Hello Nick, Re previous post about speaking to god and ineffable experience:
I was not attempting to assert anything, merely ask questions. Specifically, questions regarding Eric's assertion denying ineffability and "defining" the Real as that which has effects. So I proposed two scenarios involving a "Thing" that had measurable, sometimes predictable, effects and asked if thir "effect ability" gave them ontological status of "Real" despite the fact that they were ineffable or, in the case of God, 'effed' inaccurately. The question might be generalized to one of the relationship between what we can know (epistemology) and what is real (ontology). A subtext to this question is a concern: as we elaborate our epistemology, and make it rigorous, do we arbitrarily, in my view, void segments of ontology? Is this a bad thing? Now to one of your lard-ettes: "**Hang on, Dave. We are starting to talk as if ANYTHING is effable."** I don't know about you, but I would never make such an assertion, nor propose any example of something being "effed." I agree with Korzibski's dictum, "The Map is not the Territory!" And I am perfectly happy, all my "Experience" is compatible with, and my adopted philosophy of Hermeneutics is consistent with that dictum. I have no desire to reduce ambiguity. I thrive on constant change. I have no need to replace metaphor with lexical terms. For me there is no "Truth" — even if defined as a provisional agreement, ala Peirce. The "approximately effable" linguistic constructions we utilize to attribute "meaning" to our experiences are all equally false-to-fact, but pragmatically useful to the extent they keep us fed and amused. Comments on other elements of larding await the reading of the paper you sent. davew On Wed, Dec 11, 2019, at 8:23 PM, thompnicks...@gmail.com wrote: > Hi, Dave, and thanks, Frank. See Larding Below: > > Nick Thompson > Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology > Clark University > thompnicks...@gmail.com > https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ > > > > *From:* Friam <friam-boun...@redfish.com> *On Behalf Of *Prof David West > *Sent:* Wednesday, December 11, 2019 2:58 AM > *To:* friam@redfish.com > *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] [EXT] Re: A pluralistic model of the mind? > > > Last summer I spoke with God. The effects were profound and obvious to all. > Many of the effects, measured with MRI and encephalographic devices, were > quantifiable. I spoke of my experience, as best as I could, recognizing that > whatever words I used told but part of the story. Other's experience of me > changed as well - they uniformly and consistently experience me, not as the > fun loving drunken whoring party guy, but only as the pious jackass that was > the inevitable and most profound effect of my experience. > **[NST===>] My Larder is only half working on this computer. ** > > God is therefore real and extant? > **[NST===>] Does God “prove out”? In order to answer that question, we would > have to have a conception of God that could possibly “prove out”. I say that > God is the Wizard in Wizard of Oz. An old guy who hides in a closet and > manipulates our experience with giant levers. That conception is probably > “prove-out-able” but probably doesn’t prove out. Or, ringed around with > sufficient special meanings, it could become circular, and therefore not > “prove-out-able”. So,** > > But wait ... > > I did not really speak with God. That word and all the other words, and the > framing of the effects, piety replacing ribaldry, came after the fact, a post > hoc rationalization/interpretation/articulation of "something." And, of > course, the form of all those words and effects is but > **[NST===>] Why “but”, Dave? It’s an artifact of culture. It’s an experience > that proves out only with in the framework of a culture. As long as you stay > within the culture, it proves out pretty good. When you moved away from home, > it didn’t prove out. ** > an artifact of the culture (and maybe the Jungian collective unconscious) > within which I was raised. > > There was "An Experience;" but even that label, those two words, is > false-to-fact. > **[NST===>] Stipulated** > What "Was" had no bounds, in time or space and, in fact continues (and > predated) the implied bounded context inherent in the meaning of 'an > experience'. There is an implied relation between the "Experience" and an > ego, an "I:" 1) the "Experience" was apart from "I," 2) "I" was part of the > "Experience," 3) "I" perceived/sensed the "Experience." None of these implied > relations are accurate or complete, or even differentiable from each other. > > There was a Real, Existing, Thing. "It" was effectual; in that patterns of > brain waves and detectable activity in different parts of the brain before > and after "It" are measurable and comparable. > **[NST===>] Not sure what all this brain talk is doing. What experiences does > brain talk represent. Were you looking at an MRI while all of this was > happening?** > Behavior and experience — from the "inside" — was altered dramatically, in > the sense of the "color," the filtering lens, the 'fit" of interpretations of > individual experiences is dramatically altered. Experience — of others on the > "outside" — is altered as well, although often not expressible beyond, > "there's something different about you, can't put my finger on it, but ... " > **[NST===>] The outsidedness and the insidedness of experiences are > themselves experiences which prove out in markedly different ways. ** > > Not only was the "Thing" effectual, it is, within statistical limits, > possible to predict the nature and degree of the effects that ensue from > "Thing-Occurrence." Moreover, it is possible to establish an "experimental > context" whereby others can "experience" the "Thing" and thereby confirm the > prediction of effects. > > "Thing-Occurrence" ---> partially predictable, measurable (sometimes > quantifiable) effects ---> "Thing is Real/Existing? > > Despite being, in every way ineffable — in that no words capture its totality > and any words used, in any naturally occurring human language, are > false-to-fact. > **[NST===>] Hang on, Dave. We are starting to talk as if ANYTHING is effable. > Let’s agree on an example of proper, unambiguous effing that we can use as a > model, a case where you, and I, and all members of FRIAM can agree, “Nick and > Dave really effed that sucker!” In the meantime, please have a look at the > attached text, pp 4-8. ** > ** ** > **Here, for the lazy amongst you, is a “gist”** > ** ** > Working through thought-experiments like the one above leads us to conclude > that all descriptions, particularly satisfying ones, are inevitably > explanatory and that all explanations are descriptive. And yet, you cannot > explain something until you have something to explain – so all explanations > must be based on prior descriptions. The only reasonable conclusion, if you > take both of these claims at face value, is that all explanations are based > on prior explanations! The distinction between description and explanation > concerns their position in an argument, not their objectivity or subjectivity > in some enduring sense. Whether a statement is explanatory or descriptive > depends upon the understandings that exist between the speaker and his or her > audience at the time the statement is made. *Descriptions are explanations > that the speaker and the audience take to be true for the purpose of seeking > further explanations*.[1] > <https://www.fastmail.com/mail/compose/Mde3e24e57585027ee6f4e539?u=f61741a2&domain=fastmail.fm#_ftn1> > > ** ** > > ???? > > dave west > > > On Wed, Dec 11, 2019, at 6:10 AM, Eric Charles wrote: >> Ok.... I'm going to try to do a better take on the "ineffable" issue. I want >> to start by admitting that there is some sense in which ANYTHING I want to >> describe is never fully described by the words I use, in some reasonable use >> of the word "fully." If I see a turtle, and I tell you that I saw a turtle, >> I haven't provided you with a full description of exactly what the >> experience was like. So, I'm willing to admit that... but I'm not convinced >> there is anything deeper than that about Nick's inability to express his >> "feelings" to his granddaughter... and with that out of the way I will >> return to what I think is the broader issue. >> >> Real / existing things have effects. That is what it is to be real / to >> exist. If someone wants to talk about something that exists but have no >> effects, they are wandering down an rabbit hole with no bottom, and might as >> well be talking about noiseless sounds or blue-less blue. >> >> The pragmatic maxim tells us: " Consider what effects... we conceive the >> object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is >> the whole of our conception of the object." So anything we conceive of is, >> in some sense, a cluster of effects, and so everything "real" is _in >> principle_ conceivable. And to the extent anything can be expressed >> adequately - whether by words or any other means of expression - concepts >> can be expressed, and so anything real can be expressed. >> >> However, i'm not sure the effability is really the important part. The >> bigger question was about epistemology and ontology. But the pragmatic maxim >> covers that as well. Things that have effects are _in principle_ we may >> presume there are many, many effects that we don't yet have the means to >> detect, but anything that has effects could, under some circumstances, be >> detectable. So the limits of what _is_ are the same as the limits of what >> can in principle be known. Postulation of things that are existing but which >> can't, under any circumstances, be known is internally contradictory. >> >> Was that a better reply? It felt more thorough at least... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ----------- >> Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. >> Department of Justice - Personnel Psychologist >> American University - Adjunct Instructor >> >> >> >> >> On Tue, Dec 10, 2019 at 7:36 PM uǝlƃ ☣ <geprope...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> I intend to respond to both Nick's and EricC's comments about "faith in >>> convergence" at some point. But I've been caught up in other things. So, in >>> the meantime, ... >>> >>> "Irony and Outrage," part 2: Why Colbert got serious — and why Donald Trump >>> isn't funny >>> https://www.salon.com/2019/12/08/irony-and-outrage-part-2-why-colbert-got-serious-and-why-donald-trump-isnt-funny/ >>> >>> There are 2 interesting tangents touching this thread: >>> >>> 1) Re: ineffability -- "But also that the mere logic of the humorous >>> juxtaposition eludes him — the notion that you do not issue the argument, >>> you create a juxtaposition that invites the audience to issue an argument." >>> >>> I'll argue that the content of a (good) joke is *ineffable*. The whole >>> purpose of the joke teller is to communicate something without actually >>> *saying* it. If you explain a joke, it breaks the joke. >>> >>> And 2) Re: limits to epistemology limiting ontology -- "That, to me, is >>> illustrative of that broader point I try to make about how when a threat is >>> salient to you, it becomes hard to enter the state of play, ..." >>> >>> I *would* argue that pluralists will be more able to enter the "state of >>> play" Goldthwaite describes (and I've described on this list a number of >>> times as variations of "suspension of disbelief", "empathetic listening", >>> and being willing to play games others set up) than monists. I think >>> monists should TEND to be more committed to their way of thinking than >>> pluralists ... more willing to believe their own or others' brain farts. At >>> least in my case, being a pluralist means, in part, that I refuse to >>> *commit* to ontological assertions of any kind. I'll play with various >>> types of monism just as readily as I'll play with 3-tupleisms ... or >>> 17-tupleisms. I think that's what makes me a simulant of passing >>> competence. You just need to tell me *what* -ism you want to simulate. >>> >>> As such, it seems that maybe Dave's got the cart before the horse. It's the >>> failure of ontology that's mandating voids in epistemology. We should work >>> toward robust *ways of knowing* and loosen up a bit on whatever it is we >>> think we know. I say "would argue" of course because, being totally >>> ignorant of philosophy, I'm probably just confused about everything. >>> >>> On 12/10/19 12:43 PM, Prof David West wrote: >>> > Both your anecdotes support, my assertion that lots of things and lots of >>> > experiences are ineffable. This does not mean they are not "expressible" >>> > nor "communicable, merely that they cannot be expressed with words nor >>> > communicated using words. >>> > >>> > Words fail! Indeed! >>> > >>> > Entire languages fail. Entire epistemological philosophies fail. >>> > >>> > You "rendered" the ineffable to your grand-daughter, but you did NOT >>> > render them to me with words. You you words to circumscribe and speak >>> > about an experience of a kind that you believe I might have first hand, >>> > equally ineffable, experience of and that your indirect words would move >>> > me to make a connection. At best, your words, your language, worked like >>> > a game of Charades or Pictionary as a means of limning the space wherein >>> > I might find my own experience of like kind. >>> > >>> > A "mystic" engages an experience that is ineffable, and then utters >>> > thousands, book volumes worth, of words attempting to limn a space >>> > wherein you too might engage the same experience — or, if an optimist, >>> > might awaken in you a recognition of what you have already experienced. >>> > More Charades and Pictionary — spewing forth words ABOUT the experience; >>> > never expressing, in words or language, the experience itself. >>> > >>> > At least some ineffable experiences can be expressed directly using a >>> > language of voltages and wave forms, (Neurotheology), but not words or >>> > mathematical symbols or such-based languages. >>> > >>> > The question remains: why does a failure of epistemology mandate voids in >>> > ontology? >>> > >>> > I love your etymological daffiness, I share it. >>> > >>> > The definitions cited reflect an arrogance of the "enlightened" in the >>> > notion "too great for words." A lot of mystics make this, what I believe >>> > to be, error, attempting to grant an ontological status of REAL that does >>> > not follow from the simple fact that it cannot be expressed in words. >>> > >>> > And another sidenote — something might be "ineffable" simply because you >>> > are not allowed to use a word, ala Carlin's seven dirty words, or the >>> > "N-Word" or the "C-Word." >>> >>> -- >>> ☣ uǝlƃ >>> >>> ============================================================ >>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >>> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove >> ============================================================ >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove >> > > > > [1] > <https://www.fastmail.com/mail/compose/Mde3e24e57585027ee6f4e539?u=f61741a2&domain=fastmail.fm#_ftnref1> > Conversely, explanations are descriptions that the speaker and audience hold > to be unverified under the present circumstances. > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove > > > *Attachments:* > * Introduction-nst-17-06-18 (002).docx
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
