Eric:

Thanks or your careful reading of the document.  See below.

Comments:

Minor Issue - there is an interesting statement made as a
final sentence in the next-to-last paragraph of page 6.
It reads -

"A party has access to a particular key if it has access to
 all of the secret information needed to derive it."

Can you clarify the causality associated with this logical
expression?  It is likely that a party can derive a key if
"[the party] has access to all of the secret information
needed to derive [the key]."  This is particularly true if
we only treat as "secret" anything that a party might not
know.  In other words, if a party has all required input
data as well as the key derivation algorithm, clearly the
party can derive the key.

But are you making a statement about entitlement - i.e - are
you saying it is both necessary and sufficient that a party
has legitimate access to secret information (used to derive
a key) as a condition of being allowed access to a key?  Or
are you just making the simple observation that a key may be
known to any party having all of the information necessary to
derive the key on their own - without specifically intending
to rule on whether or not it is appropriate to simply be given
the key?

If the former, "if" should be changed to "if and only if" -
otherwise, I am not sure the statement adds any value.

As an observation from a non-expert, I find it difficult to
understand why it should be the former - if that is indeed
your intent.

I suggest:
A party is considered to have access to a particular key if
and only if the party has access to all of the secret
information needed to derive the key.

This same statement is also repeated under "Limit key scope"
(p9), last sentence of the first paragraph.

We'll use the same words in both places.

=============================================================

Minor comment - next to last paragraph on page 2, it may be
a good idea to expand "IETF working groups" (first - long -
sentence) to be more inclusive.  This might be accomplished
by changing the sentence from -

"Given the complexity and difficulty in designing secure,
 long-lasting key management algorithms and protocols by
 experts in the field, it is almost certainly inappropriate
 for IETF working groups without deep expertise in the area
 to be designing their own key management algorithms and
 protocols based on Authentication, Authorization and
 Accounting (AAA) protocols."

- to -

"It is complex and difficult to design robust key management
 algorithms - even by people with expertise in the field.
 Given this fact, it is almost certainly inappropriate for
 IETF working groups - and other standards development bodies
 - to be designing their own key management algorithms and
 protocols based on Authentication, Authorization and
 Accounting (AAA) protocols.  This is especially true if the
 group in question does not include people having the needed
 expertise in security algorithms and protocols."

(Actual wording is entirely up to the author, however, the
 original sentence is fairly complex and might be interpreted
 to _only_ apply to IETF working groups)

I suggest:
It is complex and difficult to design robust key management algorithms
and protocols, even by people with expertise in the field.  Given this fact,
it is most often inappropriate for IETF working groups and other
standards development organizations (SDOs) to be designing their own key
management algorithms and protocols based on Authentication, Authorization
and Accounting (AAA) protocols.  This is especially true for groups that do
not include people with the appropriate experience.  These guidelines apply
to documents requesting publication as IETF RFCs.  However, these guidelines
will also be useful to other SDOs that specify AAA key management that depend
on IETF specifications for protocols such as EAP [RFC3748], RADIUS [RFC2865],
and Diameter [RFC3588].

______________________________________________________________

Minor Comment - In the definition of "Key Wrap" (p4), you also
include a definition of the acronym "KEK."  This term is not
used through-out the remainder of the document.  Consequently,
I wonder why this definition is provided.  If it is intended
to be used by other document writers, should it be called out
as a separate definition?

Okay.  I'll drop "(KEK)" from the end of the definition.

______________________________________________________________

Minor Comment - Under "Cryptographic algorithm independent"
(p8), the third sentence in the first paragraph (lines 4, 5)
might be reworded to clarify that you're not describing the
same algorithm in both cases.  For example, change from -

"The ability to negotiate the use of a particular
 cryptographic algorithm provides resilience against
 compromise of a particular cryptographic algorithm."

- to -

"The ability to negotiate the use of a particular
 cryptographic algorithm provides resilience against
 compromise of one or more other cryptographic
 algorithms."

I suggest:
The ability to negotiate the use of a particular cryptographic algorithm
from a set of cryptographic algorithms provides resilience against
compromise of one or more cryptographic algorithms.

______________________________________________________________

NIT - Under "Strong, fresh session keys" (p9), the second
sentence of the last paragraph should read -

"Multiple session keys may be derived ..."  ("be" added)

Fixed.

______________________________________________________________

NIT - Under "Peer and authenticator authorization", second
paragraph, second sentence (p11) should read -

"Once the AAA key ... these parties should hold a common
 view of the authorizations associated with the other
 parties."  ("with" added)

Fixed.

Russ



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