Andrew, The scenario in our paper assumes rising concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere. So, yes, decisions about mitigation have already been made before decisions about solar geoengineering, and the implementation of solar geoengineering does not influence future decisions about how much CO2 to emit.
On the timescales this game is played on, this lack of interplay is sensible because the climate effects from emissions reductions are so much slower than the effects of geoengineering. We assume that at any given time, geoengineering is the only tool available to increase or decrease damages from climate change in the coming decade. The model is actually much more applicable to near-term than far-term scenarios because, of course, as time goes on past decisions about geoengineering will have influenced decisions about mitigation, perhaps in a way that our assumed emissions scenario is no longer realistic enough to allow us to correctly simulate the basic dynamics of the geoengineering game. Your torture analogy is interesting, though it would be difficult to test any hypotheses you might make based on it in an empirically-based model. Such is the tradeoff between models like ours and realism. Kate On Tuesday, February 12, 2013 11:28:25 PM UTC-8, andrewjlockley wrote: > > As I understand it, this scenario excludes the interplay between games in > mitigation and games in geoengineering. > > Present political debate around GE is highly affected by the interplay. > Indeed, it could be argued that this interplay is the central factor in > current debate. > > The simplifying assumption used by the authors therefore applies only in a > decarbonised world, and is thus inapplicable to all near-term scenarios. > > Therefore, a more realistic model is that of torture. For example, the UK > has a history of posturing against torture, whilst tacitly and deeply > co-operating with states that torture - in both the practice of torture and > the utilization of intelligence gained by torture. > > We should expect similar double-standards from developed nations with an > active environmental lobby in the case of GE. > > A > On Feb 13, 2013 3:09 AM, "Ken Caldeira" > <kcal...@carnegiescience.edu<javascript:>> > wrote: > >> Kate Ricke, Juan Moreno-Cruz and I have a paper out today in >> Environmental Research Letters (attached). >> >> http://iopscience.iop.org/1748-9326/8/1/014021/ >> YouTube video at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EZihgJbvABE >> >> Environmental Research Letters <http://iopscience.iop.org/1748-9326/> Volume >> 8 <http://iopscience.iop.org/1748-9326/8>Number >> 1<http://iopscience.iop.org/1748-9326/8/1> >> >> Katharine L Ricke *et al* 2013 *Environ. Res. Lett.* *8* 014021 >> doi:10.1088/1748-9326/8/1/014021<http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/8/1/014021> >> Strategic incentives for climate geoengineering coalitions to exclude >> broad participation OPEN ACCESS >> >> Katharine L Ricke1, Juan B Moreno-Cruz2 and Ken Caldeira1 >> >> *Abstract* >> >> Solar geoengineering is the deliberate reduction in the absorption of >> incoming solar radiation by the Earth's climate system with the aim of >> reducing impacts of anthropogenic climate change. Climate model simulations >> project a diversity of regional outcomes that vary with the amount of solar >> geoengineering deployed. It is unlikely that a single small actor could >> implement and sustain global-scale geoengineering that harms much of the >> world without intervention from harmed world powers. However, a >> sufficiently powerful international coalition might be able to deploy solar >> geoengineering. Here, we show that regional differences in climate outcomes >> create strategic incentives to form coalitions that are as small as >> possible, while still powerful enough to deploy solar geoengineering. The >> characteristics of coalitions to geoengineer climate are modeled using a >> 'global thermostat setting game' based on climate model results. Coalition >> members have incentives to exclude non-members that would prevent >> implementation of solar geoengineering at a level that is optimal for the >> existing coalition. These incentives differ markedly from those that >> dominate international politics of greenhouse-gas emissions reduction, >> where the central challenge is to compel free riders to participate. >> >> _______________ >> Ken Caldeira >> >> Carnegie Institution for Science >> Dept of Global Ecology >> 260 Panama Street, Stanford, CA 94305 USA >> +1 650 704 7212 kcal...@carnegiescience.edu <javascript:> >> http://dge.stanford.edu/labs/caldeiralab @kencaldeira >> >> *Caldeira Lab is hiring postdoctoral researchers.* >> *http://dge.stanford.edu/labs/caldeiralab/Caldeira_employment.html* >> >> Our YouTube videos<http://www.youtube.com/user/CarnegieGlobEcology/videos> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "geoengineering" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to geoengineerin...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. >> To post to this group, send email to geoengi...@googlegroups.com<javascript:> >> . >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/geoengineering?hl=en. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "geoengineering" group. 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