Nicholas Thompson wrote: Nick,
Difficult books are like difficult men: challenging for a while, but ultimately too much trouble and too little payoff for the effort. Give me effortless elegance every time. Remind me, why are you doing Rosen? And while I'm at it, I haven't had time to read all the chatter about life itself and insight and creativity, but this is one of the most disappointing dialogues yet on friam. The curve of research in neuroscience has exploded, finally beginning a synthesis that includes multiple nodes of knowing (including, Nick, contemplative psychology). Not to mention that quantum ambiguity continues to confound logic. And as humans, we can't STAND not resolving the amibiguity. Reason is the way we operate, we must KNOW. But the "not-knowing" is absent here. (Too Bhuddist for you?) Where in all this discussion is the contemplative inquiry, the extended epistemology? You want to talk about mind and life? Then visit the Mind and Life Institute site. This discussion might have more meaning if you guys were reading Varela and Maturana and Bateson and Boehm. We all agree there is no non-relational reality, but that includes our relationship with "God." Even Stu Kauffman is "Reinventing the Sacred" (while still going after the physicists. I don't get it. You won, Stu, the 21st century is the Age of Biology!) And it looks to me like Ann may be the prophet in your midst. Oh, well, I'll keeping checking in at friam, because as Pablo Cassals the great cellist said when asked at the age of 94 "why do you keep practicing every day?" "Because", he said, "I think I detect signs of improvement." Merle > Phil, > Everybody needs to remember that this is my synopsis of Rosen, not Rosen. > Also, I am starting my synopsis on Chapter Five. I have read the > previous chapters with great care and understand things abut them, but > the synopsis of chapter five will never settle down until somebody has > written synopses to the earlier chapters. > Now substance. I am not sure the word "realize" is causal in Rosen's > lingo. He just means that some tangible object or process in our > worlds has the same formal structure. Am I wrong about this???/ > For him, causality consists of entailments in the world "out there". > If it is the case that hitting the ball entails the ball dissappearing > over the fence, then he would say that the hit caused the ball to fly > over the fence. Physical laws get their implication only when they > display "congruence" with events in the world. This, according to > Rosen, is why Newton can disclaim an interest in causality. Do you > have the book at hand? Am I wrong about this??? > Have I misjudged the group's interest in Rosen? I have imagined by now > that others would be beavering away at synopses of other chapters > and/or been so seduced by my incompetence that they would have taken > over the synopsizing of chapter five. > I dont know any other way to come to understand a difficult book. > Nick > Nicholas S. Thompson > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, > Clark University ([EMAIL PROTECTED] <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>) > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Phil Henshaw <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > *To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;The Friday Morning Applied > Complexity Coffee Group <mailto:friam@redfish.com> > *Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > *Sent:* 8/3/2008 5:36:00 PM > *Subject:* RE: [FRIAM] Rosen, Life Itself > > I find it interesting that he seems to establish the applicability > of his formalism to physical systems with the casual word > “realize” as in “/Any two natural systems that realize this > formalism …” /as if no demonstration was required. There seems to > be no instrumentality for such a transference, the same difficulty > of there being no information input-output device for a human > mind, just each person’s original recreation device. Whenever > natural systems adopt a structure from some other place they do so > by reinventing it for themselves, from scratch, which costs you > your basis of proof it would seem to me. > > *From:* [EMAIL PROTECTED] > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] *On Behalf Of *Nicholas Thompson > *Sent:* Friday, August 01, 2008 1:02 AM > *To:* friam@redfish.com > *Cc:* [EMAIL PROTECTED] > *Subject:* [FRIAM] Rosen, Life Itself > > Dear Anybody Interested in Rosen, > > I have continued to plug away at the task of writing a synopsis of > the crucial chapter 5 of Rosen. As you see if you go look at > > > http://www.sfcomplex.org/wiki/RosenNoodles#Comments_on_chapter_5.2C_Entailment_Without_States:_Relational_Biology > > the chapter is in danger of defeating me. > > Is the passage below any clearer to anybody else than it is to > me??? Because of the difficulties of distinguishing my words from > Rosen;s, reading of the passage below will be GREATLY facilitated > by reading it in HTML. > > Rosen writes, > > "/Now … let us suppose that … [there is a formalism, F] that > describes a set of formal components, interrelated in a particular > way. Any two natural systems that realize this formalism … can > they be said to realize, or manifest, a common organization. Any > material system that shares that organization is by definition a > realization of that organization./" > > Rosen now precedes build such a formalism. > > “/We have by now said enough to clearly specify what the formal > image of a component must be. It must in fact be a mapping (sic!) / > > /“f: A-->B / > > /“This formal image clearly possesses the necessary polar > structure, embodied in the differentiation it imposes between the > domain A of f and its range B. It also posses the necessary > duality; the “identity” of the component is embodied in the > mapping f itself, while the influence of larger systems, O, in > which the component is embedded, is embodied in the specific > arguments in A on which the mapping can operate. / > > /“In what follows, I shall never use the term “function” in its > mathematical sense, as a synonym for mapping; I reserve it > entirely as an expression of the relation of components to systems > and to each other.” p. 123, LI.* */ > > I have reproduced, rather than summarize this passage, because its > meaning is opaque to me. > > The first two paragraphs seem to be saying that components map but > the last paragraph seems to insist that the function of a > component is not to map. What follows in the text is a two-page > orgy of notion in which organization is expressed as a series of > mappings and metamapping in the manner outlined below. Given the > disclaimer in the last sentence above, I haven’t a clue what he > could be saying. > > But when the orgy of notation is over, he is clear about what he > THINKS he has said.… > > /“…organization … involves a family of sets, a corresponding > family of mappings defined on these sets, and above all, the > abstract block diagram that interrelates them, that gives them > functions”. p.126, LI. / > > Nicholas S. Thompson > > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, > > Clark University ([EMAIL PROTECTED] <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>) > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
