By committing US forces, financing and
reputation to ancient Mesopotamia, under false pretenses, the Bush2
administration has blundered into a historical and cultural minefield. Their business school mentality about
governing led them to conclude foreign policy was really just business
acquisitions on a grand scale.
They were wrong.
Under the strain of this responsibility
lies the knowledge that Bush campaigned on accountability and the past residue
of his father’s administration, personnel included. The burden of the neoconservative
mantra to “get this one right”, to be more successful in Bush2 than they were
in Bush1, will lead either to a new administration, or hopefully before that
can occur legally, a collective desire to re-spin policy toward the realism of
business, and cut one’s losses.
As Brad suggests, the Rockefeller
Republicans are surely beginning to question the wisdom of pursuing this
“business plan”. There are even
conservative lawmakers and organizations questioning Ashcroft and the US
Patriot Act. Now we will see who
really has “spine” and what kind of leadership emerges. This is why you see Sen. Lugar saying
in a Der Spiegel interview that the UN must be given an opportunity to
shepherd Iraq into stability, carefully demurring when the interviewer made
pointed remarks, why Powell interrupted a family vacation to meet with Kofi
Annan, why party line conservative pundits now demand that our allies must be
forced to stand with us, under a UN peacekeeping force, when they’d argued
previously we could do this unilaterally.
Coincidentally, I’ve had this below prepped
for posting today. Madeline
Albright lets loose in the upcoming issue of Foreign Affairs magazine, sparing
no one; Bush and the policy he has unwisely pushed, Rumsfeld and his
doublespeak; terrorists; the French.
In these excerpts I chose she points out with common sense that you
can’t promote democracy from the barrel of a gun and that alone is the
ultimate failure of Bush2 “shock and awe” Plan A in the Middle East. However, she insists as I hear Lawry
saying, that it is not too late to change course. The question is are they
really listening? Will they
accept a strategic retreat and quietly shelve the Bush preemptive doctrine –
just in time?
- KWC
It’s titled
Bridges, bombs or
bluster? @ http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030901faessay82501/madeleine-k-albright/bridges-bombs-or-bluster.html.
…NEITHER,
NOR
“ Many observers see in the Bush
administration's policies an admirable demonstration of spine in confronting
those who threaten the safety of the American people. I would join the
applause -- if only those policies were safeguarding U.S. citizens more
effectively.
But
they are not. Moreover, I remain convinced that had Al Gore been elected
president, and had the attacks of September 11 still happened, the United
States and NATO would have gone to war in Afghanistan together, then deployed
forces all around that country and stayed to rebuild it. Democrats, after all,
confess support for nation building, and also believe in finishing the jobs we
start. I also believe the United States and NATO together would have remained
focused on fighting al Qaeda and would not have pretended -- and certainly
would not have been allowed to get away with pretending -- that the ongoing
failure to capture Osama bin Laden did not matter. As for Saddam, I believe
the Gore team would have read the intelligence information about his
activities differently and concluded that a war against Iraq, although
justifiable, was not essential in the short term to protect U.S. security. A
policy of containment would have been sufficient while the administration
pursued the criminals who had murdered thousands on American soil.
The
Bush administration's decision to broaden its focus from opposing al Qaeda to
invading Iraq and threatening military action against others has had
unintended and unwelcome consequences. According to the recent findings of the
Pew
Global Attitudes Project,
which surveyed 16,000 people in 20 countries and the Palestinian territories
in May, the percentage of those who have a favorable view of the United States
has declined sharply (15 percentage points or more) in nations such as Brazil,
France, Germany, Jordan, Nigeria, Russia, and Turkey. In Indonesia, the
world's most populous Muslim-majority state, the view of the United States
plunged from 75 percent favorable to 83 percent negative between 2000 and
2003. Support for the U.S.-led war on terror has declined in each of the
countries listed above, along with pivotal Pakistan, where it stands at a
disheartening 20 percent. The
citizens of such NATO allies as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy
rated Russia's Vladimir Putin more highly as a world leader than
Bush.
Significant majorities of those interviewed in Russia and in 7 of 8
predominantly Muslim countries (Kuwait being the exception) claimed to be
somewhat or very worried about the potential threat to their societies posed
by the U.S. military. I never thought the day would come when the United
States would be feared by those it has neither the intention nor the cause to
harm.
The
ouster of Saddam has indeed made the world, or at least Iraq, a better
place. But
when the United States commits tens of billions of dollars to any worthwhile
project, that is the least it should be able to say. Even more vital is progress toward
mobilizing the kind of multinational, multicultural, multifaceted, and
multiyear initiative required to discredit, disrupt, and dismantle al Qaeda
and whatever splinter factions it may one day spawn. That initiative will require a maximum
degree of global coordination and the integration of force, diplomacy,
intelligence, and law. It will
require strong working relationships in regions where radical ideologies
thrive and pro-Western sentiments are scant. And above all, it will require
vigorous leadership from Islamic moderates, who must win the struggle for
control of their own faith. Unfortunately, the Iraq war and the
subsequent U.S. occupation of Baghdad -- the capital of Islam during that
faith's golden age -- have made more difficult the choices Islamic moderates
and others around the world must make.
The
problem is that President Bush has reframed his initial
question. Instead of simply asking others to
oppose al Qaeda, he now asks them to oppose al Qaeda, support the invasion of
an Arab country, and endorse the doctrine of preemption -- all as part of a
single package. Faced with this choice, many who
staunchly oppose al Qaeda have nevertheless decided that they do not want to
be "with" the United States, just as some Iraqis are now making clear their
opposition both to Saddam and to those who freed them from him.”
…
For years, Arab populations have received a distorted message from Washington:
that the United States stands for democracy, freedom, and human rights
everywhere except in the Middle East and for everyone except the Arabs. The
time has come to erase that perception and the reality that too often lies
behind it. Democracy will not end terrorism in the Arab world, but neither
will it nourish it, as despotism does. Bin
Laden's appeal is based on what he symbolizes: defiance.
In fact, he offers nothing except death and destruction, and Muslim majorities
will reject this if they are offered real alternatives.
Indeed,
democratization is the most intriguing part of the administration's gamble in
Iraq. The creation of a stable and united Iraqi democracy would be a
tremendous accomplishment, with beneficial repercussions in other Arab
societies. But was invading Iraq the right way to start building democratic
momentum in the Arab world? The answer will depend on how divided Iraq
remains, and how dicey the security situation becomes. U.S. soldiers will have
a hard time democratizing Iraq if they are forced to remain behind walls and
inside tanks. And U.S. officials will lack credibility preaching the virtues
of freedom if they feel compelled to censor broadcasts, search houses, ban
political parties, and repeatedly reject Iraqi demands for more complete
self-rule. The Bush administration was determined to retain for itself the
authority to supervise every aspect of Iraq's postwar transition. History will
judge whether that was a wise decision, but I am reminded in this context of
one of "Rumsfeld's
Rules,"
the Pentagon chief's guide for wise public policy: "It
is easier to get into something than to get out of it."
(end
of excerpts)
This
is a long essay, which for my eyesight’s sake, I saved as a word document
(66.5 KB). Contact me if you
would like to do the same.