I unintentionally omitted the citation: Citation Bem, D. J. (2011). Feeling the future: Experimental evidence for anomalous retroactive influences on cognition and affect. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100*(3), 407–425. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0021524 <https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1037/a0021524>
--- Frank C. Wimberly 140 Calle Ojo Feliz, Santa Fe, NM 87505 505 670-9918 Santa Fe, NM On Mon, May 11, 2020, 5:51 AM Prof David West <profw...@fastmail.fm> wrote: > Psi is vastly more extensive (types) and complicated than Daryl seems to > recognize. Based on the abstract, his experimental method precludes the > possibility of obtaining any but negative results. I would attempt to > explain why, but I doubt anyone on the list is interested. > > davew > > > On Sun, May 10, 2020, at 4:18 PM, Frank Wimberly wrote: > > Here is an abstract by Daryl Bem (I thought there was only one 'r'): > > > > > > > > > > Abstract > > The term psi denotes anomalous processes of information or energy transfer > that are currently unexplained in terms of known physical or biological > mechanisms. Two variants of psi are* precognition* (conscious cognitive > awareness) and premonition (affective apprehension) of a future event that > could not otherwise be anticipated through any known inferential process. > Precognition and *premonition* are themselves special cases of a more > general phenomenon: the anomalous retroactive influence of some future > event on an individual's current responses, whether those responses are > conscious or nonconscious, cognitive or affective. This article reports 9 > experiments, involving more than 1,000 participants, that test for > retroactive influence by “time-reversing” well-established psychological > effects so that the individual's responses are obtained before the > putatively causal stimulus events occur. Data are presented for 4 > time-reversed effects: precognitive approach to erotic stimuli and > precognitive avoidance of negative stimuli; retroactive priming; > retroactive habituation; and retroactive facilitation of recall. The mean > effect size (d) in psi performance across all 9 experiments was 0.22, and > all but one of the experiments yielded statistically significant results. > The individual-difference variable of stimulus seeking, a component of > extraversion, was significantly correlated with psi performance in 5 of the > experiments, with participants who scored above the midpoint on a scale of > stimulus seeking achieving a mean effect size of 0.43. Skepticism about > psi, issues of replication, and theories of psi are also discussed. > (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved) > > > On Sun, May 10, 2020 at 3:50 PM Frank Wimberly <wimber...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > Eric Charles, > > As you read this recall that I have an MS in psychology so you can think > of me as a disenchanted former psychologist. > > You hint at something I have wondered about. Psychologists seem to have > physics envy. They want to make wonderful counter-intuitive discoveries > like the photon slit experiment, etc that seem incredible. But some (not > I) claim that their findings are either obvious or incapable of > replication. I took classes from Darryl Bem who could fascinate > undergraduates with his self-perception ideas. He was also an amateur > magician who was in his element when he was performing before an auditorium > full of amazed people. Admittedly he explained how he did his illusions. > He must have been expelled from the magicians union. > > Frank > > --- > Frank C. Wimberly > 140 Calle Ojo Feliz, > Santa Fe, NM 87505 > > 505 670-9918 > Santa Fe, NM > > On Sun, May 10, 2020, 2:35 PM Eric Charles <eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > Frank, > So far as I can tell, no one is denying thought. I'm certainly not. There > are phenomenon at play, and one of the things that happens when you science > a phenomenon is that you end up with descriptions of the phenomenon (and > explanations for the phenomenon) that don't match mundane intuitions about > things,. We should expect that the science of psychology defines its > subject matter different from mundane intuitions in the same way that the > science of physics and the science of biology did for their respective > subject matters: Sometimes those definitions end up pretty close to the > mundane intuitions of a given era, other times you end up with definitions > that are radically different. > > In these contexts, I like to remind people how mindbogglingly unintuitive > Newtonian momentum is. When was the last time you moved an object and it > didn't come to rest? Aristotle's system is much more intuitive. > > ----------- > Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. > Department of Justice - Personnel Psychologist > American University - Adjunct Instructor > > <echar...@american.edu> > > > On Sun, May 10, 2020 at 10:46 AM Frank Wimberly <wimber...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > As I said to Nick approximately a dozen years ago, people who deny thought > must not have it. I don't mean that as an insult. It's that for me > thought is the one thing I can't deny because it's the first *experience* > At that point Nick dismisses me as a Cartesian. > > --- > Frank C. Wimberly > 140 Calle Ojo Feliz, > Santa Fe, NM 87505 > > 505 670-9918 > Santa Fe, NM > > On Sun, May 10, 2020, 8:34 AM uǝlƃ ☣ <geprope...@gmail.com> wrote: > > Ha! Well, by ignoring the poignant example, you've ignored my entire > point. And it's that point by which I can't agree with the unmoored > distinction you're making. The celery example isn't about being alive. > Sorry for injecting that into it. The celery example is about *scale*. > Celery's movement *is* movement. An antenna's behavior *is* its movement. I > introduced antennas' behavior in order to help demonstrate that behavior is > orthogonal to life. > > Now, the distinction you're making by saying that behavior is a proper > subset of movement, would be fine *if* you identify some movement that is > *not* behavior. I didn't see that in the Old Dead Guy text you quoted ... > maybe I missed it? Anyway, that's the important category and celery and > antennas fit right in. > > But the behavior/movement discussion (including observer-ascribed > intention) is a bit of a distraction. What we're actually talking about is > *hidden* states (a.k.a. "thinking", maybe extrapolated to "consciousness"). > So, the examples of light-following or higher order objective targeting is > like trying to run before you can walk. Why do that? Why not talk about, > say, the hidden states of an antenna? If we could characterize purely > *passive* behavior/movement, we might be able to characterize *reactive* > movement. And if we do that, then we can talk about the complicatedness (or > complexity) of more general *transformations* from input to output. And > then we might be able to talk about I⇔O maps whose internal state can (or > can't) be estimated solely from their I&O. > > We don't need all this philosophical rigmarole to talk about the > complexity of I⇔O maps. > > On 5/9/20 6:17 PM, Eric Charles wrote: > > Ok, so it sounds like we agree there is a distinction can be made > between behavior and "mere movement". So what is that difference? I would > argue, following E. B. Holt, that it is the presence of intentionality. > Note crucially that the directedness of the behavior described below is > descriptive, /not /explanatory. The intention is not a force behind the > behavior, it is a property of the behavior-to-circumstance mapping that can > be demonstrated by varying conditions appropriately. > > [...] > > P.S. I'm going to try to ignore the celery challenge, because while we > recognize plants as living, we do not typically talk about them as > behaving. And I think the broad issue of living vs. not-living is a > different issue. We probably should talk about plants behaving a bit more > than we normally do, but I think it is worth getting a handle on what we > mean in the more normal seeming cases before we try to look for > implications like those. > > > -- > ☣ uǝlƃ > > .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... > .... . ... > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam > unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC <http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/FRIAM-COMIC> > http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > > .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... > .... . ... > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam > unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > > .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... > .... . ... > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam > unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > > > > -- > Frank Wimberly > 140 Calle Ojo Feliz > Santa Fe, NM 87505 > 505 670-9918 > .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... > .... . ... > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam > unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > > > .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... > .... . ... > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam > unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >
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