-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Phil Henshaw wrote: > I think that's a very consistent argument, and very similar to the one > Bohr used as the basis for the Copenhagen convention and dumping > Einstein's idea of the physical world. As I recall, the argument was > that science is information and so nothing exists for science except > what exists as scientific information, and so uncertainties that define > a limit to scientific knowledge also define a limit to any meaningful > scientific reality. So as scientists, reality does not exist beyond > what is knowable. I think it was that slim logical thread that kept the > otherwise very unsatisfying assertion that phenomena are created by our > observations from being tossed out as ridiculous.
Interesting. Your paraphrase certainly seems analogous to what I submitted if information and action are taken as analogous fulcra. But, I'm not sure the analogy is very robust. My argument hinges on action and unity (discretion) where "things" are only things, separate from all the other goo in which we're bathed, by virtue of their being acted upon or acting upon as a unit. Hence, an "emergent thing" is fictitious if it cannot be acted upon separately from the other things to which it's related, including its constituents. For example, an "emergent phenomenon", in order to be a real thing, would have to either act as a unit or be acted upon as a unit. (By "act", I don't mean "ascribed thing-hood by an observer". I mean "does physical work"... moves objects around, generates heat, etc.) Now, personally, I tend to agree with Günther and I don't rely on the word "emergence" for conversations I regard as important. I have yet to see an emergent phenomenon.... and I doubt that I ever will. Of course, that doesn't mean they don't exist. It also doesn't mean that the concept is useless. Unicorns may not exist either; but, it is important that we can think about them and perform thought experiments with them. Given these details (especially the descent into discretion begged by the action requirement), it's hard for me to maintain the analogy between my argument and information as scientific currency. > For most people the question comes down to which way they *like* > thinking about the world, since either one can be made satisfying if > that's what you like... I prefer, and find more productive, thinking > that I'm exploring a world that exists without my knowledge of it, and > is built in such a complicated way that my descriptions will inevitably > be flawed. That's the 'bad' part of it I suppose. It also leaves me > always beginning my learning rather than trying to end it, and open to > being surprised. Yes! You've pointed out an extremely important part of the human condition (and science, as the search for truth). Stated preference is a symptom of the historical accretion of (often accidental) experiences each of us goes through. And so preference is a very important indicator that compresses (a lossy one) lots of information about a person's history into a digestible chunk. The same can be said of a person's actions. When presented with a situation and a suite of possible actions, those actions chosen by the subject are indicators of that person's historical accretion of experiences. Personally, I prefer to flip back and forth amongst various different points of view. I arrogantly think that I can do this purposefully; but, it's probably more accidental than anything else. If I can do it purposefully at all, it's probably more guided by intuition or instinct than anything conscious. Reductionism is useful in many situations. Concepts like "emergence" are useful in many situations. Internal loci of control are sometimes useful, likewise with external loci. Sometimes it's handy for me to think that I created the universe to entertain myself. [grin] And sometimes it's useful for me to think I'm an insignificant spec that can be faithfully modeled as an ideal gas molecule. Such flip-flopping often leads others to think I contradict myself. In reality, it is logically impossible for a person to contradict themselves because all their actions (including statements of preference) flow from their historically accreted experience. The perceived contradictions come because partial models (usually ideal or abstracted) based on one subset of actions often contradict partial models based on some other subset of actions. It's also important to remember that evidence taken via self-reporting is highly suspect (and usually misleading or flawed). So statements of preference are not to be trusted! Hence, though I may _say_ my preference is to flip-flop, it's probably not true. [grin] - -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com Men who are unhappy, like men who sleep badly, are always proud of the fact. -- Bertrand Russell -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.6 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iD8DBQFGeUnKZeB+vOTnLkoRAityAJ9RrKtQrNHD3kZ2FNd1hdtx1wN53wCfTF5X MOLPElbaRRFOGGDPa3tzhTQ= =Zbmx -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
