Dear friends,

I've stumbled upon a controversial (to me) manuscript: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/behavioral-and-brain-sciences/article/excess-capacity-learning/909013EF15575CF119FD511904CDF0C3 (Excess Capacity Learning, by Dubova and Sloman, appearing on CUP-edited Behavioral and Brain Sciences).

In essence the claim is: double descent in NN training smells like the human cognitive system.  My very rough distillation, following a cursory read, is: three regimes of representational capacity are laid out.

i. constrained - not enough: I love food, remember burgers taste good to me, sort of can tell a burger joint if I see one;

ii. sufficient - I go to burger-making places to have one;

iii. excess - I retain more information than necessary (e.g. day of week on which I had a bad burger).

I don't need to know the day of the week, but given a bad burger experience on a given day, I will refrain from eating one on the same day.  Implication: maybe on Wednesdays there's a different burger flipper at work.

Here's a proper synthesis: https://www.santafe.edu/news-center/news/upending-assumptions-about-learning-inspired-by-an-ai-phenomenon

I don't buy it.  For starters, I see a circular reasoning: the moment an "excess signal" becomes predictive, it stops being "excess" and becomes "sufficient", in their parlance.

The editors are requesting commentary here*, and I can't think of a more apt congregation to throw this curveball.

Thank you for your attention to this matter,

Cheers,

-Matteo


*https://drive.google.com/file/d/1XkBQ2K0_hIz4Se8b0cOUKreM96ONBqqP/view <<< link appears on the SFI webpage, assumedly safe

.- .-.. .-.. / ..-. --- --- - . .-. ... / .- .-. . / .-- .-. --- -. --. / ... 
--- -- . / .- .-. . / ..- ... . ..-. ..- .-..
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe   /   Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom 
https://bit.ly/virtualfriam
to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
archives:  5/2017 thru present https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/
  1/2003 thru 6/2021  http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/

Reply via email to