Russ,

        Your wording suggestions are fine with me.

--
Eric 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Russ Housley [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> Sent: Monday, January 22, 2007 12:33 PM
> To: Eric Gray (LO/EUS); Bernard Aboba
> Cc: [email protected]; Sam Hartman
> Subject: Re: Gen-ART Last Call Review of Document 
> draft-housley-aaa-key-mgmt-06.txt
> 
> Eric:
> 
> Thanks or your careful reading of the document.  See below.
> 
> >Comments:
> >
> >Minor Issue - there is an interesting statement made as a
> >final sentence in the next-to-last paragraph of page 6.
> >It reads -
> >
> >"A party has access to a particular key if it has access to
> >  all of the secret information needed to derive it."
> >
> >Can you clarify the causality associated with this logical
> >expression?  It is likely that a party can derive a key if
> >"[the party] has access to all of the secret information
> >needed to derive [the key]."  This is particularly true if
> >we only treat as "secret" anything that a party might not
> >know.  In other words, if a party has all required input
> >data as well as the key derivation algorithm, clearly the
> >party can derive the key.
> >
> >But are you making a statement about entitlement - i.e - are
> >you saying it is both necessary and sufficient that a party
> >has legitimate access to secret information (used to derive
> >a key) as a condition of being allowed access to a key?  Or
> >are you just making the simple observation that a key may be
> >known to any party having all of the information necessary to
> >derive the key on their own - without specifically intending
> >to rule on whether or not it is appropriate to simply be given
> >the key?
> >
> >If the former, "if" should be changed to "if and only if" -
> >otherwise, I am not sure the statement adds any value.
> >
> >As an observation from a non-expert, I find it difficult to
> >understand why it should be the former - if that is indeed
> >your intent.
> 
> I suggest:
> A party is considered to have access to a particular key if
> and only if the party has access to all of the secret
> information needed to derive the key.
> 
> >This same statement is also repeated under "Limit key scope"
> >(p9), last sentence of the first paragraph.
> 
> We'll use the same words in both places.
> 
> >=============================================================
> >
> >Minor comment - next to last paragraph on page 2, it may be
> >a good idea to expand "IETF working groups" (first - long -
> >sentence) to be more inclusive.  This might be accomplished
> >by changing the sentence from -
> >
> >"Given the complexity and difficulty in designing secure,
> >  long-lasting key management algorithms and protocols by
> >  experts in the field, it is almost certainly inappropriate
> >  for IETF working groups without deep expertise in the area
> >  to be designing their own key management algorithms and
> >  protocols based on Authentication, Authorization and
> >  Accounting (AAA) protocols."
> >
> >- to -
> >
> >"It is complex and difficult to design robust key management
> >  algorithms - even by people with expertise in the field.
> >  Given this fact, it is almost certainly inappropriate for
> >  IETF working groups - and other standards development bodies
> >  - to be designing their own key management algorithms and
> >  protocols based on Authentication, Authorization and
> >  Accounting (AAA) protocols.  This is especially true if the
> >  group in question does not include people having the needed
> >  expertise in security algorithms and protocols."
> >
> >(Actual wording is entirely up to the author, however, the
> >  original sentence is fairly complex and might be interpreted
> >  to _only_ apply to IETF working groups)
> 
> I suggest:
> It is complex and difficult to design robust key management algorithms
> and protocols, even by people with expertise in the field.  
> Given this fact,
> it is most often inappropriate for IETF working groups and other
> standards development organizations (SDOs) to be designing 
> their own key
> management algorithms and protocols based on Authentication, 
> Authorization
> and Accounting (AAA) protocols.  This is especially true for 
> groups that do
> not include people with the appropriate experience.  These 
> guidelines apply
> to documents requesting publication as IETF RFCs.  However, 
> these guidelines
> will also be useful to other SDOs that specify AAA key 
> management that depend
> on IETF specifications for protocols such as EAP [RFC3748], 
> RADIUS [RFC2865],
> and Diameter [RFC3588].
> 
> >______________________________________________________________
> >
> >Minor Comment - In the definition of "Key Wrap" (p4), you also
> >include a definition of the acronym "KEK."  This term is not
> >used through-out the remainder of the document.  Consequently,
> >I wonder why this definition is provided.  If it is intended
> >to be used by other document writers, should it be called out
> >as a separate definition?
> 
> Okay.  I'll drop "(KEK)" from the end of the definition.
> 
> >______________________________________________________________
> >
> >Minor Comment - Under "Cryptographic algorithm independent"
> >(p8), the third sentence in the first paragraph (lines 4, 5)
> >might be reworded to clarify that you're not describing the
> >same algorithm in both cases.  For example, change from -
> >
> >"The ability to negotiate the use of a particular
> >  cryptographic algorithm provides resilience against
> >  compromise of a particular cryptographic algorithm."
> >
> >- to -
> >
> >"The ability to negotiate the use of a particular
> >  cryptographic algorithm provides resilience against
> >  compromise of one or more other cryptographic
> >  algorithms."
> 
> I suggest:
> The ability to negotiate the use of a particular 
> cryptographic algorithm
> from a set of cryptographic algorithms provides resilience against
> compromise of one or more cryptographic algorithms.
> 
> >______________________________________________________________
> >
> >NIT - Under "Strong, fresh session keys" (p9), the second
> >sentence of the last paragraph should read -
> >
> >"Multiple session keys may be derived ..."  ("be" added)
> 
> Fixed.
> 
> >______________________________________________________________
> >
> >NIT - Under "Peer and authenticator authorization", second
> >paragraph, second sentence (p11) should read -
> >
> >"Once the AAA key ... these parties should hold a common
> >  view of the authorizations associated with the other
> >  parties."  ("with" added)
> 
> Fixed.
> 
> Russ
> 
> 
> 

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