FPI = Front Pembels Islam, Pembela negara. Jadi FPI Pembela Negara Islam............????
On 30 January 2017 at 10:00, 'Sunny' am...@tele2.se [GELORA45] < GELORA45@yahoogroups.com> wrote: > > > res : *Bela negara = Bela rezim!?* > > http://www.newmandala.org/dangerous-ideology-behind-bela-negara/ > > > The dangerous ideology behind Bela Negara > BHATARA IBNU REZA - 25 JAN, 2017 > > > By calling upon citizens’ supposed rights and obligations to defend the > nation, Indonesia’s military is marching down a perilous path, writes > Bhatara Ibnu Reza. > > In early January, the Indonesian public was shocked to discover that the > military had been training the notorious Islamic Defenders’ Front (Fron > Pembela Islam or FPI) in Lebak, Banten. > > According to news reports, the military trained the vigilante group, who > played a major role in Jakarta’s recent anti-Ahok protests, as part of its > Bela Negara (State Defence) Program, codified by Indonesia’s 2015 Defence > White Paper. > > The news was first broadcast via FPI’s Instagram account with pictures of > the training going viral across cyberspace, including exercises with the > army (TNI) in Madura. > > Faced with such controversy and a wave of criticism from civil society, > the Siliwangi Military Command removed the Lebak district regional > commander for violating procedure. > > But the incident is yet another controversy in a long list of troubles > that has plagued Bela Negara since its inception. More significantly, this > latest misstep is based on a flawed ideology that brings the Indonesian > military and citizens too close together for comfort. > > [image: FPI-Instagram] > <http://www.newmandala.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/FPI-Instagram.jpg> > > Indonesia’s military training members of FPI. Image: FPI/Instagram > > Bela Negara aims to recruit civilians to defend the state by providing > basic military training, including weapon use, and the reinforcement of > state ideology among ordinary citizens. The program also has a militaristic > style, and no particular law has been made to legitimise the program. > > According to Indonesia’s 2015 Defence White Paper, in 10 years the program > will recruit 100 million militant cadres across the archipelago. But these > ‘militant cadres’ are not recognised under any defence law, and it is not > clear whether they are combatants or civilians. > > The only legal basis for the program is Article 27(3) and Article 30(1) of > the Constitution; these highlights both the right and duty of citizens to > defend the state under the Total People’s Defence and Security System. > > Originally, Total People’s Defence was Indonesia’s experience of guerilla > warfare during the war of independence. Two key elements characterise it. > First, the potential for all citizens to fight the ‘enemy’, and second, the > blurred distinction between the military and the people during an armed > resistance. > > Legally, the ideology breaches the laws of war since the implementation of > Total People’s Defence does not clearly distinguish between civilians and > combatants, which is the basic international rule protecting civilians in > armed conflicts. The distinction principle imposes obligations on > conflicting parties to differentiate between combatants and civilians. In > addition, combatants only have the right to attack legitimate military > targets, and civilians are immune from targeting unless they take a direct > part in hostilities. > > The intention to obscure the distinction was not without purpose – this > being to ensure the military remains influential in the social and > political life of Indonesia. The ideology also mirrors the Army’s > self-declared sense of unity with the people (kemanunggalan TNI dan rakyat). > > The Army adopts this position by defining themselves as being one with the > people and identifying their interests as the people’s interests. The > stance also allows the military to undermine the civilian government if the > government is seen not to act in the people’s interests, and defend their > interest in politics. > > The Army also uses the ideology of Total People’s Defence to act > independently and empower their territorial commands to form so-called > civilian people’s resistance, also known as militias. These are created as > a pretext under citizens’ right to defend the state. > > These militia groups have been recruited, trained and supported by the > state armed forces to do ‘the dirty work’ of the military against > separatist elements and society’s undesirables, mostly in conflict areas > like East Timor and Aceh. Its most recent incarnation is seen in the > district military command ‘tacitly’ providing training to FPI under Bela > Negara. > > As such, Bela Negara is simply another way for the military to engage in > national politics through the militarisation of the civilian population > under their supposed rights and obligations when it comes to defending the > nation. > > This activity is reinforced by the use of terms like proxy war against > foreign intervention, and extreme ideologies and external influences like > communism and homosexuality. By choosing to engage with and confront such > issues, it is easy for the military to find allies with vigilante groups > like FPI. Furthermore, these groups can easily transform themselves into > Bela Negara groups and become the military’s proxy. > > Most worryingly, though, with its illegal use of a dangerous ideology, > Bela Negara is cultivating a culture of violence and breaching the law of > armed conflict. > > Bhatara Ibnu Reza is a PhD candidate in the Faculty of Law at the > University of New South Wales, where he is researching civilian involvement > in state defence. He is also as a senior researcher for Imparsial, the > Indonesian Human Rights Monitor. > > > > >
