RE: [Futurework] Will Bush become a Shia Moslem? Glass half-full or glass half empty?

[Karen Watters Cole]

By committing US forces, financing and reputation to ancient Mesopotamia, under false pretenses, the Bush2 administration has blundered into a historical and cultural minefield.  Their business school mentality about governing led them to conclude foreign policy was really just business acquisitions on a grand scale.  They were wrong.    Under the strain of this responsibility lies the knowledge that Bush campaigned on accountability and the past residue of his father’s administration, personnel included.  The burden of the neoconservative mantra to “get this one right”, to be more successful in Bush2 than they were in Bush1, will lead either to a new administration, or hopefully before that can occur legally, a collective desire to re-spin policy toward the realism of business, and cut one’s losses.    As Brad suggests, the Rockefeller Republicans are surely beginning to question the wisdom of pursuing this “business plan”.  There are even conservative lawmakers and organizations questioning Ashcroft and the US Patriot Act.  Now we will see who really has “spine” and what kind of leadership emerges.  This is why you see Sen. Lugar saying in a Der Spiegel interview that the UN must be given an opportunity to shepherd Iraq into stability, carefully demurring when the interviewer made pointed remarks, why Powell interrupted a family vacation to meet with Kofi Annan, why party line conservative pundits now demand that our allies must be forced to stand with us, under a UN peacekeeping force, when they’d argued previously we could do this unilaterally.    Coincidentally, I’ve had this below prepped for posting today.  Madeline Albright lets loose in the upcoming issue of Foreign Affairs magazine, sparing no one; Bush and the policy he has unwisely pushed, Rumsfeld and his doublespeak; terrorists; the French.  In these excerpts I chose she points out with common sense that you can’t promote democracy from the barrel of a gun and that alone is the ultimate failure of Bush2 “shock and awe” Plan A in the Middle East.  However, she insists as I hear Lawry saying, that it is not too late to change course. The question is are they really listening?  Will they accept a strategic retreat and quietly shelve the Bush preemptive doctrine – just in time?   -  KWC   It’s titled Bridges, bombs or bluster? @ http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030901faessay82501/madeleine-k-albright/bridges-bombs-or-bluster.html.    …NEITHER, NOR “ Many observers see in the Bush administration's policies an admirable demonstration of spine in confronting those who threaten the safety of the American people. I would join the applause -- if only those policies were safeguarding U.S. citizens more effectively. But they are not. Moreover, I remain convinced that had Al Gore been elected president, and had the attacks of September 11 still happened, the United States and NATO would have gone to war in Afghanistan together, then deployed forces all around that country and stayed to rebuild it. Democrats, after all, confess support for nation building, and also believe in finishing the jobs we start. I also believe the United States and NATO together would have remained focused on fighting al Qaeda and would not have pretended -- and certainly would not have been allowed to get away with pretending -- that the ongoing failure to capture Osama bin Laden did not matter. As for Saddam, I believe the Gore team would have read the intelligence information about his activities differently and concluded that a war against Iraq, although justifiable, was not essential in the short term to protect U.S. security. A policy of containment would have been sufficient while the administration pursued the criminals who had murdered thousands on American soil. The Bush administration's decision to broaden its focus from opposing al Qaeda to invading Iraq and threatening military action against others has had unintended and unwelcome consequences. According to the recent findings of the Pew Global Attitudes Project, which surveyed 16,000 people in 20 countries and the Palestinian territories in May, the percentage of those who have a favorable view of the United States has declined sharply (15 percentage points or more) in nations such as Brazil, France, Germany, Jordan, Nigeria, Russia, and Turkey. In Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim-majority state, the view of the United States plunged from 75 percent favorable to 83 percent negative between 2000 and 2003. Support for the U.S.-led war on terror has declined in each of the countries listed above, along with pivotal Pakistan, where it stands at a disheartening 20 percent. The citizens of such NATO allies as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy rated Russia's Vladimir Putin more highly as a world leader than Bush. Significant majorities of those interviewed in Russia and in 7 of 8 predominantly Muslim countries (Kuwait being the exception) claimed to be somewhat or very worried about the potential threat to their societies posed by the U.S. military. I never thought the day would come when the United States would be feared by those it has neither the intention nor the cause to harm. The ouster of Saddam has indeed made the world, or at least Iraq, a better place.  But when the United States commits tens of billions of dollars to any worthwhile project, that is the least it should be able to say.  Even more vital is progress toward mobilizing the kind of multinational, multicultural, multifaceted, and multiyear initiative required to discredit, disrupt, and dismantle al Qaeda and whatever splinter factions it may one day spawn.  That initiative will require a maximum degree of global coordination and the integration of force, diplomacy, intelligence, and law.  It will require strong working relationships in regions where radical ideologies thrive and pro-Western sentiments are scant.  And above all, it will require vigorous leadership from Islamic moderates, who must win the struggle for control of their own faith.  Unfortunately, the Iraq war and the subsequent U.S. occupation of Baghdad -- the capital of Islam during that faith's golden age -- have made more difficult the choices Islamic moderates and others around the world must make. The problem is that President Bush has reframed his initial question.  Instead of simply asking others to oppose al Qaeda, he now asks them to oppose al Qaeda, support the invasion of an Arab country, and endorse the doctrine of preemption -- all as part of a single package.  Faced with this choice, many who staunchly oppose al Qaeda have nevertheless decided that they do not want to be "with" the United States, just as some Iraqis are now making clear their opposition both to Saddam and to those who freed them from him.” … For years, Arab populations have received a distorted message from Washington: that the United States stands for democracy, freedom, and human rights everywhere except in the Middle East and for everyone except the Arabs. The time has come to erase that perception and the reality that too often lies behind it. Democracy will not end terrorism in the Arab world, but neither will it nourish it, as despotism does. Bin Laden's appeal is based on what he symbolizes: defiance. In fact, he offers nothing except death and destruction, and Muslim majorities will reject this if they are offered real alternatives. Indeed, democratization is the most intriguing part of the administration's gamble in Iraq. The creation of a stable and united Iraqi democracy would be a tremendous accomplishment, with beneficial repercussions in other Arab societies. But was invading Iraq the right way to start building democratic momentum in the Arab world? The answer will depend on how divided Iraq remains, and how dicey the security situation becomes. U.S. soldiers will have a hard time democratizing Iraq if they are forced to remain behind walls and inside tanks. And U.S. officials will lack credibility preaching the virtues of freedom if they feel compelled to censor broadcasts, search houses, ban political parties, and repeatedly reject Iraqi demands for more complete self-rule. The Bush administration was determined to retain for itself the authority to supervise every aspect of Iraq's postwar transition. History will judge whether that was a wise decision, but I am reminded in this context of one of "Rumsfeld's Rules," the Pentagon chief's guide for wise public policy: "It is easier to get into something than to get out of it."  (end of excerpts) This is a long essay, which for my eyesight’s sake, I saved as a word document (66.5 KB).  Contact me if you would like to do the same.