Nick, Yes, I think Ginger (dog) has consciousness and I behave as if she does. She declines to discuss it.
I don't exclude you from consciousness I just defer to your assertion that you don't have it. You behave as if you have it but how can I contradict your claim that you don't? You say consciousness is a pattern of patterns and I say, approximately, it's what I experience. You might say that water is H2O and I say it's what I drink. Both are true? I'm not so sure about the patterns. Frank (505) 670--9918 On Aug 24, 2014 3:13 PM, "Nick Thompson" <nickthomp...@earthlink.net> wrote: > I may be unwinding here, but now I must contradict my assertion a moment > ago that your position is consistent. Despite your definition of > consciousness, your surely behave as if Ginger is conscious, do you not? > So, while you are consistent with in accepting that your definition > excludes me from consciousness, your behavior with respect to me (and > Ginger) emphatically belies your reliance on your own definition, does it > not? > > > > Now this argument could turned on me. When I say that I believe that > consciousness is a high-order pattern in behavior, a pattern of patterns, > if you will, is my assertion consistent with my behavior? Or do I actually > behave as if I think I and others act from an inner awareness, inaccessible > to others. I don’t think I do the latter, but, of course, it remains to be > seen. > > > > > > Nick > > > > Nicholas S. Thompson > > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology > > Clark University > > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > > > *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Frank > Wimberly > *Sent:* Sunday, August 24, 2014 2:55 PM > *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group > *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by > environment > > > > In case anyone cares, the argument ends like this: I am forced into the > extreme, but unassailable, position that I have consciousness as I > conceptualize it but that I can't demonstrate that anyone or anything else > has it. Nick's conclusion, I think, is that certain entities have an > illusion that they have consciousness (behavior) but cannot explain what it > is. But I may be wrong about the latter. > > Frank > > Sent from my Verizon 4G LTE Phone > (505) 670--9918 > > On Aug 24, 2014 11:46 AM, "Frank Wimberly" <wimber...@gmail.com> wrote: > > If you say you are not conscious, I defer to your superior knowledge of > the subject (you). > > Frank > > P.s. Nick and I have been through this argument before. > > Sent from my Verizon 4G LTE Phone > (505) 670--9918 > > On Aug 24, 2014 11:43 AM, "Nick Thompson" <nickthomp...@earthlink.net> > wrote: > > So, now we move to the next step of the argument: > > > > On what basis do any of you confidently assert that I am conscious when I > say I am not? > > > > Nick > > > > Nicholas S. Thompson > > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology > > Clark University > > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > > > *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Frank > Wimberly > *Sent:* Sunday, August 24, 2014 1:06 PM > *To:* 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' > *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by > environment > > > > But you are nonetheless correct. All this reminds me of the old joke: A > skeptic asks God, “How do I know that I exist?” God replies, “And who is > asking?” > > > > Frank > > > > > > Frank C. Wimberly > > 140 Calle Ojo Feliz > > Santa Fe, NM 87505 > > > > wimber...@gmail.com wimbe...@cal.berkeley.edu > > Phone: (505) 995-8715 Cell: (505) 670-9918 > > > > *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com > <friam-boun...@redfish.com>] *On Behalf Of *Steve Smith > *Sent:* Sunday, August 24, 2014 10:41 AM > *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group > *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by > environment > > > > > > Rebuttal by shame! If you have to ask you can't afford it. > > <grin> you saw right through me! > > > > -- rec -- > > > > On Sun, Aug 24, 2014 at 10:29 AM, Steve Smith <sasm...@swcp.com> wrote: > > > > Hey, wait a minute, guys! You have lost me. What is this "consciousness" > of which you speak. I am not sure I have one and I need you to describe it > to me in a way that I can recognize it. > > No you don't... and if you don't know that, then you are not a truly > conscious being, but rather a clever simulacrum of one. > > > > > N > > Nicholas S. Thompson > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology > Clark University > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > -----Original Message----- > From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of John Kennison > Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 11:50 AM > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by > environment > > Eric, > > As I understand it, Dennett's position and Chalmers' are not only > incompatible, their difference is more extreme than one simply being the > denial of the other. > Dennett says that a zombie is simply impossible. If we tried to create a > computer that could think like a human, it would be conscious --perhaps > even > if it just did a good job of analyzing things the way humans did --even > without loving pets, etc. (I say perhaps, because I'm not sure what Dennett > actually means.) > Chalmers says (I think) that even if we created a physically object that > was > identical to a human, it wouldn't necessarily be conscious --which I find > too extreme. When I said I favored Chalmers, I meant that it seems > plausible > that consciousness might not simply emerge if a system behaves in a > sufficiently sophisticated way. --the way the system is constructed could > make a difference. But these are only top of my head guesses. > > --John > > ________________________________________ > From: Friam [friam-boun...@redfish.com] on behalf of Eric Charles > [eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com] > Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 10:04 AM > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by > environment > > John, > So, in a "snapshot" I think "A conscious system and a non conscious one > could be physically identical", however, I think it would be disingenuous > to > say that we could not tell them apart through interaction over time. This > issue is not whether or not it is easy, but merely whether it is possible. > > I guess the question boils down to how you respond to challenges about > philosophical zombies. These discussions normally begin with someone > asserting "You can imagine things that behave exactly like you and I in all > ways, but not conscious." The presenter then goes on to lay out a series of > riddles these creatures lead to. However, I am not sure I buy the premise. > I > would assert that you CANNOT imagine such creatures. Can you really imagine > a creature that acts exactly like you without consciousness? Perhaps you > can > imagine a creature that appears to act lovingly towards your dog (if you > have a dog) without feeling the love that you feel. But can you imagine a > creature that appears to act lovingly towards your dog with being aware of > your dog?!? > > It seems like the type of claim we allow people to get away with at the > start of a philosophical discussion, because it is a pretty normal seeming > premise, and we all like to play such games... but if we really stopped to > consider the premise, we would not let it pass. > > (Obviously, this need not be read as a question to you, it is a challenge > to > Chalmers and others who hold those views.) > > Eric > > > > ----------- > Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. > Lab Manager > Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning American University, Hurst Hall > Room 203A > 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. > Washington, DC 20016 > phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 > email: echar...@american.edu<mailto:echar...@american.edu> > > > On Fri, Aug 22, 2014 at 1:16 PM, John Kennison > <jkenni...@clarku.edu<mailto:jkenni...@clarku.edu>> wrote: > Thanks Nick, > > I found a few statements I would revise in what I wrote. > Perhaps, I should have said that my argument seems valid rather correct. > I was careless in describing Chalmers' view (He said something like: A > conscious system and a non conscious one could be physically identical). > And I was being presumptuous in describing Dennett as giving a great tour > of the issues --I don't know that much about the issues. > --John > ________________________________________ > From: Friam [friam-boun...@redfish.com<mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com>] > on > behalf of Nick Thompson > [nickthomp...@earthlink.net<mailto:nickthomp...@earthlink.net>] > Sent: Friday, August 22, 2014 12:37 PM > To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony > 'personalities' shaped by environment > > John, > > Thanks for this. But now I have to read Dennett again. I am afraid my > copy > is in a box in Santa Fe, so may have to come over and borrow yours for a > few > days. But I am in somebody else's vacation cabin in NH for the moment, so > it will be a while. > > The following is from my shaky memory. Please don't flame me, anybody; > just put your arm around my shoulders and lead me from error. > > There appears to be a divide amongst philosophers of science concerning how > much to be a rationalist. Thomas Kuhn is the classic IRRATIONALIST An > awful > lot of the philosophy of science that we were all taught in graduate school > is irrationalist in this sense. Even Popper, who stressed the logic of > deduction in his philosophy ("falsification") was irrationalist in his > account of where good scientific ideas come from ("bold conjectures"). The > hallmark of an irrationalist is a tendency to put logic words in ironic > quotes, such as "proof" or "inference" or "truth" , or to use persuasion > words ("intuition pumps") that avoid invoking logical relations. So, > Dennett's failure to organize the book in the manner you suggest is part > and > parcel of his irrationalism, as is, by the way, your observation that an > argument can be effective without being clear. > > I want to pull back a bit my distinction between metaphysical and factual. > I guess I REALLY think the distinction is relative to a particular > argument. > In any argument, there are the facts we argue from and the facts we argue > about. There is a sense in which metaphysics consists in the facts we > ALWAYS argue from. I hope I haven't shot my own high horse out from under > me, here. > > Nick > > Nicholas S. Thompson > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > -----Original Message----- > From: Friam > [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com<mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com>] On > Behalf Of John Kennison > Sent: Friday, August 22, 2014 8:35 AM > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' shaped by > environment > > Nick: > I find your distinction between metaphysical questions and factual > questions > helpful because it clarifies the vague feeling I expressed about making > "some sort of error" when I said that consciousness is "having an inner > subjective life". I no longer feel it is an error but I should categorize > it > as a metaphysical position rather than a scientific fact. (I prefer the > term > ``scientific fact`` to your term ``fact``.) It still seems like a good > argument ("I know consciousness exists because I experience it") even > though > this cannot be a scientific argument. > > Eric, Steve, et al: > Thanks for your very interesting comments. I would like to add some further > comments about Dennett. I both enjoyed and was frustrated by his book > "Consciousness Explained". I recommend it highly but with the following > caveats: > > (1) I wish the book were organized differently. I think it should have > started with "The Challenge" (section 5 of chapter 2, p.39-42). I > paraphrase > this challenge as: > First, Dennett says he wants to explain Consciousness in > scientific terms, without invoking anything beyond contemporary science. I > take this to mean that he wants to show that we can analyze and explain > human behavior entirely in scientific, materialistic terms without > appealing > to any 'mysterious' forces. (Therefore, to focus on the behavior rather > than the motives, of conscious people, Dennett starts by telling > speculative > stories about the phenomenology of consciousness.) > Secondly, he doesn't want to be like behaviorists who "pretend > they don't have the experiences we know darn well they share they share > with > us. If I [Dennett] wish to deny the existence of some controversial feature > of consciousness, the burden falls on me to that it is somehow illusory." > (p.40 of the book). > Thirdly he wants to do an honest job of explaining the > empirical evidence. > This challenge intrigued me. The first and second goals seem almost > contradictory. I wondered how he could possibly pull it off. > > (2) As far as I remember, Dennett never summarizes how he met this > challenge. (I read this book over 15 years ago and I might have forgotten > the summary. At any rate, as I go over the book now, I can't find the kind > of summary I would like to see.) So here is my summary of how Dennett did: > (a) After having read the book, I feel there is no theoretical barrier to > explaining all of the behavior of apparently conscious beings in purely > materialistic terms. > (b) My memory is that Dennett explains the feeling of being conscious in > terms of the strong AI hypothesis, which says that any system that carries > out a sufficiently complex task will automatically be conscious. I am not > certain if I believe this, but it or something like it seems necessary if > we > take the first two goals seriously. Dennett apparently believes that the > emergence of consciousness depends only on the behavior exhibited. By > contrast, Chalmers argues that a conscious systems and a non-conscious > system could exhibit the same type of behavior. I don't see any reason to > favor either position, but I prefer Chalmers. > > (3) On Dennett's style: This is what I find both frustrating and > intriguing. > He seems to discuss various ideas without fully arranging them into an > argument, as I would tend to do. Dennett relies on this tendency of the > reader to complete the argument. So Dennett spends less time on > argumentation and more on telling stories. Sometimes it works, sometimes it > doesn't. As mentioned above, I came away with a strong feeling about the > first part of the challenge. I also had a strong feeling that our > consciousness often fools us into thinking it is in control when it isn't. > I > liked Dennett's presentation of the Pandemonium model of language (based on > work of Selfridge, Dawkins and others) and I feel it explains a lot of > things that would otherwise be murky. On the other hand, I was dissatisfied > with the chapter on "Qualia Disqualified". I even found myself agreeing > with > his students (and others) that he hasn't really explained consciousness > --but I think he gave us a great tour of the issues. (If I had written the > book, and arranged it more logically, the thread of the arguments might > have > been clearer, but it would have been a much less effective book.) > > --John > ________________________________________ > From: Friam [friam-boun...@redfish.com<mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com>] > on > behalf of Eric Smith [desm...@santafe.edu<mailto:desm...@santafe.edu>] > Sent: Saturday, August 16, 2014 12:31 PM > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] BBC News - Ant colony 'personalities' > shaped by environment > > Hi Steve, > > I am neither knowledgeable, nor do I have time to report even my own > experiences, without making a mess of things. But perhaps I can give some > titles of things people have pointed out to me. > > There seem to be several schools of approach (meaning, groups of people who > criticize each other a lot). I't hard even to know how to break them down > into clusters, because there are several axes of variation. > > There is a school who are mechanistic, and who think of themselves as > mechanistic. > > At one end within that school, one has Dan Dennett. Much of what he says > seems to me like a lot of effort to beat the dead horse of mysticism, and I > have no patience for that, because I find it tedious and uninteresting. > Beyond that, it is not clear to me how much he has contributed in real > ideas. One that seems okay, if I understand it from informal conversations > that have involved him, is that it involves a kind of recursive > self-reference of thought. Meaning, that thought is a process for handling > responses to events (or, in a very broad use of the noun, "things"), and > part of what consciousness does is render the state of thought as a "thing" > in its own right, having the same symbolic kind of representation as the > mind gives to other "things", so that thought can then process a > representation formed about its own state. This seems like part of the > common lore, expressed already in this thread, and not novel. Dennett > seems > to want to associate this ability specifical ly with language, and seems > almost to want to treat it as an _application_ of linguistic faculty. I > don't think that is a well-motivated position, but I am glad Dennett does > it > because it makes an important point. Language, in having syntax, can > manipulate words within the syntactic system, much as it uses words to > manipulate ideas within semantic systems. That is hard to understand in > language, and making us aware of the fact that it is hard, even though it > has been before our eyes for centuries, seems helpful in expressing part of > what makes assigning clear meaning to statements about consciousness hard. > > On another extreme from Dennett but still materialist, we have Giuglio > Tononi and his "Phi" measure. Basically, Tononi adopts information theory > as a language, and within that language introduces a concrete notion of > what > it means for an information system to be irreducible, in a way that I think > is analogous to the notion of irreducibility of representations of groups, > in the theory of representations. The details are different because > information theory is a different structure from algebra, but the basic > notion of something's not being splittable into factors is the same. I am > now a couple of years out of date wrt Tononi's publications, but I think it > is fair to say that Tononi asserts that having a very large irreducible > component of information is the _essence_ of consciousness, and that all > the > other things like self-reference (which I would argue are also essential, > even if irreducibility is too) are merely other phenomena of mind but not > the thing that distinguishe s conscious states. The Tononi development > has > the virtue of being an actual idea that is formalized and thus > unambiguously > exchangeable among people. It may also have a kernel of something > important. Many people who work in consciousness seem to think it does. > For my taste, it is too non-embodied to likely be a very comprehensive part > of the right answer. I think both the embodied dimensions of the things > that contribute to conscious states, and some kind of recursion, are > primitives that are essential. Tononi has a large book about this, and I > think several shorter papers that are on the arXiv. > > Somewhere in here is Christof Koch, who is also considered one of the > important contributors, but I don't know what his ideas are. I include him > because if you are asking who the thought leaders at the moment seem to be, > my understanding is that he is one of them. > > There is also Max Tegmark, who has a recent paper "Consciousness as a state > of matter", available from the arxiv. This (which I have read) seems to me > to be a smart mathematician's discussion of a generally nice point, which > adds nothing of substance to where we are stuck. Tegmark is making an > argument with which I agree, that most-everything we see in nature that is > robust is a "state of matter", understood as modern physics uses the term. > Hence, the distinctive and characteristic nature of consciousness too. But > the only thing about consciousness in what Tegmark builds is what he gets > from Tononi. The rest of it is more about the theory of measurement in > quantum mechanics, than it is anything that distinguishes consciousness > from > other patterns of order to which we have given names and phenomenologies. > > Now, if I understand it at a distant second hand, Chalmers has a criticism > of all of these kinds of positions, notwithstanding their technical > differences, which is that he would claim they fail to recognize what he > calls "the hard problem". I do not know exactly how Chalmers uses > language, > and I cannot speak for him, but to try to use my own language to express > what I think he says, I would say he asserts that these mere > characterizations of mechanism are not "accounting for" what we mean when > we > report "the experience of" this or that. Here, the word "qualia" is often > introduced, to refer to the antecedent of such reports. > > I think Dennett thinks of (and perhaps calls) Chalmers the worst sort of > Cartesian dualist, whereas Chalmers would say that Dennett is claiming that > consciousness "doesn't really exist", or something morally equivalent. I > believe both of them think of the axis on which they hold opposite ends as > different and bigger than any of the axes that separate the technical > people > from one another. Chalmers seems (for good or ill) to attract people who > do want to be dualists or mystics (or mysterians), so without putting in a > lot of time with original material, it is hard to get a clear picture of > him > through the people who claim to render him. > > Ih the middle of all this, helping us sort it all out, is John Searl, who > has a short little book "The problem of consciousness". Searl is at his > best when using pellucid common language to explain why everyone else is > being silly. He is much less impressive when asked to introduce an actual > new idea that moves the discussion forward. However, in saying that, I do > not mean to diminish the value (or the enjoyment) of his criticisms. He > has > some language in there about various kinds of dualists, which I find > mystifying, because it all exists within such self-referential circles of > language that I wouldn't know how to link it to anything in the rest of the > world. But, if you want to know about dualists, this is a good place to > find them categorized. > > I find reporting on a lot of this like I think I would feel if sent to the > middle east to report on exactly why it is necessary for some factions to > fight other factions. There seems to be a long way between being humans, > and so exercising the individual and social behaviors that constitute > bringing ourself to share or coordinate various internal states that we > refer to with names for awareness or states of mind or whatever, and > finding > a language that, in symbolic form, makes a faithful representation of what > it is that distinctively allows us to be what we are and do what we do. > Each of these guys seems to bring attention to the absence of such language > in one or another way. What I can't understand is why they think there is > anything more than "a hard problem" of inventing a valid language to > faithfully reflect the structure of a natural phenomenon, and their main > difference is in how much each thinks he has captured and the others have > not. But I think they would argu e there is more to their positions than > that. > > Of course, I have no expert knowledge, and haven't put that much time even > into reading their literatures as an outsider and tourist. So it is to be > expected that a lot of it will pass over me. > > Several of these guys have either TED talks, or lectures that stream on the > web, which are shorter than reading their papers, but even more > unsatisfying. > > Oops. Too much text. > > All best, > > Eric > > > > > > On Aug 16, 2014, at 11:04 AM, Steve Smith wrote: > > Gentlemen, > > I am also interested in both the nature of consciousness and the > nature of > > knowledge regarding what appear to be entirely subjective phenonomena > (arising from the fact of consciousness?). > > The last time I attended a Cognitive Neuroscience conference (6 years > > ago?) I was impressed with how far things had come with regard to > correlating brain imaging and *reported* subjective experiences. I > realize that sometimes more data and even higher quality data doesn't > necessarily improve a model qualitatively, but I have been hoping that > there > would be some conceptual breakthroughs from this work. > > Unfortunately, as the popular media and the population in general > (which > > is chicken, which is egg?) have taken a stronger interest in science (or > has > come to fetishize the artifacts of science?) there is a lot more "noise" to > sort through to find signal. The number of articles or even entire issues > of magazines and the number of books on the topic has risen dramatically in > the past 10 years or so, but I rarely see what looks like new insight into > the nature of consciousness. > > I'm hoping someone here with more direct experience or more patience > with > > the literature (BTW, the "hard literature" on the topic is generally too > opaque for me, so I'm lost in a middle-ground limbo between the popular > accounts and the actual work-product of scientists) knows of new insights > or > new twists on the old models to share. > > Does anyone have a short list of recent publications which reframe the > > question in a new way? > > - Steve > > Hi Nick, > > One of the problems in discussing consciousness is that it seems very > > hard to break it down into simpler concepts. There are what might be called > "high-level" words such as "inner life", "awareness", "apprehension", which > suggest consciousness but only to someone who already ha a sense of what > consciousness is. Whereas low level words, which refer to things that can > be readily measured do not seem adequate to get at the real meaning of > consciousness. So we are left with metaphors. When I use words such as > "access" and "inner life" they suggest a container but they are not > necessarily used to denote an actual container but to describe a situation > which has some of the properties of a container. > > However, there does seem to be a real container that describes the > information I have access to. I get raw information from my body. > This is not to say that my consciousness is located in my body, but > that what I know about the outside world starts with how my body > senses the outside world. These senses are then processed or > contemplated somehow and this results in what I think I know about > the world. There is no way that "I can see exactly what you see" > because what you see comes from your body and what I see comes from > my body. If we literally mean "see" then what you see is what enters > your eyes and what I see is what enters my eyes. You might tell me > about what you see, but that is not the same as seeing what you see > because what you have seen has been processed by you then > reformulated in terms of speech, which is then processed by me. Even > if we witnessed the same event, we would have slightly different > viewpoints, and our eyes are different, and, in any case, we w > > ou! > > ld start interpreting the incoming rays of light as soon as they > started > > to enter our respective eyes. > > You also gave examples in which I might infer what you saw. This > seems to > > presuppose I have a theory of what Nick is all about or some means of > making > inferences. (I don't have a well-articulated theory of Nick, but I do > arrive > at conclusions about what to make of you. I'm not certain how I do this, > but > I am certain that I do it all the time, quite effortlessly and almost > automatically.) At any rate this drawing of inferences does not seem to be > seeing exactly what you see, but a way (not necessarily very accurate) of > getting a rough approximation of what you saw. > > --John > > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe > at St. John's College to unsubscribe > http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe > http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe > http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe > http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe > http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe > http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > > > > > ============================================================ > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >
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