FOR WHAT IT'S WORTH, the struggle within the Bush administration is getting more attention than Karen Hughes ever wanted it to get: see snippet below from http://www.stratfor.com/fib/fib_view.php?ID=205737
I also heard an insightful comment on National Public Radio (Talk of the Nation, I think) about most Americans' perception of the Saudis as our friends/allies vs enemies: for many Americans the only memory of the Saudis is as our very cooperative allies during Desert Storm a decade ago; however, their motives and interests are different today, obviously, because Kuwait has not been occupied again and there is not immediate fear that SH can or is interested in taking control of a neighbor's oil production. It's obvious to everyone on this list, at least, that much has changed in 10 years and the same conditions and political environment no longer are there, but to the average voter the assumption remains that SA is still one of America's best friends in the ME. Thus, a PR campaign to justify ambitious and hastily made plans, and that's why so much of this appears fragmented and poorly researched, regardless of 9/11 as a pivotal marker that "changed everything". You can use that only so much. Pearl Harbor didn't change the agenda, conditions and action in Japan's warfare in the Pacific all it did was change our response. Likewise, 9/11 didn't change the history, decades of violence and attempts at peace and their failure, or the sociopolitical culture that greeted Bush & Cheney on 9/12. We are in the process of mythmaking, just as the Gulf of Tonkin "incident" justified Johnson accelerating US activity in SE Asia. 9/11 is being used as an excuse, not a justification. Identifying WMD and the threat of their use is justification for regime change, not speculation and conjecture or wishful thinking. However, historians are kept busy writing books about just such decisions and calls to war for far sillier reasons. - Karen The Iraq Obsession: Summary 14 August 2002 Opposition to a U.S. attack on Iraq is increasingly being voiced internationally and within Washington. Despite the divisions it is causing, the Bush administration is not abandoning its strategy because it sees a successful campaign against Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein as a prime way to shatter the psychological advantage within the Islamist movement and demonstrate U.S. power. Analysis The diplomatic and political walls began to close in on the Bush administration's Iraq policy last week. First, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder very publicly announced something Berlin had been saying privately for years: The German government wants no part in any invasion of Iraq. Then Republican House majority leader Dick Armey said he saw little justification for an Iraqi operation. Schroeder's stance may be mainly a political ploy aimed at Germany's Sept. 22 elections as he currently is trailing conservative challenger Edmund Stoiber, who has taken a more pro-U.S. military stance. But Washington must still take seriously the opposition to an Iraq campaign within the German government and populace. Germany is a key staging area for U.S. forces. There are pre-positioned equipment and forces based in the country that undoubtedly would be needed for any attack. Depending on the opposition, U.S. bases in Germany might not be available for use. The statement from Armey also means that in addition to expected opposition from liberals, Bush could face the same from his own political base. At this point it seems there are very few outside the Bush administration who want an Iraq invasion, with the possible exception of the British government and Israel. Bill wrote: Keith, I agree that there is a struggle going on in the Bush administration. Even though 'W' is not a match for the brain power surrounding him, you have to remember that his background and wealth is in and from oil and he probably has a much warmer feeling for Saudi money than anyone else there. Bill
