I'm stepping in quite late to answer one of John's questions. He asserted
that what I see is what enters my eyes and what you see is what enters your
eyes, and therefore we never "really" see the same thing. (I am
paraphrasing, obviously.)
I would assert that we are in is a place where "plain language" philosophy
can help us out. Certainly what you see is not what enters your eyes. You
never "see" complex patterns of light, you see THINGS by virtue of your
sensitivity to light. Your perceptual world is full of objects and events,
and those are the things you see, hear, smell, etc. (Invoke James Gibson
here.) This is why we can talk about seeing different sides of "the same
thing", because we agree that we are seeing the same thing.
One big problem in psychology (and epistemology) is that people get a
little bit of scientific knowledge and then they start loosing track of the
thing to be explained. Descartes, for instance, was interested in how we
see the things around us, and he did a perfectly sensible thing: He leaned
about the eye ball. In so doing, he learned that there was an inverted
image on the back of the retina (and for now we will avoid discussion of
how ubiquitous that phenomenon). This was a perfectly legitimate discovery,
and it was reasonable to think that part of the explanation for "how we see
objects" would involve understanding the role of this inverted image.
However, rather than proceed with that, Descartes suddenly started asking
how we see the inverted retinal image. Uhg, so many unnecessary confusions
were created by this poorly conceived question! We need to try to avoid
this.
Incidentally, to belatedly comment on Steve's post: I am of the opinion
that most neuroimaging work in psychology is motivated by similar
confusions. That is not to say that fMRI and EEG can tell us nothing, but
that we are not getting anywhere trying to use it to answer such poorly
conceived questions.
-----------
Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
Lab Manager
Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning
American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A
4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20016
phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190
email: echar...@american.edu
On Sat, Aug 16, 2014 at 10:36 AM, John Kennison <jkenni...@clarku.edu>
wrote:
> Hi Nick,
>
> One of the problems in discussing consciousness is that it seems very hard
> to break it down into simpler concepts. There are what might be called
> "high-level" words such as "inner life", "awareness", "apprehension", which
> suggest consciousness but only to someone who already ha a sense of what
> consciousness is. Whereas low level words, which refer to things that can
> be readily measured do not seem adequate to get at the real meaning of
> consciousness. So we are left with metaphors. When I use words such as
> "access" and "inner life" they suggest a container but they are not
> necessarily used to denote an actual container but to describe a situation
> which has some of the properties of a container.
>
> However, there does seem to be a real container that describes the
> information I have access to. I get raw information from my body. This is
> not to say that my consciousness is located in my body, but that what I
> know about the outside world starts with how my body senses the outside
> world. These senses are then processed or contemplated somehow and this
> results in what I think I know about the world. There is no way that "I can
> see exactly what you see" because what you see comes from your body and
> what I see comes from my body. If we literally mean "see" then what you see
> is what enters your eyes and what I see is what enters my eyes. You might
> tell me about what you see, but that is not the same as seeing what you see
> because what you have seen has been processed by you then reformulated in
> terms of speech, which is then processed by me. Even if we witnessed the
> same event, we would have slightly different viewpoints, and our eyes are
> different, and, in any case, we would start interpreting the incoming rays
> of light as soon as they started to enter our respective eyes.
>
> You also gave examples in which I might infer what you saw. This seems to
> presuppose I have a theory of what Nick is all about or some means of
> making inferences. (I don't have a well-articulated theory of Nick, but I
> do arrive at conclusions about what to make of you. I'm not certain how I
> do this, but I am certain that I do it all the time, quite effortlessly and
> almost automatically.) At any rate this drawing of inferences does not seem
> to be seeing exactly what you see, but a way (not necessarily very
> accurate) of getting a rough approximation of what you saw.
>
> --John
>
> ________________________________________
> From: Friam [friam-boun...@redfish.com] on behalf of Nick Thompson [
> nickthomp...@earthlink.net]
> Sent: Friday, August 15, 2014 9:07 PM
> To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped
> by environment
>
> John,
>
> Ok. I am in. But we have to go slowly, because, as somebody
> famously said, "In philosophy, if you are not moving slowly, you aren't
> moving." Not clear where to start. I don't want to try to defend my
> "insight" that our vernacular understanding of consciousness arises not
> because it is accurate but because it makes society possible. I will say
> in
> its defense only that the McNauton Rule which forms the basis for our
> notion of legal responsibility, states that I can only be considered
> criminally responsible If I know the nature and quality of my own acts.
> This phrase, "knowing nature and quality of one's acts" sounds a heckuva
> lot
> like a definition of [self] consciousness to me.
>
> I thought we perhaps could start with unpacking "interior", since
> it
> appears in both of your messages ("access"). What does it mean to say that
> my thoughts are "inside" me. It ought to mean, if we play the language
> game of "inside" by the rules, that there is some sort of container that my
> thoughts are enclosed within. The use of the word, "access", would seem
> to
> suggest that I have ways of getting at the insides of the "box" to "see" my
> thoughts that you do not have. Perhaps the box is a 5-sided box, and it's
> open side faces me, so I can see inside and you cannot? If that is how
> the
> metaphor works, then you should be able to come around to my side of the
> box and look in examine its contents with me. Or, if my access is provided
> by a key, you should be able to use that key to get inside my box. In
> other
> words, there should be some set of conditions under which you can see
> exactly what I see. Since this entailment of the box metaphor undermines
> the essential privacy of mind, I assume that you would rule it out by, say,
> asserting that only I have the key to my box, and I cannot loan it to you.
>
>
> But now we encounter another problem. I think you would agree that you do
> have some access to the inside of my box, beyond the access that I might
> provide you by telling you what is inside it. Certainly, if I wrote you
> now the words, "I really have no interest in issues in the philosophy of
> mind," you would have every reason to assert that I had misrepresented the
> contents of my box to you. So, to make the metaphor work, we would have to
> imagine that, perhaps it's sides are not entirely opaque, or not opaque all
> the time. Perhaps they are sometimes translucent?
>
> How about a different metaphor altogether? How about the metaphor of
> "point
> of view"? My consciousness is just that what is seen from the point of
> view on the world from where I stand. It is mine only in the sense that it
> is indexed to me, not in the sense that I own it or that it is in me. For
> example, there is a cup on my desk whose inscription is turned toward me so
> that if you were sitting across my desk from me right now, you would not
> "have access to it". The inscription is, "ONLY MUGS PAY POLL TAX." I am
> conscious of it in the sense that my behavior points to it. From your
> point
> of view, my consciousness is just all that my behavior designates. When
> your behavior designates the relations between me and some of the objects
> in
> your environment, you become conscious of what I am conscious. When my
> behavior designates those same relations, I become self-conscious. I
> think
> "self-consciousness is what we are principally arguing about, here.
>
> I hope this answer is somewhat satisfying. Thanks for running me around
> the
> track. I am trying to write some on this subject this summer. I really
> need the exercise.
>
> Best,
>
> Nick
>
>
>
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
> Clark University
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of John Kennison
> Sent: Friday, August 15, 2014 12:52 PM
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by
> environment
>
> Hi Nick,
>
> I certainly don't think of what you said as "rude" --in fact I asked you
> to
> tell what errors you might see in what I said.
> And in any case, I am very glad to agree that we are old friends and can,
> if
> necessary, forgive what might appear as rudeness.
>
> I am willing to accept your conclusion that the words "inner subjective
> life" are not really very useful and do no contribute much to my idea of
> what consciousness is. I don't think I claimed that they are either of
> these
> things.
>
> I am having difficulty seeing the connection between these words and a
> quasi-legal understanding that I and only I get to speak for myself.
> I guess I would say that my sense of what my consciousness is all about
> will be different from yours because I have access to my thoughts and vague
> feelings etc. that differs from the kind of access you have. It's okay with
> me if you speak for myself (so to speak) --and I imagine you will, perhaps
> over the previous sentence. I invite and will (I think) welcome your
> analysis.
>
> --John
>
> ________________________________________
> From: Friam [friam-boun...@redfish.com] on behalf of Nick Thompson
> [nickthomp...@earthlink.net]
> Sent: Friday, August 15, 2014 11:38 AM
> To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'
> Cc: James Laird
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by
> environment
>
> Hi, John,
>
> Nothing like a sober, quiet, good question to knock an old warrior off his
> high horse.
>
> Ok. Now that I am standing on the ground ...
>
> First, let us stipulate, we are talking about self-consciousness, here, ...
> something beyond sentience, right? If so, then I think your question is a
> wonderful example of a "mystery", like we talked about yesterday. A
> mystery
> is a state of pleasurable confusion generated by using words outside their
> realm of usefulness. So, I would predict that if we sat down and unpacked
> "inner", "subjective", and "life" we would discover that these words have
> really nothing to contribute beyond the assertion that "I, and only I, get
> to speak for me." In other words, under your use of "consciousness", it
> is
> really a quasi-legal understanding central to human interaction that, in
> the
> absence of a legal certification of incompetence, our assertions about our
> own needs, wants, thoughts, etc., are to be taken as definitive. So, for
> instance, what I just said -- that your view of consciousness is not quite
> what you think it is -- would be (may be) seen as RUDE, in polite society,
> because, on your own understanding of consciousness, you and only you get
> to
> say what you think it is. Because we have been friends for more than 40
> years, I hoping you will let that rudeness pass.
>
> On my account, an entity is conscious of something when it acts with
> respect
> to it, and SELF-conscious, when it acts with reference to itself. On that
> account, a simple thermostat is clearly conscious, but not self-conscious.
> A more complicated thermostat, which calibrates its own sensitivity (which
> most modern thermostats do), would probably have to be admitted as
> self-conscious.
>
> Nick
> Nicholas S. Thompson
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of John Kennison
> Sent: Friday, August 15, 2014 11:00 AM
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by
> environment
>
> Nick,
>
> I guess my criterion for consciousness would be something like "has an
> inner
> subjective life". It's not something that I can measure and it has the
> problem of circularity --if you ask me what I mean by an "inner subjective
> life" I will soon be making a circular definition. I am willing to concede
> that I don't have a suitable definition for a scientific study of
> consciousness. Still the question of whether a thermostat has consciousness
> seems meaningful to me. (I don't have an answer --other than "I doubt it".
> )
> Perhaps, I am making some kind of error. If so, could you explain what my
> mistake is.
>
> --John
> ________________________________________
> From: Friam [friam-boun...@redfish.com] on behalf of Nick Thompson
> [nickthomp...@earthlink.net]
> Sent: Friday, August 15, 2014 10:20 AM
> To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by
> environment
>
> So, I looked up David Chalmers . Yeh, I know: I shouldn't have HAD to
> look up David Chalmers. Here from Philosophy Index
>
> A potential problem with this speculation, which Chalmers acknowledges, is
> that it may imply the consciousness of things that we would not normally
> consider to have consciousness at all. For instance, Chalmers wonders if
> this means that a thermostat may have some experiential properties, even if
> they are especially dull. He does not commit to the notion that they do,
> but
> the possibility remains in the more speculative area of his thought.
>
> This is one of those "TED" insights, to which the only rational response
> is,
> "Duh!" Why exactly is that a problem? What exactly would it have meant to
> say that "humans are conscious" if it were not possible to discover that
> (1)
> things other than humans are conscious and/or that humans are not, in fact,
> conscious. Either we have a criterion for consciousness or we don't; once
> we have a criterion, we either apply it rigorously or . we are dishonest.
> It's really quite simple, actually.
>
>
> N
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>
> From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Eric Smith
> Sent: Friday, August 15, 2014 9:45 AM
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by
> environment
>
> Quick, somebody call David Chalmers!
>
>
> On Aug 15, 2014, at 9:25 AM, Eric Charles wrote:
>
>
> Weird that they want to call it "personality" instead of more simply saying
> that ant colonies seem to adapt to their local environment. Of course, the
> flashiness of the claim is the only reason it is being covered on the BBC,
> so I guess it isn't that weird after all.
>
>
> -----------
> Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
> Lab Manager
> Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning American University, Hurst Hall
> Room 203A
> 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
> Washington, DC 20016
> phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190
> email: echar...@american.edu<mailto:echar...@american.edu>
>
> On Fri, Aug 8, 2014 at 3:57 PM, Gillian Densmore
> <gil.densm...@gmail.com<mailto:gil.densm...@gmail.com>> wrote:
> A few swarm inteligence from the 90s described that. Scott Kelly's "Fast
> Cheap and Out of Controll" touched on that. In his case they knew ants
> (and
> often uncles) could pass around experience- and displayed something
> simillar
> to hummans sense of experience they didn't have a explination. Then again
> his forray into science was from the 90s.
>
> On Fri, Aug 8, 2014 at 9:01 AM, Tom Johnson
> <t...@jtjohnson.com<mailto:t...@jtjohnson.com>> wrote:
>
> So who is going to integrate this into the sugar model?
>
> http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-28658268
>
> ===================================
> Tom Johnson - Inst. for Analytic Journalism Santa Fe, NM
> t...@jtjohnson.com<mailto:t...@jtjohnson.com>.
> 505-473-9646<tel:505-473-9646>
> ===================================
>
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