On Wed, Dec 27, 2000 at 07:59:36PM -0600, Mark J. Roberts wrote:
> On Thu, 28 Dec 2000, Oskar Sandberg wrote:
< >
> > Again no. The KSK should never be used to return to a site when one has
> > the option of remembering the secure subspace key. KSKs can, and will, be
> > cancered, replaced on route, lost and replaced by somebody else, etc etc.
>
> To summarize my statements in another post:
>
> 1) KSKs are most likely to be subverted the first time you request
> them. Subsequent requests will likely be found in your node's store,
> because KSK redirects are so small. Remembering Mallory's SSK accomplishes
> nothing except creating a false sense of security.
Most likely is not good enough. A user can, at any given time, make the
decision that they don't need to bother with security, but if we make the
system inherently insecure then we are making that call for everyone all
the time.
> 2) If Freenet is to grow we need simple guessable keys to make users
> feel comfortable. After Freenet is well-established, we can deprecate KSKs
> entirely and encourage secure links from trusted, reliable sources.
I am not saying that KSKs should not be used, I am saying that they should
never contain more than a plane redirect to any and all the essential data
so that documents on Freenet can be linked to and bookmarked securely.
Nothing that you have suggested is impossible or even more difficult
for the user within that constraint.
>
>
> --
> Mark Roberts
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>
>
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--
'DeCSS would be fine. Where is it?'
'Here,' Montag touched his head.
'Ah,' Granger smiled and nodded.
Oskar Sandberg
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