Russ,
Your wording suggestions are fine with me.
--
Eric
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Russ Housley [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Sent: Monday, January 22, 2007 12:33 PM
> To: Eric Gray (LO/EUS); Bernard Aboba
> Cc: [email protected]; Sam Hartman
> Subject: Re: Gen-ART Last Call Review of Document
> draft-housley-aaa-key-mgmt-06.txt
>
> Eric:
>
> Thanks or your careful reading of the document. See below.
>
> >Comments:
> >
> >Minor Issue - there is an interesting statement made as a
> >final sentence in the next-to-last paragraph of page 6.
> >It reads -
> >
> >"A party has access to a particular key if it has access to
> > all of the secret information needed to derive it."
> >
> >Can you clarify the causality associated with this logical
> >expression? It is likely that a party can derive a key if
> >"[the party] has access to all of the secret information
> >needed to derive [the key]." This is particularly true if
> >we only treat as "secret" anything that a party might not
> >know. In other words, if a party has all required input
> >data as well as the key derivation algorithm, clearly the
> >party can derive the key.
> >
> >But are you making a statement about entitlement - i.e - are
> >you saying it is both necessary and sufficient that a party
> >has legitimate access to secret information (used to derive
> >a key) as a condition of being allowed access to a key? Or
> >are you just making the simple observation that a key may be
> >known to any party having all of the information necessary to
> >derive the key on their own - without specifically intending
> >to rule on whether or not it is appropriate to simply be given
> >the key?
> >
> >If the former, "if" should be changed to "if and only if" -
> >otherwise, I am not sure the statement adds any value.
> >
> >As an observation from a non-expert, I find it difficult to
> >understand why it should be the former - if that is indeed
> >your intent.
>
> I suggest:
> A party is considered to have access to a particular key if
> and only if the party has access to all of the secret
> information needed to derive the key.
>
> >This same statement is also repeated under "Limit key scope"
> >(p9), last sentence of the first paragraph.
>
> We'll use the same words in both places.
>
> >=============================================================
> >
> >Minor comment - next to last paragraph on page 2, it may be
> >a good idea to expand "IETF working groups" (first - long -
> >sentence) to be more inclusive. This might be accomplished
> >by changing the sentence from -
> >
> >"Given the complexity and difficulty in designing secure,
> > long-lasting key management algorithms and protocols by
> > experts in the field, it is almost certainly inappropriate
> > for IETF working groups without deep expertise in the area
> > to be designing their own key management algorithms and
> > protocols based on Authentication, Authorization and
> > Accounting (AAA) protocols."
> >
> >- to -
> >
> >"It is complex and difficult to design robust key management
> > algorithms - even by people with expertise in the field.
> > Given this fact, it is almost certainly inappropriate for
> > IETF working groups - and other standards development bodies
> > - to be designing their own key management algorithms and
> > protocols based on Authentication, Authorization and
> > Accounting (AAA) protocols. This is especially true if the
> > group in question does not include people having the needed
> > expertise in security algorithms and protocols."
> >
> >(Actual wording is entirely up to the author, however, the
> > original sentence is fairly complex and might be interpreted
> > to _only_ apply to IETF working groups)
>
> I suggest:
> It is complex and difficult to design robust key management algorithms
> and protocols, even by people with expertise in the field.
> Given this fact,
> it is most often inappropriate for IETF working groups and other
> standards development organizations (SDOs) to be designing
> their own key
> management algorithms and protocols based on Authentication,
> Authorization
> and Accounting (AAA) protocols. This is especially true for
> groups that do
> not include people with the appropriate experience. These
> guidelines apply
> to documents requesting publication as IETF RFCs. However,
> these guidelines
> will also be useful to other SDOs that specify AAA key
> management that depend
> on IETF specifications for protocols such as EAP [RFC3748],
> RADIUS [RFC2865],
> and Diameter [RFC3588].
>
> >______________________________________________________________
> >
> >Minor Comment - In the definition of "Key Wrap" (p4), you also
> >include a definition of the acronym "KEK." This term is not
> >used through-out the remainder of the document. Consequently,
> >I wonder why this definition is provided. If it is intended
> >to be used by other document writers, should it be called out
> >as a separate definition?
>
> Okay. I'll drop "(KEK)" from the end of the definition.
>
> >______________________________________________________________
> >
> >Minor Comment - Under "Cryptographic algorithm independent"
> >(p8), the third sentence in the first paragraph (lines 4, 5)
> >might be reworded to clarify that you're not describing the
> >same algorithm in both cases. For example, change from -
> >
> >"The ability to negotiate the use of a particular
> > cryptographic algorithm provides resilience against
> > compromise of a particular cryptographic algorithm."
> >
> >- to -
> >
> >"The ability to negotiate the use of a particular
> > cryptographic algorithm provides resilience against
> > compromise of one or more other cryptographic
> > algorithms."
>
> I suggest:
> The ability to negotiate the use of a particular
> cryptographic algorithm
> from a set of cryptographic algorithms provides resilience against
> compromise of one or more cryptographic algorithms.
>
> >______________________________________________________________
> >
> >NIT - Under "Strong, fresh session keys" (p9), the second
> >sentence of the last paragraph should read -
> >
> >"Multiple session keys may be derived ..." ("be" added)
>
> Fixed.
>
> >______________________________________________________________
> >
> >NIT - Under "Peer and authenticator authorization", second
> >paragraph, second sentence (p11) should read -
> >
> >"Once the AAA key ... these parties should hold a common
> > view of the authorizations associated with the other
> > parties." ("with" added)
>
> Fixed.
>
> Russ
>
>
>
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