P.S. Frank, Thanks for the support. On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 11:48 AM Russ Abbott <russ.abb...@gmail.com> wrote:
> I don't think the mathematical analogy is relevant. It doesn't seem to me > to apply to remembering a face. > > Nick said about someone doing arithmetic silently: Her face goes blank, > for a few seconds, and then she gives us an answer. What we have is the > question, the answer, and the moment of blankness. > > I still want to know what you say is going on during the moment of silence > -- and especially how you talk about the "visions" in her mind that > accompany the arithmetic work she is doing. Do you deny there are "visions > of some sort" as she works out the answer? What's going on in your mind as > you count backwards (silently)? How do you talk about that stuff? > > BTY I don't deny that physical activity is taking place. There are > certainly neurons firing, blood flowing, ATP being converted to ADP with > the released energy being used for something, etc. > > On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 11:29 AM Nick Thompson <nickthomp...@earthlink.net> > wrote: > >> Frank, >> >> >> >> Will you look at my last post to russ and comment (on line, if possible) >> on the plausibility of my mathematical interpretation? >> >> >> >> Nick >> >> >> >> Nicholas S. Thompson >> >> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology >> >> Clark University >> >> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ >> >> >> >> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Frank >> Wimberly >> *Sent:* Saturday, February 27, 2016 12:25 PM >> >> >> *To:* 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' < >> friam@redfish.com> >> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Subjectivity and intimacy (lost in the weeks?) >> >> >> >> Russ, >> >> >> >> In 1967 I took a course in cognitive processes at Carnegie Mellon. One >> aspect of that course could be called “what’s wrong with behaviorism?” At >> one point it was said, “When behaviorists talk about ‘sub-vocal speech’ you >> have won the argument.” >> >> >> >> The “hard problem” is hard. >> >> >> >> Nick and I have been arguing (in a friendly way) about these issues for >> years. There’s the “rabbit hole”. >> >> >> >> In my opinion and for what it’s worth. >> >> >> >> Frank >> >> >> >> >> >> Frank C. Wimberly >> >> 140 Calle Ojo Feliz >> >> Santa Fe, NM 87505 >> >> >> >> wimber...@gmail.com wimbe...@cal.berkeley.edu >> >> Phone: (505) 995-8715 Cell: (505) 670-9918 >> >> >> >> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com >> <friam-boun...@redfish.com>] *On Behalf Of *Eric Charles >> *Sent:* Saturday, February 27, 2016 11:58 AM >> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group >> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Subjectivity and intimacy (lost in the weeks?) >> >> >> >> *"I meant counting silently"* >> >> Whatever the relationship is between counting very loudly and counting in >> a whisper, I would posit the same as the relationship between counting in a >> whisper and counting with no discernible physical motion. >> >> Instructing a child in how to "count in your head" is a process of >> instructing a child in how to count without their mouth-flap moving so >> much. After you are done with the instructions you have a child who does >> whatever they did before, but without their mouth-flap moving so much. >> >> Theories of learning are, of course, quite interesting in their own >> right, but no other magic required. >> >> I presume at this point you are going to assert that I have still not >> answered your question, because by "counting silently" you mean more than >> simply "counting silently." I certainly have not, with my answer above, >> solved the "hard problem." All I could say, once again, is that I don't >> think there is a hard problem to be solved. >> >> >> >> (P.S. Sorry to all if I am being any odder than usual in my answers. I am >> preparing a talk on these topics for next week, and so I am in >> "professional stickler" mode as a result.) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ----------- >> Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. >> Lab Manager >> Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning >> American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A >> 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. >> Washington, DC 20016 >> phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 >> email: echar...@american.edu >> >> >> >> On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 1:35 PM, Russ Abbott <russ.abb...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >> I meant counting silently and without and discernable physical motion. >> Same things for visualizing. >> >> >> >> On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 9:26 AM Eric Charles < >> eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> *"What about counting backwards from100 by 7's: 100, 93, 86, ... How do >> you describe those sorts of activities in your terms?"* >> >> I describe it just like that. "Counting backwards from 100 by 7's." To >> confirm this, I asked my daughter to do that, and she did. Her mouth opened >> and closed, her throat vibrated, and I heard numbers just as you described. >> I thought the description was apt. >> >> *"what about...visualizing someone's face?" * >> >> Well, that is going to be a bit trickier, and various answers have been >> offered that would avoid your posited problem. >> >> I would point out, first, that we all, at least occasionally "see" that >> someone is doing this. You are around someone you are very familiar with, >> something happens, they get a particular contemplative look, and we see >> that they are remembering someone from their past. "You're thinking about >> her again, aren't you. I can tell." "Yes, how did you know?" "I've known >> you long enough. Like I said, I can tell." >> >> Second, I would say (following the work of François Tonneau) that the >> best way to describe such events is as a continued response to a thing that >> is not currently present. Just as we no longer think there is any >> particular mystery about how people behaving towards objects at a spatial >> distance, we need not posit any particular mystery about how people behave >> towards objects at a temporal distance. >> >> The brain is certainly a crucial part in such processes, but so is the >> rest of the body and the surrounding environment. A brain in a vat may >> present a mystery, but the same questions could be asked about a stomach in >> a vat. >> https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/fixing-psychology/201412/deep-thoughts-the-stomach-in-jar-problem >> >> The "hard problem" is a conceptual confusion, not a real problem to be >> solved. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ----------- >> Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. >> Lab Manager >> Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning >> American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A >> 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. >> Washington, DC 20016 >> phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 >> email: echar...@american.edu >> >> >> >> On Sat, Feb 27, 2016 at 2:02 AM, Russ Abbott <russ.abb...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >> Rather than wanting, which is somewhat nebulous, what about doing >> arithmetic or visualizing someone's face? What about counting backwards >> from100 by 7's: 100, 93, 86, ... How do you describe those sorts of >> activities in your terms? >> >> >> >> >> >> On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 9:42 PM Nick Thompson <nickthomp...@earthlink.net> >> wrote: >> >> Hi, Russ, >> >> >> >> Ok, so now we are out of the Weeds of Pragmatism thread, I am, FWIW, free >> to speak me own “mind” – i.e., give you the basis to make accurate >> predictions of my behavior in this sort of situation in the future. >> >> >> >> I think the short answer is that largely Eric and I don’t. And when we >> do, we think we are talking about behavior patterns. Some of those >> behavior patterns may be meta meta ……. Etc. and have to be experienced over >> long reaches of time before they can be recognized. Although I perhaps >> know too little math to use this metaphor, I like to think of mental states >> such as “wanting” as analogous to as derivatives of functions – >> measurements we speak of occurring as an instant, but actually ways of >> describing events longer in duration that can only be known by multiple >> measurements collected over time. So when in ordinary language we speak of >> wanting “a hot fudge sundae”, we speak as if we are talking about an >> instantaneous state in some internal space called the mind, when we >> actually characterizing information concerning our behavior with respect to >> ice-cream, nuts, whipped cream, and chocolate sauce that would constitute >> evidence for a directedness towards those things as an end. >> >> >> >> You probably know too much math to get much pleasure out of my use of >> that metaphor. John will no doubt correct me. >> >> >> >> NIck >> >> >> >> Nicholas S. Thompson >> >> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology >> >> Clark University >> >> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ >> >> >> >> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Russ >> Abbott >> *Sent:* Friday, February 26, 2016 7:50 PM >> >> >> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group < >> friam@redfish.com> >> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Subjectivity and intimacy (lost in the weeks?) >> >> >> >> What I still don't understand (and would like to understand) is how Eric >> and Nick talk about mental activities. For example if I ask you to add 15 >> and 43, what do you say you are doing? If I ask you to think about what the >> other looks like, does some image come to mind? What do you say is >> happening as you hold that image in your mind? >> >> >> >> In none of my posts have I put a position forward. (Nevertheless you have >> often replied as if I have.) My first post asked how you describe intimacy >> -- or if that term means anything at all to you. This is similar. I want to >> know how you describe the sorts of mental activities that we (and even you >> presumably) find familiar. >> >> >> >> On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 4:35 PM Eric Charles < >> eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> Russ... well... there we are. >> >> I know the supposed "hard problem" of which you speak, but I think it is >> a rabbit hole full of confusion, not an actual problem to be solved. The >> posited mystery simply does not exist. We might as well be discussing a >> philosopher's stone or the universal solvent. No amount of technological >> innovation, or details about the activities of cells in a particular part >> of our body, will solve a problem that doesn't exist. >> >> >> >> >> >> ----------- >> Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. >> Lab Manager >> Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning >> American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A >> 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. >> Washington, DC 20016 >> phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 >> email: echar...@american.edu >> >> >> >> On Thu, Feb 25, 2016 at 11:10 PM, Russ Abbott <russ.abb...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >> Sorry, No. Most of it was not satisfying. >> >> >> >> You originally said that the science of mind was doing reasonably well. >> When I asked what you meant you talked about how shallow psychology is. >> >> >> >> I said I expected there to be technology that lets me experience what you >> are experiencing. You replied that if I believed something (which I didn't >> claim) then I wouldn't need such technology. That wasn't the point. >> >> >> >> I guess we agreed that good work is being done on computer vision. I said >> that we will increasingly be able to link brain activity to subjective >> experience. I didn't say anything about a Cartesian theater. You raised the >> notion of a Cartesian theater to knock it down and then talked about grass. >> >> >> >> The "hard" problem you must know refers to Chalmers. >> >> >> >> On Thu, Feb 25, 2016 at 12:51 PM Eric Charles < >> eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> Russ, >> >> I mulled over replying a few times, but wasn't sure what to say. However, >> by restating your genuine interest in my response, I now feel like a jack >> ass for not responding earilier, so here it goes. Some of these answers >> might not be at all satisfying, but I will do my best so long as you accept >> the caveat that I am uncertain if some of it will really answer your >> questions. >> >> >> >> "When you say "the science of the mind seems to be doing reasonably well" >> what are you referring to?" >> >> In the original context, I am referring to what people saw when looking >> around in the late 1800s. In fact, I think there is very good working being >> done in psychology today, but what I consider "good work" is a very small, >> and marginalized, corner of the modern field. Most stuff that passes as >> "important" psychology research today is either barking up the wrong tree >> entirely, or is so mundane as to be uninteresting. Mainstream psychology is >> driven much more by the ability to make clever press releases than by a >> critical view to advancing the field. >> >> Compare the recent big-press items in physics to the recent big-press >> items in psychology, and it makes you want to weep for our field. The >> biggest news item in Psychology right now is a multi-year study showing >> that people "feel less in control" of their actions when following the >> orders by another person, in comparison to a group that chose the same >> actions without being ordered to do them. Seriously. (Yes, seriously.) >> >> >> "I wouldn't be surprised if we develop technology that lets me experience >> what you are experiencing via neural sensor and communication systems." >> >> I think we do not have a sensible way to talk about the brain's role in >> psychological processes at this time (I've published a few papers about >> this), and that when such a language is worked out it will violate most our >> folk-psychology intuitions. If you believe that empathy a thing people >> sometimes do, then, I submit, you yourself do not believe we need the >> posited device to experience what another is experiencing. >> >> >> >> "We have taken impressive steps in computer vision in recent years. I >> expect that work to help us develop a more formal structure for our own >> visual experiences." >> >> >> >> Well... sure... but that is not qualitatively different than the advances >> made in vision research over the past hundred years. We know a lot about >> how vision works. Generally speaking, computer vision does not work like >> human vision, because, as with all evolved processes, humans are not the >> most computationally efficient things in the world. But, there *are *people >> working to build inefficient and non-elegant computer vision systems for >> the purposes of testing hypotheses regarding human vision. Good stuff. >> >> >> >> "I don't expect a breakthrough that will suddenly crack "the hard problem >> of consciousness. More likely we will be able to say more and more >> accurately what sort of subjective experience someone is having by looking >> at what their brain is doing." >> >> This is probably the difficult part of your comment to respond to. I >> simply don't believe there is a "hard problem." To the extent that I even >> understand what you are talking about there, I think the brain is one part >> of a much larger system that we would need to examine. That is not to say >> that examining the brain adds nothing, but to say that an exclusive focus >> on the brain misrepresents the phenomena of interest. >> >> To elaborate a bit: Traditional philosophy has addressed been largely >> oriented towards "internalizing" psychological processes. The Cartesian >> claim (an extension of the Platonic claim) was that we only experience the >> world that plays out in the theater of our ghost-souls. "Why do I >> experience the grass as green?" you ask. "Because the greenness is present >> in the theater of your soul," is the answer. This, of course, doesn't solve >> anything. Saying that we only experience the world that plays out in the >> theater of brains has *almost *all of the same problems, and should be >> rejected. At the least, it adds nothing. >> >> The approach that I would advocate for could be described as >> "externalizing" psychological processes. "Why do I experience the grass as >> green?" you ask. "Because there is some identifiable property of the grass >> that you are responding to, and that property, out there, is what you mean >> by the word 'green'," would be my answer. That property could be quite >> complex to specify (it is certainly MUCH more complicated than a narrow >> range of wave lengths), but whatever that property is, that is thing you >> are asking about when you ask about "green". If you want to know if someone >> is experiencing the same thing you are when they talk about "green" then we >> see if the parameters for their response match the parameters for your >> response. That is, we act if they are experiencing, quite literally, the >> same *things*. It is challenging problem, but it is a straightforward >> and tractable scientific problem, and it renders the philosophers so-called >> "hard problem" moot. >> >> Was any of that satisfying? >> >> Best, >> >> Eric >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ----------- >> Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. >> Lab Manager >> Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning >> American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A >> 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. >> Washington, DC 20016 >> phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 >> email: echar...@american.edu >> >> >> >> On Thu, Feb 25, 2016 at 1:29 AM, Nick Thompson < >> nickthomp...@earthlink.net> wrote: >> >> Russ, >> >> >> >> Partly exhaustion, I think. >> >> >> >> Once we all agree that there is no *in-principle reason* that I cannot >> ultimately tap your subjective mind, then we all know what we are and we >> are just dickering about the price. >> >> >> >> Nick >> >> >> >> Nicholas S. Thompson >> >> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology >> >> Clark University >> >> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ >> >> >> >> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Russ >> Abbott >> *Sent:* Wednesday, February 24, 2016 10:15 PM >> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group < >> friam@redfish.com> >> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Subjectivity and intimacy (lost in the weeks?) >> >> >> >> Nick, Eric, >> >> >> >> I'm disappointed that neither of you responded to my reply (below) to >> Eric's message. Perhaps it got lost in the weeks. >> >> >> >> -- Russ >> >> >> >> On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 9:56 PM Russ Abbott <russ.abb...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >> Eric, When you say "the science of the mind seems to be doing reasonably >> well" what are you referring to? I thought your position was that mind was >> not a useful concept. I suppose that what you mean by mind is something >> that can be investigated by looking at behavior. But what is that sort of >> mind? Wouldn't it be better to call it something else so that people like >> me don't get confused? So to get back to my original question and to help >> me understand what you are saying, what are the recent advances in the >> science of mind I should be thinking of in this regard? >> >> >> >> Also, I'm not convinced that subjective experience is forever beyond the >> reach of scientific investigation. I wouldn't be surprised if we develop >> technology that lets me experience what you are experiencing via neural >> sensor and communication systems. And if I can experience what you are >> experiencing we will presumably be able to record it and parse it. >> >> >> >> We have taken impressive steps in computer vision in recent years. I >> expect that work to help us develop a more formal structure for our own >> visual experiences. This is not to say that the formal structure will be a >> subjective experience for the computer. But it is to say that it will give >> us some leverage for investigating subjective experience. Similarly open >> brain surgery has helped us understand how the brain is connected to >> subjective experience. >> >> >> >> Just as we now know a lot about how natural language works even though no >> science can speak or fully understand natural language, I expect that we >> will develop similar theories about how subjective experience works. >> >> >> >> I don't expect a breakthrough that will suddenly crack "the hard problem >> of consciousness." More likely we will be able to say more and more >> accurately what sort of subjective experience someone is having by looking >> at what their brain is doing. We now have ways to allow people to act in >> the world by thinking about what they want. These are fairly superficial >> mappings of brain signals to physical actuators. But it's pretty impressive >> nonetheless. More advances along these and related lines will make >> subjective experience less of a mystery and more just another feature of >> the world. >> >> >> >> On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 7:09 PM Eric Charles < >> eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> Russ said: "*Eric's point that the world must be a certain way if we are >> to do science doesn't make sense to me. If Schrodinger, Heisenberg, etc. >> thought like that they would have denied the two-slit experiments, and >> quantum mechanics wouldn't exist. Science (as you all know) is >> fundamentally empirical. You can't demand that the world be a certain way >> so that it's easier to do science.*" >> >> Exactly! Let me try another tact. >> >> 1) We could imagine (with various levels of clarity) any number of worlds >> in which things worked differently from each other. >> >> 2) "Doing science" is largely a process of trying to figure out which of >> those worlds we live in, by searching for the best way to divide up >> empirical evidence, so that it is reliable and can be agreed up. (Peirce >> was particularly fascinated with the advances made in 18th century >> chemistry.) Scientists search for more and more stable ways to view the >> world, i.e., ways which stand up to more and more empirical scrutiny. >> (Early attempts at the periodic table, though imperfect, serve as an >> excellent example of this, leading to countless confirmatory experiments, >> including the correct prediction of the properties of yet-to-be-isolated >> elements.) >> >> 3) In order to do science about something, we need only one thing to be >> true: It can be investigated empirically. That is, it is something, "out >> there" which we can turn our machinations towards, and which will yield >> stable results once we find the appropriate methods for its investigation. >> >> >> >> 4) Many important big-name people have declared that a science of >> psychology is impossible, because the stuff under discussion in that >> context simply cannot be investigated empirically. Kant, is a prime >> example. Those big-names declared that another person's mind was not the >> type of thing that you could examine empirically, because the province >> of the soul did not yield itself to earthly poking and prodding. If those >> big-names are correct, and minds cannot be investigated, *by their very >> nature*, we would expect efforts in that direction to fail-to-produce >> the convergence-of-ideas characteristic of successful science. >> >> 5) We can imagine a world in which those big-names are correct. We can >> imagine a world in which many types of things can be investigated >> empirically, but *not* minds, and in which all attempts to produce a >> science of the mind would fail pathetically. >> >> 6) The above view has had a virtual strangle hold on Western thinking for >> centuries. However, in the late 1800's a few serious scholars started >> thinking that "science of psychology" might be given a go, to see how it >> went. They were widely dismissed, not allowed to hold their heads high in >> either scientific circles or philosophical ones. >> >> 7) And that's where we find ourselves. *If* a science of psychology is >> possible, then *de facto* the subject matter of psychology is some swath >> of empirically investigatable happenings, about which a community of >> investigators would eventually reach a consensus as the scientific process >> takes its course. We might not live in such a world, but we won't know >> without trying it. A science of ether winds never worked out. The attempted >> science of medieval humours was a bust. A science of studying >> bumps-on-people's-heads has been roundly rejected. All sorts of attempted >> sciences have not worked out over the years. But the science of the mind >> seems to be doing reasonably well. Either that progress is an illusion, and >> empirical-psychologists will soon go the way of the phrenologists, or that >> progress is evidence that the big-names who thought of "mind" as inherently >> uninvestigatable were wrong on a very fundamental level. >> >> If you are to study a romantic partner's mind in order to become intimate >> with her, then her mind must be something that can be studied. If I am to >> study your feeling of intimacy, then your feeling-of-intimacy must be >> something that can be studied. And so on, and so forth. Whatever methods >> and categories that leads us two, such is the stuff of the science of >> psychology, whether it matches any of our preconceptions, or not. >> >> Best, >> >> Eric >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ----------- >> Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. >> Lab Manager >> Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning >> American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A >> 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. >> Washington, DC 20016 >> phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 >> email: echar...@american.edu >> >> >> >> On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 7:13 PM, Russ Abbott <russ.abb...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >> I'm flattered. Thank you. I can see myself in the Devil's Advocate role >> -- except for the last part. I'll grant that you can think whatever you >> want. >> >> >> >> *[NST==>”close” is a metaphor; I am suggesting a co-location in space >> metaphor to substitute for the privacy-inside metaphor which I take to be >> yours. I am suggesting, roughly, that the more experiences we share, the >> more we are of one mind. <==nst]* >> >> >> >> That won't work for my sense of intimacy. One can be intimate (in my >> sense) on the telephone and via written words. Sharing (i.e., participating >> in the same) experiences is not required for intimacy in my sense. What is >> required (in my sense) is sharing (i.e., talking about one's subjective >> experiences of one's) experiences. >> >> >> >> *[NST==>You will find this sentence totally unintelligible until you >> entertain the notion that the self is an inferred entity, inferred using >> the same sort of equipment that we use to infer the motives, aspirations, >> feelings, and thoughts of others. What differs between you and me is the >> amount of time we spend around me. To the extent that I spend more time >> than you do around me, I am probably a better source of info about what I >> am up to, thinking about, etc., ceteris paribus. Thus, I may greater >> familiarity with me than you do, I don’t have any special access to me. >> <==nst]* >> >> >> >> What does it mean to infer something if one has no subjective experience? >> I think of inferring something as having to do with thinking about it. More >> generally what does it mean to think about something in your framework? >> I'll agree that thinking involves stuff happening in the brain. So it's >> behavior in that sense. But it's not behavior in the sense you seem to be >> talking about. So what does it mean in your sense to think about something? >> >> >> >> I realize I'm on shaky ground here because computers "think" about things >> without having what I would call subjective experience. >> >> >> >> *[NST==>If you insist that a mind is a thing that is enclosed in a head >> (or a steel cabinet, etc.), then I can only say that if a robot does mind >> things, than a robot “has” a mind. But I rebel against the metaphor. >> <==nst]* >> >> >> >> I don't insist that a mind is anything. I don't know how to talk about >> subjective experience scientifically. I see no reason to deny it, but I >> agree we have made little scientific progress in talking about it. >> >> >> >> By the way, Eric's point that the world must be a certain way if we are >> to do science doesn't make sense to me. If Schrodinger, Heisenberg, etc. >> thought like that they would have denied the two-slit experiments, and >> quantum mechanics wouldn't exist. Science (as you all know) is >> fundamentally empirical. You can't demand that the world be a certain way >> so that it's easier to do science. >> >> >> >> *[NST==>I have to run, now, but please see Intentionality is the Mark of >> the Vital >> <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281409844_Intentionality_is_the_mark_of_the_vital> >> . >> Ethology is thick with intentionality. Language is not an necessary >> condition for intentionalty. All is required is the sign relation (cf >> Peirce). <==nst]* >> >> >> >> I looked at (but didn't read in any detail) the Intentionality paper. The >> upshot seems to be that non-humans have intentionality. I don't argue with >> that. My question for you is still how you reconcile intentionality with >> not having subjective experience. What is intentionality without >> subjectivity? (Again, I'm moving onto shaky ground since we have >> "goal-directed" software even though the software and the computer that >> runs it has no subjective experience.) >> >> >> >> I guess in both cases in which computers seem to "think" or "plan" we are >> using those terms as analogs to what we see ourselves doing and not really >> to attribute those processes to computers or software. >> >> >> >> On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 3:23 PM Nick Thompson <nickthomp...@earthlink.net> >> wrote: >> >> See Larding below: >> >> >> >> Nicholas S. Thompson >> >> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology >> >> Clark University >> >> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ >> >> >> >> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Russ >> Abbott >> *Sent:* Monday, February 22, 2016 3:08 PM >> >> >> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group < >> friam@redfish.com> >> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Subjectivity and intimacy >> >> >> >> Sorry that I'm not responding to Glen, Jochen, or John, but I've got to >> defend Nick's devil's advocate. Nick, you do keep changing the subject. >> In response to your two suggested definitions of intimacy I asked the >> following. >> >> >> >> -------------- >> >> >> >> Version 1: Intimacy is just being so close that you see the same world >> from where you stand. >> >> >> >> I don't know how to understand that. Do you mean close wrt Euclidean >> distance? How does that relate to, for example, pain? No matter how close >> you are to someone, you can't see, for example, their toothache. >> >> *[NST==>”close” is a metaphor; I am suggesting a co-location in space >> metaphor to substitute for the privacy-inside metaphor which I take to be >> yours. I am suggesting, roughly, that the more experiences we share, the >> more we are of one mind. <==nst] * >> >> >> >> Version 2: When the self you see projected in another ‘s behavior toward >> you is the same as the self you see projected in your own behavior. >> *[NST==>You >> will find this sentence totally unintelligible until you entertain the >> notion that the self is an inferred entity, inferred using the same sort of >> equipment that we use to infer the motives, aspirations, feelings, and >> thoughts of others. What differs between you and me is the amount of time >> we spend around me. To the extent that I spend more time than you do >> around me, I am probably a better source of info about what I am up to, >> thinking about, etc., ceteris paribus. Thus, I may greater familiarity >> with me than you do, I don’t have any special access to me. <==nst] * >> >> >> >> *If I remember what happened when we last did this Russ, you made me >> clearer and a clearer (and Eric, who wrote the Devil’s Advocate questions, >> in some ways modeled himself after you), but in the end, you just concluded >> that I was nuts, and we let it go at that. * >> >> >> >> I don't know how to understand that either. What do you mean by "self?" >> What does it mean to project it toward someone? What does it mean to say >> that it's the same self as the one you project? Over what period of time >> must they be the same? If we're talking about behavior would it matter if >> the projecting entity were a robot? (Perhaps you answered those questions >> in the papers I haven't read. Sorry if that's the case.) >> >> *[NST==>If you insist that a mind is a thing that is enclosed in a head >> (or a steel cabinet, etc.), than I can only say that if a robot does mind >> things, than a robot “has” a mind. But I rebel against the metaphor. >> <==nst] * >> >> >> >> -------------- >> >> >> >> You responded with a long (and clear and definitive) extract from your >> paper. But I don't see how it answers my questions. Wrt the first question, >> if we're talking about behavior, distance doesn't see relevant. Wrt the >> second question, the extract doesn't (seem to) talk about what you mean by >> a self or what it means for the projected behaviors of two of them to be >> "the same" -- or even what projected behavior means. Is it the case that >> you also don't "believe in" intentionality? After all how can there be >> intentionality without a subjective intent? And if that's the case, what >> does "projected" mean? Is it the same as oriented in 3D space? >> >> *[NST==>I have to run, now, but please see Intentionality is the Mark of >> the Vital >> <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281409844_Intentionality_is_the_mark_of_the_vital> >> . Ethology is thick with intentionality. Language is not an necessary >> condition for intentionalty. All is required is the sign relation (cf >> Peirce). <==nst] * >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 1:38 PM glen <geprope...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> >> I may as well chime in, too, since none of what's been said so far is >> meaningful to me. My concept of intimacy runs along M-W's 2nd entry: >> >> 2 : to communicate delicately and indirectly >> >> This is almost nothing to do with subjectivity and almost nothing to do >> with non-private knowledge (things others know). It has to do with >> "delicate" attention to detail and, perhaps, manipulation. A robot could >> easily be intimate with a human, and demonstrate such intimacy by catering >> to many of the tiny things the human prefers/enjoys, even if each and every >> tiny preference is publicly known. Similarly, 2 robots could be intimate >> by way of a _special_ inter-robot interface. But the specialness of the >> interface isn't its privacy or uniqueness. It's in its handling of >> whatever specific details are appropriate to those robots. >> >> Even if inter-subjectivity is merely the intertwining of experiences, >> it's still largely unrelated to intimacy. Two complete strangers can >> become intimate almost instantaneously, because/if their interfaces are >> pre-adapted for a specific coupling. There it wouldn't be >> inter-subjectivity, but a kind of similarity of type. And that might be >> mostly or entirely genetic rather than ontogenic. >> >> And I have to again be some sort of Morlockian champion for the >> irrelevance of thought. 2 strangers can be intimate and hold _radically_ >> different understandings of the world(s) presented to them ... at least if >> we believe the tales told to us in countless novels. 8^) >> >> >> On 02/22/2016 12:40 AM, Jochen Fromm wrote: >> > Nice to see FRIAM is still alive! >> > I like this definition as well: "Intimacy is just being so close that >> you see the same world from where you stand". In a family for example we >> are being so close that we roughly see and experience the same world. >> > >> > I still believe that the solution to the hard problem lies in >> Hollywood: cinemas are built like theaters. If we see a film about a >> person, it is like sitting in his or her cartesian theater. We see what the >> person sees. In a sense, we feel what the feels as well, especially the >> pain of loosing someone. >> >> -- >> ⇔ glen >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> >> >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> >> >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> >> >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> >> >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> >> >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > >
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