> Yeah, I'm sure there are ways to draw as little attention as > possible, but I also agree with you that in the scope of the > investigation, it's not going to take a genius to see that there is > something wrong about available size... However, evidence by > exclusion is not admissible.
Interesting. Hadn't thought about that... > But again, the "I forgot" defense is very hard to prove against as > well. What we don't want is a path to where NOT providing unencrypted > data is a crime in itself, because all that becomes is a method to > ensure that you get prosecuted for *something* irrespective of what > can be proved. Yeah, definitely. One can also pretend to cooperate: "Oh, I just had some source code from a previous job stored there. It's been so long, I don't remember the password anymore. You can ask X corp for the code." > I have a bad feeling about this stuff. Same here. There are certainly people doing very evil things trying to hide it with encryption. On the other hand, how many more of those evil people will you catch because you are forcing them to give up keys? How many people will be put at risk of government abuse or other unfortunate data leaks due to being compelled to give up keys? tim _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
