On Fri, Jun 15, 2012 at 8:18 AM, Luca Barbato <lu_z...@gentoo.org> wrote: > On 06/15/2012 06:57 AM, Chí-Thanh Christopher Nguyễn wrote: >> If you have influence on UEFI secure boot spec, you could suggest that >> they mandate a UI which lists all boot images known to the EFI boot >> manager, and the user can easily whitelist both individual loaders and >> the keys used to sign them. >> > > That would be a good compromise. >
Agreed, though MS is likely to be sensitive about how this is done. One of their requirements: System.Fundamentals.Firmware.UEFISecureBoot / 14: Mandatory. No in-line mechanism is provided whereby a user can bypass Secure Boot failures and boot anyway Signature verification override during boot when Secure Boot is enabled is not allowed. A physically present user override is not permitted for UEFI images that fail signature verification during boot. If a user wants to boot an image that does not pass signature verification, they must explicitly disable Secure Boot on the target system. Sounds like they want to make getting around signature issues a fairly technical exercise. This of course raises the barrier to loading another OS, though to be fair the "Stuxnet wants to access your boot sector - hit OK to allow or Cancel to not display the cute video your friend sent you" options that are typical these days hasn't really been very effective in keeping out malware. Rich
