Dear Dan, Views of nature
I've read through the Thompson paper of 2003 (Chapter 8) and your paper of 2012, attached to the email sent by Jesse Reynolds a few days ago. Neither paper tackles geoengineering, but both help to define four camps rather than the two I had assumed in my last email. Of particular interest to me was the figure 1 in the Thompson paper, where the four camps are defined in a quadrant. Each has a different view of nature, represented by a ball perched on a line. If the line is concave, then nature is inherently stable. If the line is convex, then nature is "ephemeral". If the line is straight, then nature is "fickle and untrustworthy". If the line is concave with humps on each side, then nature is tolerant up to a certain discoverable threshold. Strength of emotional response Because of feelings of solidarity, people tend to be polarised into one of the four camps (where we had two before). Anything which conflicts with the view of nature of the group is rejected, regardless of scientific evidence. This is your assertion, and I can believe it. The strength of rejection is remarkable in my experience, even from top scientists who one would expect to be objective in their judgement. Thus climate models are often accepted in preference to observations, if these observations conflict with deeply held views of the Earth System (as you might call nature). In particular, if the observations suggest the system is past a threshold or "tipping point", such a conclusion can be totally rejected by spurious argument and reliance on models showing no such threshold. The views of their particular camp will then reinforce this rejection (and the spurious arguments for it) in what one might consider group denial. Subject of discourse Battle lines are set in concrete. The discourse of the papers is about global warming and how each camp reacts to proposed policies for CO2 emissions reduction. But CO2 emissions reduction, however drastic, will not halt global warming and will have little effect in the Arctic, where warming is accelerating. This restriction of discourse makes it extremely difficult to discuss any interventions other than CO2 emissions reduction, with its related topics of clean energy, sustainable lifestyle, etc. The problem of facing the real world What does the scientist do when he finds that real-world observations of the Earth System show that it is beyond the threshold where CO2 reduction alone could prevent a catastrophe? Suppose the "discoverable threshold" has already been passed. None of the camps (except perhaps the fatalists) will accept this, because it conflicts with their world view of nature. Geoengineering is the only solution, but is rejected by the three main camps, because they don't believe, reject or ignore the scientific evidence. (The so-called fatalists in the fourth camp are inherently defeatist, so they see no point in trying geoengineering, but at least they are tolerant of the idea, since the evidence for a geoengineering requirement fits with their world view.) The way forward Scientists in this position have no large camp to join. They are isolated except in their solidarity on shared scientific opinion. Yet, if the people in the various camps could have sufficient self-awareness to counter their natural feelings against geoengineering, then there could be meaningful collaboration between people in all camps to tackle the real-world problem that these scientists present. It is in the interests of everyone on the planet that the climate problem is sorted. And nobody need suffer as a result of the kind of interventions being proposed: removal of CO2 from the atmosphere and cloud cooling techniques to cool the Arctic. With careful management they should be entirely beneficial. Could a psychologist help to solve a real-world problem of climate change by releasing people from the restricted view of nature held by their own camp? Cheers, John On Fri, Mar 7, 2014 at 6:18 PM, Rau, Greg <r...@llnl.gov> wrote: > John, > Yes "buck up" = "cheer up" over here, sorry or the cowboy colloquialism. > Psychology is indeed at the root of behavior, a little detail they didn't > teach us in Earth Science grad school. That's why we need the professionals > in human behavior on our side - Madison Ave, Mark Zuckerberg, etc ;-) > Greg > ------------------------------ > *From:* John Nissen [johnnissen2...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* Thursday, March 06, 2014 3:21 PM > *To:* Rau, Greg > > *Cc:* dmorr...@gmail.com; geoengineering@googlegroups.com; > dan.ka...@yale.edu; John Nissen > *Subject:* Re: [geo] Re: Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: > Testing a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. & > Soc. Sci. > > Hi Greg, > > Having researched the meaning of "buck up", I realise that your meaning > is to do with cheering me up, rather than speeding me up. > > It is cheering to have a meaningful discussion on the popular rejection > of geoengineering. I can understand a religious objection to > geoengineering, on the grounds that weather is God's business so we should > not interfere with it. And I can understand that scientists are used to > observing the environment while trying not to alter the subject of their > observations. But these are not sociological effects. What fascinates me > is how a psychologist can bring a new perspective on this. You, Dan, have > shown, in the CCT theory, how the majority of people, and that of course > includes scientists, fall into one of two distinct classes and identify > themselves with an associated 'camp', as I call it. > > My deduction from what you, Dan, have said is that geoengineering is > rejected by both camps. The strength of emotion exhibited against > geoengineering indicates that something is offending deeply held values - > values shared by the associated camp. There is certainly overt antagonism > between the camps. But a strong subconscious driver may be fear. We see > an aversion to the discussion of "present danger" share by both camps - > anything that is at all scary. > > The camp that rejects climate change has an aversion to discussing the > scientific evidence which indicates the danger to human society from many > degrees of global warming and from Arctic meltdown. This camp rejects > geoengineering because it is associated with this evidence which it does > not wish to discuss. People in this camp say that geoengineering will not > be required for a long time, if ever, because the world is changing > slowly. When a scientist describes the actual situation to such a person, > they reply "it can't possibly be as bad as that". > > On the other hand the camp which accepts climate change also has an > aversion to the discussion of near-term danger, while they accept the > long-term danger of climate change, e.g. by the end of the century. Some > reject geoengineering on the grounds that it is a conspiracy by the other > camp (especially fossil fuel industry) to 'get out of gaol free', i.e. to > continue their vile polluting practice of burning fossil fuels. Others say > that geoengineering is too dangerous - the implication it is more risky to > apply geoengineering than to leave the climate system to change. (This is > like condemning the fire engines for the water damage they might produce, > while the building is burning down.) Others have more sophisticated > arguments - all having the characteristic of avoiding proper discussion of > near-term danger, especially from the warming of the Arctic. > > So who can escape from this emotional reaction? There are the > psychologists, like you, Dan, who can present the situation as a case study > in psychological theory. There are economists who accept the economic > impact of fossil fuel reduction, yet realise that climate change will have > a huge economic impact, even within a few decades, because of the limited > carbon budget set by AR5. And there are those of us who acknowledge that > there are these two camps who are pre-occupied by fighting a battle over > emissions reductions, while two more immediate problems are overlooked: > > 1. The global warming and ocean acidification from existing CO2 in the > atmosphere require that CO2 is removed from the atmosphere, by the CRD > geoengineering techniques. > > 2. The Arctic will proceed towards total meltdown, unless it is quickly > cooled by SRM geoengineering techniques sufficient to halt the sea ice > retreat. > > Neither of the two camps is seriously engaged in discussion about these > urgent requirements for geoengineering. Or they will deny the science and > scientific observations that point to these requirements. > > And yet geoengineering offers a golden opportunity for international > collaboration, for solving these most immediate and urgent problems faced > by mankind. It would be tragic if this opportunity were missed because of > psychological problems. > > Cheers, John > > > > On Tue, Mar 4, 2014 at 10:02 PM, Rau, Greg <r...@llnl.gov> wrote: > >> Buck up, John. Once the real hazards of rising sea level, failed crops, >> and acidified oceans materialize, the decision-makers just might yearn for >> some hazards of the moral kind. And you and I might still be around when >> that happens. Even then there is no guarantee that any countering action >> will be effective and safe unless we do some research to find out before >> the real need for hazard mitigation arises, which for some of us is right >> now. >> Keep up the good fight... >> Greg >> >> From: John Nissen <johnnissen2...@gmail.com> >> Date: Tuesday, March 4, 2014 11:21 AM >> To: Default <r...@llnl.gov> >> Cc: "dmorr...@gmail.com" <dmorr...@gmail.com>, geoengineering < >> geoengineering@googlegroups.com>, "dan.ka...@yale.edu" < >> dan.ka...@yale.edu>, John Nissen <j...@cloudworld.co.uk> >> Subject: Re: [geo] Re: Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: >> Testing a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. & >> Soc. Sci. >> >> Hi Greg, >> >> The theory is that people tend to be polarised into two camps. One camp >> is against the idea that climate change can have anything to do with our >> greenhouse gas emissions; and therefore (subconsciously) this camp is >> against geoengineering because it would admit of a massive problem to be >> solved. The other camp is against geoengineering (subconsciously) because >> of the moral hazard - the idea that it's a "get out of jail free" for the >> people responsible for causing climate change in the first place. They >> will talk of geoengineering as a climate "fix", that it is "playing with >> God", etc. >> >> Kahan refers repeatedly to a 2012 study where it was shown that the >> "moral hazard" argument against geoengineering was scientifically invalid. >> But subconsciously the second camp may still have this deep-seated fear of >> geoengineering. >> >> Therefore I deduce, using his argument, that neither camp will accept >> geoengineering, whatever evidence of the need for geoengineering is >> presented to them. >> >> I think this is the crux of the matter: nobody, identified with either >> of the common "camps", will accept geoengineering. Only when this impasse >> is properly acknowledged, will it be possible for people to accept the >> scientific evidence that geoengineering is needed, not only to suck CO2 out >> of the atmosphere, but also to cool the Arctic. >> >> Cheers, >> >> John >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Tue, Mar 4, 2014 at 4:22 AM, Rau, Greg <r...@llnl.gov> wrote: >> >>> This observation may bear repeating: >>> "To be effective, science communication must successfully negotiate both >>> channels. That is, in addition to furnishing individuals with valid and >>> pertinent information about how the world works, it must avail itself of >>> the cues necessary to assure individuals that assenting to that information >>> will not estrange them from their communities." >>> >>> Isn't this what good advertising does, and couldn't our community >>> benefit from some cogent advice from Madison Ave, if we could afford it? >>> Science and scientific reasoning alone apparently isn't enough, especially >>> when there are (well funded) individuals who would cast such reasoning as a >>> threat to their communities. >>> Greg >>> ------------------------------ >>> *From:* geoengineering@googlegroups.com [geoengineering@googlegroups.com] >>> on behalf of David Morrow [dmorr...@gmail.com] >>> *Sent:* Monday, March 03, 2014 6:27 PM >>> *To:* geoengineering@googlegroups.com >>> *Subject:* [geo] Re: Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: >>> Testing a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. & >>> Soc. Sci. >>> >>> FYI, the lead author of that paper, Dan Kahan, posted two additional >>> blog posts on culture, values, and geoengineering: >>> >>> >>> http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/24/geoengineering-the-cultural-plasticity-of-climate-change-ris.html >>> >>> >>> http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/26/geoengineering-the-science-communication-environment-the-cul.html >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thursday, February 27, 2014 2:04:00 AM UTC-6, andrewjlockley wrote: >>>> >>>> Poster's note : This is just brilliant. At last an explanation of why >>>> believing nonsense is rational. Useful to reflect on how this paper replies >>>> to the origin and persistence of other belief systems, as well as climate >>>> change. Leaves me wondering what nonsense I believe. >>>> >>>> http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/23/three- >>>> models-of-risk-perception-their-significance-for-self.html >>>> >>>> Three models of risk perception & their significance for self-government >>>> >>>> Dan Kahan Posted on Sunday, February 23, 2014 at 7:52AM >>>> >>>> From Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a >>>> Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. >>>> Sci. (in press). >>>> >>>> Theoretical background >>>> >>>> Three models of risk perception >>>> >>>> The scholarly literature on risk perception and communication is >>>> dominated by two models. The first is the rational-weigher model, which >>>> posits that members of the public, in aggregate and over time, can be >>>> expected to process information about risk in a manner that promotes their >>>> expected utility (Starr 1969). The second is the irrational-weigher model, >>>> which asserts that ordinary members of the pubic lack the ability to >>>> reliably advance their expected utility because their assessment of risk >>>> information is constrained by cognitive biases and other manifestations of >>>> bounded rationality (Kahneman 2003; Sunstein 2005; Marx et al. 2007; Weber >>>> 2006).Neither of these models cogently explains public conflict over >>>> climate change--or a host of other putative societal risks, such as nuclear >>>> power, the vaccination of teenage girls for HPV, and the removal of >>>> restrictions on carrying concealed handguns in public. Such disputes >>>> conspicuously feature partisan divisions over facts that admit of >>>> scientific investigation. Nothing in the rational-weigher model predicts >>>> that people with different values or opposing political commitments will >>>> draw radically different inferences from common information. Likewise, >>>> nothing in the irrational-weigher model suggests that people who subscribe >>>> to one set of values are any more or less bounded in their rationality than >>>> those who subscribe to any other, or that cognitive biases will produce >>>> systematic divisions of opinion of among such groups. >>>> >>>> One explanation for such conflict is the cultural cognition >>>> thesis (CCT). CCT says that cultural values are cognitively prior to facts >>>> in public risk conflicts: as a result of a complex of interrelated >>>> psychological mechanisms, groups of individuals will credit and dismiss >>>> evidence of risk in patterns that reflect and reinforce their distinctive >>>> understandings of how society should be organized (Kahan, Braman, Cohen, >>>> Gastil & Slovic 2010; Jenkins-Smith & Herron 2009). Thus, persons >>>> with individualistic values can be expected to be relatively dismissive of >>>> environmental and technological risks, which if widely accepted would >>>> justify restricting commerce and industry, activities that people with such >>>> values hold in high regard. The same goes for individuals >>>> withhierarchical values, who see assertions of environmental risk as >>>> indictments of social elites. Individuals with egalitarian and >>>> communitarian >>>> values, in contrast, see commerce and industry as sources of unjust >>>> disparity and symbols of noxious self-seeking, and thus readily credit >>>> assertions that these activities are hazardous and therefore worthy of >>>> regulation (Douglass & Wildavsky 1982). Observational and experimental >>>> studies have linked these and comparable sets of outlooks to myriad risk >>>> controversies, including the one over climate change (Kahan >>>> 2012).Individuals, on the CCT account, behave not as expected-utility >>>> weighers--rational or irrational--but rather as cultural evaluators of risk >>>> information (Kahan, Slovic, Braman & Gastil 2006). The beliefs any >>>> individual forms on societal risks like climate change--whether right or >>>> wrong--do not meaningfully affect his or her personal exposure to those >>>> risks. However, precisely because positions on those issues are commonly >>>> understood to cohere with allegiance to one or another cultural style, >>>> taking a position at odds with the dominant view in his or her cultural >>>> group is likely to compromise that individual's relationship with others on >>>> whom that individual depends for emotional and material support. >>>> As individuals, citizens are thus likely to do better in their daily lives >>>> when they adopt toward putative hazards the stances that express their >>>> commitment to values that they share with others, irrespective of the fit >>>> between those beliefs and the actuarial magnitudes and probabilities of >>>> those risks.The cultural evaluator model takes issue with the >>>> irrational-weigher assumption that popular conflict over risk stems from >>>> overreliance on heuristic forms of information processing (Lodge & Taber >>>> 2013; Sunstein 2006). Empirical evidence suggests that culturally diverse >>>> citizens are indeed reliably guided toward opposing stances by unconscious >>>> processing of cues, such as the emotional resonances of arguments and the >>>> apparent values of risk communicators (Kahan, Jenkins-Smith & Braman 2011; >>>> Jenkins-Smith & Herron 2009; Jenkins-Smith 2001).But contrary to the >>>> picture painted by the irrational-weigher model, ordinary citizens who are >>>> equipped and disposed to appraise information in a reflective, analytic >>>> manner are not more likely to form beliefs consistent with the best >>>> available evidence on risk. Instead they often become even more culturally >>>> polarized because of the special capacity they have to search out and >>>> interpret evidence in patterns that sustain the convergence between their >>>> risk perceptions and their group identities (Kahan, Peters, Wittlin, >>>> Slovic, Ouellette, Braman & Mandel 2012; Kahan 2013; Kahan, Peters, Dawson >>>> & Slovic 2013).Two channels of science communication >>>> >>>> The rational- and irrational-weigher models of risk perception generate >>>> competing prescriptions for science communication. The former posits that >>>> individuals can be expected, eventually, to form empirically sound >>>> positions so long as they are furnished with sufficient and sufficiently >>>> accurate information (e.g., Viscusi 1983; Philipson & Posner 1993). The >>>> latter asserts that the attempts to educate the public about risk are at >>>> best futile, since the public lacks the knowledge and capacity to >>>> comprehend; at worst such efforts are self-defeating, since ordinary >>>> individuals are prone to overreact on the basis of fear and other affective >>>> influences on judgment. The better strategy is to steer risk policymaking >>>> away from democratically accountable actors to politically insulated >>>> experts and to "change the subject" when risk issues arise in public debate >>>> (Sunstein 2005, p. 125; see also Breyer 1993). >>>> >>>> The cultural-evaluator model associated with CCT offers a more nuanced >>>> account. It recognizes that when empirical claims about societal risk >>>> become suffused with antagonistic cultural meanings, intensified efforts to >>>> disseminate sound information are unlikely to generate consensus and can >>>> even stimulate conflict. >>>> >>>> But those instances are exceptional--indeed, pathological. There are >>>> vastly more risk issues--from the hazards of power lines to the >>>> side-effects >>>> of antibiotics to the tumor-stimulating consequences of cell phones--that >>>> avoid becoming broadly entangled with antagonistic cultural meanings. Using >>>> the same ability that they reliably employ to seek and follow expert >>>> medical treatment when they are ill or expert auto-mechanic service when >>>> their car breaks down, the vast majority of ordinary citizens can be >>>> counted on in these "normal," non-pathological cases to discern and conform >>>> their beliefs to the best available scientific evidence (Keil 2010). >>>> >>>> The cultural-evaluator model therefore counsels a two-channel strategy >>>> of science communication. Channel 1 is focused on information content and >>>> is informed by the best available understandings of how to convey >>>> empirically sound evidence, the basis and significance of which are readily >>>> accessible to ordinary citizens (e.g., Gigerenzer 2000; Spiegelhalter, >>>> Pearson & Short 2011). Channel 2 focuses on cultural meanings: the myriad >>>> cues--from group affinities and antipathies to positive and negative >>>> affective resonances to congenial or hostile narrative structures--that >>>> individuals unconsciously rely on to determine whether a particular stance >>>> toward a putative risk is consistent with their defining commitments. To be >>>> effective, science communication must successfully negotiate both channels. >>>> That is, in addition to furnishing individuals with valid and pertinent >>>> information about how the world works, it must avail itself of the cues >>>> necessary to assure individuals that assenting to that information will not >>>> estrange them from their communities (Kahan, Slovic, Braman & Gastil 2006; >>>> Nisbet 2009). >>>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "geoengineering" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to geoengineering+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to geoengineering@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/geoengineering. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "geoengineering" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to geoengineering+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to geoengineering@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/geoengineering. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >> >> > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "geoengineering" group. 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