The point is that it's essentially impossible to whether there's any encrypted partition present (or how many).
Sent from my iPhone On 12 Jul 2011, at 22:21, Tim <tim-secur...@sentinelchicken.org> wrote: >>> Tim, I actually use TruCrypt now to do exactly what you speak >>> of. I pre-allocate a fixed virtual disk, and use one passcode >>> for one section of data and a different passcode for a different >>> section of data. It is impossible to determine if the disk is >>> set up in this manner, and impossible to tell which section of >>> data is being used. It is actually quite easy to do. >>> >> >> All fine and dandy until the authorities say "Your honor, the >> defendant >> is using nested encryption, we didn't find the >> $self_incriminating_evidence so he obviously hasn't complied with our >> request". >> >> double-edged sword. > > > Yeah, exactly. Any investigator worth their salt will be able to tell > the partition that got decrypted is not big enough to account for > encrypted disk space. That's where the one-time pad can create true > plausible deniability, if used correctly. Any ciphertext of length N > can decrypt to any plaintext of length N. Too bad it is too much of a > pain to implement in practice. > > Thor: maybe you could make the investigator's job harder through a > combination of compression and encryption with a similar > dual-partition scheme as you're using with trucrypt. > > tim > > _______________________________________________ > Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. > Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html > Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
