On Thu, 2003-07-24 at 21:51, Leo Bicknell wrote: > In a message written on Thu, Jul 24, 2003 at 12:48:23PM -0700, Tim Kientzle wrote: > > Another approach would be to add a new option to SSH > > so that it could encrypt only the initial authentication, > > then pass data unencrypted after that. This would > > go a long way to addressing the performance concerns. > > ssh -c none?
[EMAIL PROTECTED]:~$ uname -srm FreeBSD 5.1-RELEASE i386 [EMAIL PROTECTED]:~$ ssh -c none localhost No valid ciphers for protocol version 2 given, using defaults. Nice idea. OpenSSH has deliberately broken this, and last time I looked will not entertain unbreaking it. The patch is trivial, though. > Note, you don't want to use password authentication in this case, but > public key should still be ok. _______________________________________________ [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-hackers To unsubscribe, send any mail to "[EMAIL PROTECTED]"
