkoedilaga, said he respected the UN's position, but > added > that he considered the UN's official letter to reflect Martins' > attitude, rather than the UN's as an institution. Yet, he expressed > pride that the UN had responded to the CTF's invitation, and hoped > the > ex-UNAMET chief would reconsider his refusal to attend the hearing. > > Benjamin's contradictory statement ("a UN letter", but representing a > person, rather than the organization) is a conspicuous expression of > uneasiness in addressing the question of accountability for the > violence perpetrated by some of his country's institutions. > > After all, Dili was sent back to "Year Zero" within a week, compared > to Cambodia under Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge regime in the 1970s, when the > same process was "achieved" within two years. It marked the end of > Indonesia's decades-long illegal occupation of its tiny neighbor. > About 1,400 victims were killed (including three journalists), > hundreds of thousands persecuted and deported to the west, women > raped, and the country's basic infrastructure destroyed as Indonesian > troops prepared to leave the country. > > A number of generals, officials and militiamen were indicted, yet all > but one were released. > > Impunity reigns. Now, almost a decade later, neither Indonesia nor > Timor Leste wants to even touch the issue. Unlike in the recent past, > the international community has decided to treat the matter as a > bilateral affair between the two countries -- in marked contrast to > the Bosnia-Hercegovina case in the 1990s, which led to U.S. bombing > and the ongoing international tribunal on the ex-Yugoslavia, which > prosecutes and punishes the authors and perpetrators of the violence. > > In other words, the entire outcome is being dictated by geopolitics. > Not justice, but the geopolitics of inequality in international > relationships has decided to permit impunity, regardless of the > victims. The CTF, too, is a product of this. > > Worse still, the crimes of 1999 were artificially separated from the > gross human rights violations that preceded them, despite the fact > that the 1999 events could only occur as a result of a decades-long > brutal military occupation. > > The September mayhem obviously was just the tip of the iceberg. The > great crimes of the 1970s -- the invasion, Matebian annihilation, > Kraras killings, to mention but a few -- have been extensively > described by no less than eight thousand East Timorese and published > by the UN-commissioned CAVR. > > Neither Jakarta, Dili nor the UN Security Council was willing to > respond to the report, which could have opened the way toward some > sort of internationally recognized tribunal. The geopolitical dictate > has turned into a big-states conspiracy to avoid an international > tribunal on East Timor. > > Yet neither the UN nor, for that matter, Portugal, are innocent. The > roots of the matter go back to the May 5 New York Agreement. Since > the > occupied country of East Timor was defined as one of a "non-self > governing territory", all Indonesia had to do in 1999 was to return > to > the status-quo-ante. > > This means that while Indonesia would have remained sovereign in East > Timor, it would allow the UN to hold a "popular consultation" (an > euphemism for a referendum) in order to resolve the final status of > the territory. > > As a result, the entire responsibility for the security was > entrusted, > not to a UN force, but to the Indonesian security apparatus, i.e., > the > Police, which was previously part of the armed forces (ABRI) and by > then, certainly in East Timor, was under the command of the Army. All > the UN and Portugal contributed was the Commission of Peace and > Stability (KPS), which was to preside over the maintenance of peace > and stability. > > However, the reality in East Timor throughout May to September 1999 > contradicted all aspects of this. The Army, in effect, instructed the > Police to turned a blind eye to militia violence. I was able to leave > Dili on Sept. 6, while the group of Indonesian observers I belonged > to > were forced to wander around the country to seek refuge while > continuing to be under threat. > > There were abundant witnesses to the killings and deportations by > Army-sponsored militias, which were only made possible as extra > troops > and militiamen arrived Sept. 4, the day the UN announced the > pro-independence victory. > > Crucially, the members of the KPS, which was supposed to monitor the > situation, had left the country even earlier. While UNAMET staff were > held hostage, Benjamin, who was a KPS member, admitted that he left > on > Sept. 3, while other members and officials, including Djoko > Soegijanto, B.N. Marbun, Koesparmono Irsan and Dino Pati Djalal, > departed on Sept. 1. "What could we do? We were instructed by the > military authorities to leave the country!" Benjamin honestly > admitted. > > How could the military order officials and journalists to leave Timor > only a few days before the carnage started when they, at the same > time, argued, as they always did, that the violence was a result of > uncontrolled "civil war"? > > In other words, it was all part of the plan and the game. And the > game > was from the outset shaped by political engineering, dubious > assumptions and myths to justify the aggression, occupation and > atrocities, which ranged from the mid-1975 attacks by "Timorese > volunteers", a "civil war" among East Timorese that supposedly > continued until 1999, and the many proclamations of integration by a > tiny minority of pro-Jakarta Timorese, which culminated in the 1976 > East Timor Integration Law. > > These shameful lies also need to be looked at. While truth and > friendship are necessary and important for both Indonesia and Timor > Leste, a real friendship should not be based on lies to cover the > truth and perpetuate the impunity. > > The writer is a journalist with Radio Netherlands. >
