As long as I am scattergunning this list with the rock-salt of my random studies, I have to toss Spinoza over the transom as well.

Being too lazy (manically preoccupied) to thread my way back through the existing discussions on duality on this list, I will simply ask if anyone here has already thrown down on Spinoza's take on duality here, or even better, is willing to now:

From Spinoza's Ethics <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethics_(Spinoza_book)#Part_II:_Of_the_Nature_&_Origin_of_the_Mind>:

   /Further, there is no difference between contemplating an idea and
   thinking that it is true, and there is no//freedom of the will
   <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will>//at all. Sensory
   perception, which Spinoza calls "knowledge of the first kind", is
   entirely inaccurate, since it reflects how our own bodies work more
   than how things really are. We can also have a kind of accurate
   knowledge called "knowledge of the second kind", or "reason". This
   encompasses knowledge of the features common to all things, and
   includes principles of physics and geometry. We can also have
   "knowledge of the third kind", or "//intuitive knowledge
   <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intuition>//". This is a sort of
   knowledge that, somehow, relates particular things to the nature of
   God./

In Spinoza's taxonomy, it would seem that DaveW's "dark-matter/energy" attribution is what Spinoza calls "knowledge of the third kind".
//

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