Just a quick clarification. Regarding our "discontinuation argument," Dan writes, "Clearly the whole argument... revolves around the notion that discontinuation might be substantially more harmful than not ever having done anything. This single assumption seems highly uncertain..."
I want to stress that we do not make this assumption in the paper. As we write, "We have argued that SAG has the potential to violate the requirements of justice. This does not necessarily imply that some other climate change policy (e.g., adaptation) ought to be adopted in favor of SAG. It might be the case that all climate change policies currently up for debate are ethically problematic in various ways. Further, it might be the case that we ought to implement one of these ethically unacceptable policies as the least of several evils, and this least evil policy might turn out to be SAG..." It may well be the case that SAG, despite its risks of harm, would be the least harmful policy in certain scenarios. We have not denied that possibility. Best, Toby On Thu, Aug 18, 2011 at 1:10 PM, Dan Whaley <dan.wha...@gmail.com> wrote: > On the discontinuation argument: > > "we contend that intergenerational justice requires the present > generation to ensure that future generations have access to food, > water, shelter, and > education. If SAG is implemented and then discontinued, future > generations’ access to > these benefits could be compromised. Thus, any generation that > implements SAG accepts > the risk that it might later be discontinued, but the subjects of this > risk are the future > generations who would suffer the harmful effects if SAG should be > discontinued > abruptly" > > Clearly the whole argument (including the appropriateness of the > dialysis analogy) revolves around the notion that discontinuation > might be substantially more harmful than not ever having done > anything. > > This single assumption seems highly uncertain (I do see the three > references that are provided, Alley, 2002; Lempert et al., 1994; > Nordhaus, 1994 but am unqualified myself to appraise whether they're > the appropriate ones or make the sufficient case). Others here are > much more qualified to weigh in. What is the extent to which this > notion has been explored by the community? > > Dan > > > > > On Aug 18, 12:38 am, Toby Svoboda <tobysvob...@gmail.com> wrote: > > Thank you all for the interesting and helpful feedback. > > > > Michael mentions a case (a methane tipping point) in which deployment of > SAG > > might satisfy requirements of justice. Perhaps in certain scenarios, SAG > > would be (or would be part of) a just climate policy, or at least a > policy > > that is less unjust than other policies available in those scenarios. Our > > paper is rather preliminary in the sense that it raises some ethical > worries > > about SAG but does not take a position on whether it ought to be > deployed. > > Perhaps, even with certain ethical imperfections, in some likely > scenarios > > SAG would be the best option from a justice perspective. I don't know > > whether this would be the case. It seems that further work would be > needed > > to get clear on that. > > > > As for unilateralism, our paper does not argue that there is a high > > probability of unilateral deployment but rather that such deployment > would > > be unjust. As you know, there are a number of papers in the literature > that > > discuss unilateral deployment. Josh's paper (which appeared after ours > was > > in press) and Dan's comments raise some interesting points. Perhaps > worries > > over unilateralism are overblown. That would be a welcome result from a > > procedural justice perspective, although non-unilateral deployment > wouldn't > > necessarily be procedurally just (e.g., if some other countries, through > no > > fault of their own, were still excluded from having a say in whether and > how > > SAG gets deployed). > > > > Both Michael and Josh suggest that actual policies often violate the > > theories of procedural justice we consider in the paper. This may well be > > true, but that does not mean that those theories are false. What we > actually > > do and what we ought to do are distinct--we can fail to live up to > standards > > we should meet. Moreover, it seems that a policy could be more or less > > procedurally unjust, with the latter being ethically preferable to the > > former. For example, one could treat the Rawlsian principle as an > > ideal--even if it is rarely complied with perfectly, some decision > > procedures will come closer than others. > > > > Dan mentions a number of concerns, but I wouldn't characterize our paper > as > > containing "objections" to SAG, because we don't advocate that it ought > not > > to be deployed. In the sections on distributive and intergenerational > > justice, we point to risks of harm associated with SAG. We think these > risks > > are ethically significant and should be taken into account. All things > > considered, it might turn out that these are risks that should be > tolerated, > > but that remains to be shown in my view. > > > > Dan writes, "But on the whole, the suggested program of incremental > > research, followed possibly by limited testing, seem a sensible approach > > when we compare the risks of implementation against a world which is > clearly > > warming in a dangerous way?" We don't deny this in the paper, as we focus > on > > deployment rather than research. Dan also writes, "The idea that the > > question of intergenerational justice might be one where we're > > *disadvantaging* future generations seems likewise odd. After all, the > whole > > reason this is being proposed is in large part because of concerns about > the > > well being of future generations." But even if our intentions are good > > (e.g., the well-being of future persons), we can still cause substantial > > harm to persons. Again, perhaps we ought to deploy SAG, e.g. because the > > harm to future generations would be less if we do than if we do not. But > if > > so, it is my view that an argument for that would need to be made in > detail. > > > > Many Thanks, > > Toby > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "geoengineering" group. > To post to this group, send email to geoengineering@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > geoengineering+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/geoengineering?hl=en. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "geoengineering" group. To post to this group, send email to geoengineering@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to geoengineering+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/geoengineering?hl=en.
