Hi,

On Fri, 14 Aug 2015 10:54:57 -0400 Rich Freeman wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 14, 2015 at 8:45 AM, Kristian Fiskerstrand <k...@gentoo.org> 
> wrote:
> > They will be OpenPGP signed by a releng key during thickening and
> > portage will auto-verify it using gkeys once things are in place. As
> > such checksum for ebuilds and other files certainly needs to be part
> > of the manifest, otherwise it can open up for malicious alterations of
> > these files.
> >
> 
> As much as I'd love to see it all folded into git, the reality is also
> that git signatures are only bound to files by a series of sha1
> hashes, and sha1 is not a strong hash function.  Git really ought to
> move to sha256 at some point, preferably in a manner that makes it
> expandable in the future to other hash functions.  But, this isn't a
> high-priority for upstream.
> 
> The same limitation is true of any git gpg signature, including tag
> signatures.  It is all held together by sha1.  The manifest system is
> much stronger.
 
OK, if manifests are that important, why not generate full manifest
during repoman commit? If we do not tamper with $Id$, the only file
outside of this manifest will be ChangeLog generated during rsync
propagation. Then we have following options:
- do not sing ChangeLog: even if it will be tampered, little harm
can be done, since it doesn't affect live system or build process;
- sign ChangeLog with releng key;
- sign developer-signed manifest + ChangeLog with releng key. Thus
we'll have double signature for most important files.

Best regards,
Andrew Savchenko

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