It seems to me that "cause" is an extraordinarily slippery word. I'm involved with a group of people who are looking into "Causality in Complex Systems<http://cs.calstatela.edu/wiki/index.php/Causality_in_complex_systems>." One of the things I did while in Australia this summer was attend one or our workshops. After thinking quite a bit about causality and after arguing with a professional Philosopher about what philosophers mean by causality, I've decided to give up using that term. Instead, what I'm interested in are explanations. Even that is a difficult term to define clearly. But it seems a lot less dangerous than *causality*.
Nick can *explain *why a triangle is rigid -- although I am taken by the notion of an "elan triangulaire". But to come up with a "cause" for the rigidity of a triangle? In my view that's just asking for trouble. It's important to acknowledge, though, that Nick's explanation will presumably be predicated on the presumption that the each of the one-by-two sides is itself rigid. What about explaining that? (That's another example of how levevls of abstraction build on other levels of abstraction.) -- Russ_A On Thu, Sep 17, 2009 at 9:02 PM, Nicholas Thompson < [email protected]> wrote: > The seminar met this afternoon, now eight in number. > > I would like to think that I were the sort of person who could summarize > what we accomplished, but alas, I am not, so let me share what was > accomplished for me. I hope others in the group will correct me, > particularly any who are not in Santa FE but who have joined us in our > reading from afar. > > McLaughlin asserts that B.E. was a possible scientific position in the 19 > century but came to an end because quantum mechanics, quantum chemistry, > etc., demonstrated that there were no configurational forces. When we > explain the properties of H20 on the basis of the properties of the > molecules, electrons etc. that make it up we need invoke no new FORCES that > arise from the configuration of the particles. Elementary Newtonian forces > are all we need. But I ended up wondering if all of this was fair to the > Emergentists. After all, Mill spoke not of the composition of forces but of > the composition of causes. Presumably all forces are in some sense causes, > but nobody has yet asserted that all causes are forces. Returning to my > example of the triangle made of hinges and one-by-two's, to explain the > strength of the triangle (by comparison with the relative weakness of the > parallelogram), we need not appeal to any special forces, no "triangular > stubbornness" or "elan triangulaire". On the other hand, if you would make > a structure with hinges and one-by-twos that is strong, you better get at > least one triangle into it. In that sense, the triangular configuration of > the wood pieces is a necessary condition of the structural rigidity (and > perhaps a sufficient one as well?) and hence a CAUSE of the rigidity., in > any sense that I understand cause. In short, McLaughlin does not deny the > existence of configurational CAUSES and such causes are all that is needed > for a robust emergentism. > > Again, I long for comments from others who have read this article. > > Nick > > > Nicholas S. Thompson > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, > Clark University ([email protected]) > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/<http://home.earthlink.net/%7Enickthompson/naturaldesigns/> > > > > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org >
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
