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Personally, I think talk of removing the
37,000 US (mostly Calvary) troops from SK is premature – and fake. They act as a stabilizing presence in
the still-nervous Far East. Witness
the uproar after Japanese PM Koizumi revisited the Yasukuni shrine again today,
angering both SK and China. ( see http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/index-e.htm
). The US has succeeded tremendously with
helping to boost S Korea out of the post-colonial period, and reducing our
presence there in the future is desirable, but not at this time, not those
troops. The current talk in
Washington is a diversion, allowing hot heads like Pat Buchanon to get air time,
giving programmers for 24/7 cable news something to add to their daily
agendas. To abandon the bases in
SK anytime in the immediate future would increase the chances that Japan would
move to militarize and build her own nuclear arsenal, even though this is
difficult to imagine from a country that has an outspoken anti-nuke
constituency, and I’m not certain much will change when the WW2 generation has
all passed away. Taiwan, however, and China are still volatile
strategic areas. Where did I read
recently that Taiwan has increased her arms sales? Besides, it just isn’t going to happen. Those boots on the ground in SK provide
an essential component to the strike and deterrence strategy of the Seventh
Fleet in Asia. The 1994 Agreement
made provisions for gradual withdrawals of troops by NK, SK and the US, as Carter
notes. Please read this link to story about a US
n-power flattop being stationed at Yokosuka AFB for the very first time ever. Remarkable change. Did you know the USS Kitty Hawk is
being decommissioned in 2008? (http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/index-e.htm) Today, China says that it will be more than
happy to host a diplomatic meeting between N Korea and the US, and our envoy is
in Beijing already. http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/14/international/asia/15KOREA.html Ideally, I would like for the US to reduce
it’s permanent presence in Asia, but not under these circumstances. – Karen Op-Ed: Back to the Framework @ http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A52281-2003Jan13.html By
Jimmy Carter, Tuesday, January 14, 2003 (opening and concluding paragraphs excerpted below) “There is an eerie
case of deja vu in Korea. Nearly
nine years ago, President Kim Il Sung expelled international inspectors and
threatened to process plutonium from spent fuel at an old graphite-moderated
nuclear reactor in Yongbyon. The
Clinton administration had rejected negotiations with North Korea, was
contemplating a military strike to destroy the nuclear facility and was seeking
U.N. Security Council economic sanctions. The North Koreans announced that such
sanctions would be considered an act of war. It was clear the United States and South Korean militaries
could prevail, but there would be massive casualties from the formidable ground
forces of North Korea. As now, the isolated
and economically troubled nation was focused on resolving basic differences
with the United States. Deeply
suspicious and perhaps paranoid, the North Koreans were demanding assurances
against a nuclear attack and opportunities for normal bilateral relations. At the invitation of
Kim Il Sung, and with the approval of the White House, I went to Pyongyang and
negotiated directly with the man known as the "Great Leader." He
agreed to freeze the nuclear situation at Yongbyon and permit international
inspectors to monitor the agreement. In return, the United States was to pledge
that nuclear weapons would not be used against North Korea and that two modern
light-water reactors would be built to replace the Yongbyon facility. In the meantime, a monthly supply of
fuel oil would help provide electrical power. The subsequent death of Kim Il Sung,
who was replaced by his son, Kim Jong Il, interfered with the more rapid
timetable that we envisioned, but these nuclear proposals were accepted
officially in the Agreed Framework, also involving South Korea and Japan. Kim Il Sung wanted to
discuss long-term issues, with the goal of achieving normal relations between
the Koreas and with America. He agreed to an immediate summit meeting with
South Korea's president to discuss cross-border visitation among Korean
families and the implementation of general principles adopted in 1992 regarding
reunification. His suggestions for future talks with the United States included
cooperation in recovering the remains of U.S. soldiers, a step-by-step
reduction of Korean armed forces to 100,000 men on each side, with U.S. troops to be reduced in
the same proportion,
withdrawal of long-range artillery and other aggressive military forces from
near the demilitarized zone, and mutual inspections to ensure the
de-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Although the promised light-water reactors were not
built, substantial
progress was made between North Korea and the United States, illustrated by
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's successful discussions in Pyongyang. The Bush
administration brought a change in relationship with both Koreas. Rejection of the "sunshine policy," which had earned the Nobel Peace
Prize for South Korean President Kim Dae Jung; announcements that North Korea, like Iraq and
Iran, was part of an "axis of evil"; public
statements that the new "Great Leader" was loathed as a "pygmy" who deliberately starved his own
people, that America
was prepared to fight two wars at the same time, and that our missile defense system was a shield against North Korea -- all this
helped cause many in that country to assume that they were next on America's hit list after Iraq. …To resolve this
impasse, some forum -- perhaps convened by Russia or China -- must be found
within which these troubling differences can be resolved. The principles of the Agreed Framework of 1994 can be reconfirmed, combined with North
Korea's full and verifiable compliance with the nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty and a firm U.S. declaration of nonaggression against North Korea, so
long as all agreements are honored. Then perhaps the more
far-reaching proposals discussed with Kim Il Sung can be implemented and a
permanent peace can come to the reconciled Koreas.” (end of excerpts) Former president
Carter is chairman of the Carter Center in Atlanta. Outgoing mail scanned by NAV 2002 |
