Poster's note: Old, but new to the list.

https://www.brookings.edu/research/preparing-the-united-states-for-security-and-governance-in-a-geoengineering-future/

By:Joseph Versen <https://www.brookings.edu/author/joseph-versen/>, Zaruhi
Mnatsakanyan <https://www.brookings.edu/author/zaruhi-mnatsakanyan/>,
and Johannes
Urpelainen <https://www.brookings.edu/experts/johannes-urpelainen/>

Introduction

Imagine the following scenario: it is the year 2035. One large country,
dealing with major issues of global warming, decides to take extreme
action. The government begins secret deployment of a geoengineering system
for pumping large amounts of reflective particles into the air, a technique
designed to mimic the cooling effect of a volcanic eruption, only on a much
larger scale and over a much longer time horizon. Although such behavior
has been discouraged by the international community, research has
continued, largely behind closed doors and without real regulation. Now
that the climate situation has become more dire, the country has decided
that it can no longer afford to wait; they see geoengineering as their only
option.

At first, the decision seems wise, as the increase in global temperatures
start to level off. But soon other types of anomalous weather begin to
appear: unexpected and severe droughts hit countries around the world,
disrupting agriculture, and the ozone layer begins to decay rapidly,
exposing populations to harmful radiation. Global weather has become
politicized—delegates argue at the United Nations over new climate
complications allegedly caused by geoengineering, and diplomatic
relationships are strained. This new geoengineering crisis escalates when
another large country, under the impression it has been severely harmed by
the geoengineering, carries out a focused military strike against the
geoengineering equipment, a decision supported by other nations who also
believe they have been negatively impacted. This development, however,
becomes even more devastating, as once the geoengineering stops, global
temperatures dramatically rebound to the levels they would have reached on
their previous trajectory, prior to the use of geoengineering. The
resulting consequences of such a dramatic increase in temperatures are
disastrous.

A scenario such as the one above remains unfortunately possible given the
current state of global geoengineering policy. As the increasingly severe
effects of global warming generate greater interest in geoengineering
technologies, the United States must prepare itself for the risks and
uncertainties that come along with their potential deployment. Preparedness
for such a world will likely be multi-faceted and will likely include
improved understanding of how the global climate will change both with or
without geoengineering, the ability to detect and monitor geoengineering
activity worldwide, an adequate policy roadmap for deterring certain kinds
of geoengineering activity and for responding in case of geoengineering
deployment by other nations, among other measures.

The U.S. should also make a concerted effort to foster the development of
an international governance regime for geoengineering. In the short term,
that will involve leveraging existing international fora to legitimately
debate geoengineering issues on the international stage while also
championing a comprehensive code of conduct for geoengineering research
worldwide. In the long run, the U.S. should take the lead on creating a
geoengineering-specific international body, one with the appropriate scope
and flexibility to deal with the myriad challenges involved while also
promoting wide participation.


II. GEOENGINEERING OVERVIEW AND SECURITY CONCERNS

We have already begun to see the effects of man-made climate change around
the world. As average temperatures climb, droughts become more frequent,
storms become more destructive, and sea levels rise, among other harmful
effects. The international community has made emissions mitigation its goal
to prevent catastrophic levels of climate change, but as nations habitually
fall short of targets deemed necessary by climate scientists, the risk of
climate emergency heightens.

As a result, conversations around geoengineering have become more frequent.
Defined as “the deliberate large-scale manipulation of an environmental
process that affects the earth’s climate in an attempt to counteract global
warming,” geoengineering can broadly be divided into two very different
subcategories: 1) carbon dioxide removal, which seeks to remove carbon from
the atmosphere in order to lessen the greenhouse effect and thus slow
warming, and 2) solar radiation management, or solar geoengineering, which
attempts to increase reflection of solar radiation away from the earth in
order to slow warming. Various types of solar geoengineering approaches
include releasing reflective particles into the atmosphere (known as
strategic aerosol injection) or spraying sea water into the lower
atmosphere to generate brighter, more reflective clouds (known as marine
cloud brightening).

It is important not to confuse carbon dioxide removal and solar
geoengineering, two very different approaches, under the umbrella term
“geoengineering.” Carbon dioxide removal as a climate solution has been
largely embraced, as the risk of unintended consequences is considered
minimal. Solar geoengineering, on the other hand, presents a variety of
complicating issues.

For example, despite research on the matter, a consensus does not yet exist
around the ultimate overall climate impact of techniques like strategic
aerosol injection. Some alarming models have predicted that certain schemes
would cause droughts for a significant portion of the earth’s population.
Additionally, some predict the injection of aerosols into the atmosphere to
cause increased depletion of the ozone layer. A long list of potential
environmental complications like these exists in addition to complications
that have not even been considered.

Artificially lowering global temperatures via solar geoengineering also
presents the unique risk of “termination shock,” meaning that if deployment
of such geoengineering technology were suddenly discontinued, the resulting
abrupt warming could become even more catastrophic than if warming had
simply continued on its previous trajectory. Unpredictable events such as
terrorist attacks, natural disasters, or political action all create risk
for the sudden discontinuation of solar geoengineering and thus risk of
termination shock.

Beyond climate concerns, solar geoengineering technologies also present a
variety of new political and ethical questions. Although any ideal global
geoengineering scenario would involve substantial international
cooperation, some solar geoengineering techniques could be effectively
deployed by a single country or a small group of countries acting in
isolation. Even one extremely rich individual could conceivably deploy
their own solar geoengineering project if allowed to do so by their
respective government; in fact, a technique like strategic aerosol
injection is relatively inexpensive despite its potential for worldwide
environmental impact. Due to such great uncertainty and potential danger of
the global impact of these technologies, unilateral geoengineering
deployment is considered a very dangerous possibility.

Even if some sort of global consensus emerges regarding solar
geoengineering deployment, the question of who controls the global
“thermostat” remains. Who would ultimately have the authority to decide
what kind and how much geoengineering should take place? How will decisions
weighing global benefit against local or regional risk be made? How can it
be ensured that geoengineering decisions aren’t made to cause regional
gains or losses? A world that features solar geoengineering use will need
to answer these questions.

There is also the question of moral hazard—would the growing perception of
geoengineering as a solution to climate change harm mitigation efforts
around the world? The existence of moral hazard has been demonstrated
empirically in many areas. For instance, it has been documented that
increased healthcare insurance coverage results in increased demand for
healthcare. The international community must consider the danger that
geoengineering as global warming “insurance” could unintentionally generate
additional planet-warming behavior, which is also amplified by the risk of
termination shock.

Some also express concern over potential military applications of
geoengineering techniques. In the past, militaries around the world have
shown interest in controlling the weather, and it may seem logical to fear
the weaponization of technologies designed for such purposes. However,
given the uncertain nature of the effects of such technologies in addition
to the international ban on military use of weather modification
techniques, this particular risk may be less of a priority.

Given the potential threat that geoengineering could pose for the planet,
it is important that the global community take steps to establish order in
this space. While complete transparency among governments of the world
would be ideal in theory, it is the unfortunate reality that some actors
may pursue these activities unilaterally and in secret. The dangerous
unknowns of such behavior require the capability to detect geoengineering
activity wherever necessary. Early detection and localization of
unannounced and unilaterally deployed geoengineering activities, either by
private actors or states, requires adequate tools for rapid detection and
response to maintain global security. The United States must develop its
own realistic approach to preparing for emergency geoengineering scenarios.
Given the danger that foreign geoengineering could present, the U.S. should
establish proper security and deterrence mechanisms that can be carried out
quickly and efficiently in case of potentially harmful geoengineering
activity abroad.


Beyond surveillance, there is a dire need for a governance regime for
global geoengineering activity. The inherently international nature of
climate change and discussions of climate manipulation demand an
international approach to governance. As worsening climate conditions are
likely to generate continued worldwide interest in geoengineering
deployment, the world cannot afford to wait until an emergency arrives if
it hopes to navigate increasingly complicated climate and geoengineering
scenarios. States should collaborate to develop and refine international
norms and institutions to adequately prepare the world for the inevitable
stresses of continued climate change and the resulting reaction from states
and other actors.


III. UNDERSTANDING GEOENGINEERING GOVERNANCE

The importance of an effective governance regime for global geoengineering
is clear, but what it will look like is undetermined. To adequately answer
this question, it’s important to examine all facets of the geoengineering
conversation.


Geoengineering governance is already the subject of academic research and
debate. Often referenced in scholarly approaches to this issue are the
Oxford Principles, a set of general guidelines created by a group of
academics which was commissioned by the U.K. House of Commons Select
Committee on Science and Technology. Although other similar efforts exist,
the Oxford Principles have become the most influential. The five principles
include 1) the regulation of geoengineering as a public good, 2) public
participation in geoengineering decision-making, 3) disclosure of
geoengineering research and publication of results, 4) independent
assessment of impacts, and 5) governance before deployment. While these
principles are useful in providing a theoretical lens for framing the
geoengineering governance debate, they do not offer much in terms of
realistic enforcement, a necessary component if norms like the Oxford
Principles can ever be upheld.


A preliminary discussion for any governance regime concerns the regime’s
goal of governance: what outcome does the regime seek to achieve? For
instance, a geoengineering regime might seek to facilitate or promote
further research into geoengineering. On the other hand, the regime could
be primarily concerned with preventing geoengineering from occurring
altogether if it considers the possibilities too dangerous. Establishing a
clear goal of governance will be essential to any regime-building process
for geoengineering and will shape all elements of governance.


Once the goal of governance has been determined, one of the most important
considerations of the regime will be the deterrence of geoengineering
activity without international approval. Until the risks of solar
geoengineering are better understood, an individual country, a small group
of countries, or even an individual acting alone could cause serious global
harm by engaging in solar geoengineering. While some argue that states are
unlikely to go this route given the strong reaction that it would engender
from the international community, the risk of unilateral deployment must
still be taken seriously and addressed given that continually worsening
climate change could cause states or other actors to act desperately.


An effective geoengineering governance regime must also adequately account
for the behavior of non-state actors, as even a wealthy individual could
theoretically perform solar geoengineering on their own. International law
applies to individuals only indirectly, as states are responsible for
implementing legislation within their own jurisdiction. Even more
complicated are areas beyond national jurisdiction; governing
geoengineering on the high seas or in the stratosphere would require
additional attention. Successful governance of geoengineering will require
substantial effort to incentivize and support states in preventing solar
geoengineering by non-state actors while also determining who has
jurisdiction over ambiguous areas.


A geoengineering governance regime needs to address geoengineering research
as well as deployment. Many scholars have already called for “governance
before research,” although how to achieve such a result remains unclear. A
moratorium on solar geoengineering field research, suggested by some, would
be nearly impossible to impose. Funding of geoengineering research is also
an important aspect of the conversation. International lending institutions
such as the World Bank can serve as important governance tools via their
ability to finance geoengineering projects. If geoengineering projects are
eventually scaled up, private actors, too, will play a role in
decision-making around geoengineering as they are called upon more greatly
to provide requisite materials for geoengineering.


As previously emphasized, monitoring and intelligence will also be key to
any geoengineering governance regime. Although an ideal governance regime
would include representation of all countries of the world, it should be
expected that some states will not cooperate, whether it be by joining a
regime but ignoring any resulting mandates or by ignoring the regime
altogether. For this reason, a reliable monitoring system that allows
states to track geoengineering activity will be an important enforcement
element of a successful regime. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
provides a relevant example of an agreement featuring “wide-area
environmental detection methods to verify state compliance.” This will not
be an easy task, as successful monitoring of certain types of
geoengineering is extremely difficult, but the effort remains essential.


A potential geoengineering governance regime could take many forms in both
the near and long terms. For example, one near-term approach might seek to
use existing international institutions and agreements (listed in Table 1
below) that have jurisdiction over elements of geoengineering.


Table 1


Treaty or Convention Relevance for Geoengineering

UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Seeks to prevent
dangerous interference in the global climate system

Environmental Modification Convention (ENMOD) Prohibits environmental
modification techniques for military purposes

UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Establishes a duty to protect
and preserve the marine environment

London Convention Restricts ocean fertilization activities

Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) Restricts ocean fertilization
activities

Some advocate for leveraging these agreements to govern geoengineering in
the immediate future. However, others doubt that they will be sufficient as
none contains norms that clearly relate to geoengineering activity. One
prominent alternative short-term suggestion to address this gap in current
international law involves calling upon scientists themselves to govern
solar geoengineering research via voluntary codes of conduct. Some experts
have recommended a code of conduct requiring researchers to run thorough
environmental impact assessments alongside geoengineering research to
prevent environmental harm as well as to establish a standard of
transparency, perhaps via a voluntary registry of research projects in
which geoengineering researchers provide public updates on their work.
This, however, is unlikely to be a long-term solution as researchers in
autocratic countries may pay little attention to such voluntary governance
efforts. Yet given the improbability of a successfully implemented
moratorium on geoengineering research activity, a code of conduct may still
prove useful together with existing international law as part of a
short-term approach to governance.


When formulating a long-term approach to geoengineering governance, it is
useful to revisit other ambitious efforts in international governance that
can provide insight on aspects of governance structure. For instance, the
1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is highly relevant given the similar
global nature of the respective threats of nuclear proliferation and solar
geoengineering, especially if the goal of governance is largely
preventative. Analyzing the NPT’s treatment of non-participants India,
Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea could also be a useful exercise, as a
similar challenge may exist for a geoengineering governance regime. Such
non-cooperators have been a major problem for the international nuclear
governance regime, one a geoengineering regime should do its best to avoid
if possible.


Additionally, negotiations in the early 1980s under the United Nations
Environment Programme regarding ozone-depleting substances led to the 1987
Montreal Protocol, widely considered a successful environmental agreement
that began with 24 signatories and was eventually ratified by 197
countries. Its use of scientific assessment panels, clearly defined targets
and schedules, a dedicated financial mechanism, and a system to monitor
compliance are all features that will be important for a successful
geoengineering governance regime. Additionally, trade restrictions utilized
to deal with non-parties to the Protocol can serve as a model for a
geoengineering governance regime should any states decide not to cooperate.


The 1966 Outer Space Treaty and the 1959 Antarctic Treaty both provide
examples of international scientific cooperation and efforts to prevent
militarization of unexplored territory. These agreements differ from arms
control treaties in that a certain type of activity is being designated as
taboo, which could resemble an eventual approach to geoengineering
governance. Additionally, the flexible approaches to governance found in
the cases of these agreements due to a high degree of scientific
uncertainty around the issues at hand (as is the case in geoengineering,
currently) can provide useful insight for promoting commitment to
cooperation as collective understanding continues to evolve.


Borrowing the most useful and relevant elements of these governance regimes
while paying special attention to where they fell short can help build a
foundation for an eventual geoengineering governance regime. Such a
framework should be flexible and science-based, should have an extensive
technical and financial toolset to adequately manage the various aspects of
geoengineering, and should be capable of dealing with any non-participants
or violators with appropriate force.


IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION

Just as the international community needs to prepare for a world where
geoengineering is more seriously considered as an emergency response to
global warming, the U.S. has a responsibility to its own citizens to do
what it can to prepare unilaterally for global geoengineering challenges.
We propose three key steps that the Biden administration can take to
protect against unauthorized geoengineering activities by other nations or
non-state actors.


Develop capability for monitoring geoengineering activity

First, the United States should focus much of its effort on developing its
own capability to effectively monitor geoengineering activity at any given
location around the world. While the need for surveillance systems
specifically designed to detect solar geoengineering has not been widely
discussed, there are currently developing efforts to test a space-based
surveillance approach for tracking methane emissions. This could provide
important insight for geoengineering tracking given the similarities
between how methane emissions and how the substances involved in certain
methods of geoengineering will be detected.


Tracking solar geoengineering will also require a way to monitor the amount
and size of artificial particulates in the stratosphere and the resulting
climate effect. While climate change itself can be sufficiently monitored
by existing orbiting satellites, monitoring solar geoengineering activity
may need near-real time assessment and response to mitigate potential
threats to national security. A constellation of satellites with persistent
coverage could quickly detect and localize areas of interest that may be
affected by geoengineering activity. Development of new satellite networks
with new sensing capabilities will be essential to securing effective
geoengineering monitoring and detection.


Although much is still unknown about geoengineering, the United States
cannot afford to wait to act.


Local sampling will also be necessary to detect the chemical composition of
substances introduced into natural environments and quickly assess expected
changes in climate dynamics. Climate researchers have constructed models
that represent the results of techniques such as sulfate aerosol
geoengineering and technologies for countering the effects of
geoengineering, but these researchers need considerable additional data to
calibrate and improve those models.


Eventually, a multi-layered surveillance system with early detection
capabilities will be required, one which will need significant investment
to advance the necessary technologies. Important technologies include high
efficiency batteries and the exploration of alternative power sources as
well as applying an innovative systems approach to energy distribution and
recharging techniques. Also, the development of sensors and instruments
that can operate in challenging and extreme environments such as in the
Arctic, in the stratosphere, in the deep sea or during extreme weather
events. Other technologies involved will include imaging spectrometers and
lidar systems which have been proposed as methods not only to collect field
test data but also to be used to detect various other possible signs of
geoengineering activity. Additionally, investment in sensing technologies
is needed as well as investment in advancing AI algorithms and
computational systems which will be essential to enable near real-time
computations and organize automated responses.


These technical advancements will better allow the United States to detect
different types of geoengineering around the world early enough to allow
for an appropriate and timely response.


Develop methods to deter and respond to unilateral geoengineering without
international approval

Beyond surveillance and before the creation of an effective international
governance regime with the capability to respond, the United States must
prepare its policy response to scenarios in which other actors deploy
geoengineering technologies without international approval.


To prepare an adequate response, the government needs increased scientific
research into the effects of various solar geoengineering practices. There
is still great uncertainty around how the deployment of various solar
geoengineering techniques around the world would impact the global climate
and affect the United States’ security situation, so developing an
appropriate response to the use of such technologies by foreign actors
requires deeper familiarity with the risks associated with their use. For
instance, if continued research and climate modeling strongly suggest that
a certain type of solar geoengineering elsewhere in the world presents a
serious threat to U.S. security or the security of its allies, the United
States can tailor its policy response to meet the severity of the threat.


Such a policy will have to include answers to questions like what an
example response might look like. The United States will need to develop a
comprehensive plan of action based on its developing understanding of solar
geoengineering technologies in the case that potentially dangerous activity
should occur. What sort of immediate responses should be triggered? To what
extent does it depend on who exactly is conducting solar geoengineering, or
which particular technique is being used?


The tools deployed in responding to a geoengineering crisis will likely
reflect the perceived threat of such geoengineering activity. If a foreign
state is engaging in activity that has been determined to pose a genuine
security threat to the United States or its allies, economic sanctions
could provide an appropriately serious response without resorting to the
use of military force. Research has shown that sanctions are most effective
when implemented multilaterally via international institutions as well when
major damage is inflicted on the target economy, two realities that also
further emphasize the importance of international cooperation on
geoengineering governance.


However, it is possible that the anticipated effect of foreign
geoengineering activity might require more immediate intervention than
counting on sanctions to eventually force the offending party to change its
behavior. Research on “counter-geoengineering” practices has begun to
explore possible efforts to actively counter the effects of geoengineering
being conducted by others. This could amount to the use of a warming agent
to balance the cooling effect produced by geoengineering or by physically
disrupting the technology itself. While the back-and-forth development of
geoengineering and counter-geoengineering technology would not reflect well
on the status of global climate cooperation, further investment in
counter-geoengineering could act as a geoengineering deterrent in itself.


Leverage existing international institutions and establish a voluntary code
of conduct to promote global governance of geoengineering

Along with the development of robust surveillance systems and preparation
of a policy response to foreign geoengineering activity, it is critical
that the United States help drive and facilitate a global movement toward
geoengineering governance. Certainly the U.S. should be prepared to monitor
and respond to potentially harmful geoengineering activity. Yet given the
inherent danger, uncertainty, and difficulty in doing so, an ideal outcome
would involve no rogue geoengineering activity at all. Generating
successful short- and long-term international governance for
geoengineering, however difficult, is the safest way to achieve such an
outcome.


What can the United States do to best promote geoengineering governance in
the immediate future? First, use existing international institutions such
as the UNFCCC—Article 2 of which states that its objective is to prevent
“dangerous anthropogenic intervention in the climate system”—to legitimize
conversations around geoengineering governance. Second, embrace and promote
a universal code of conduct for research in the geoengineering space.
Quickly establishing an official forum such as the UNFCCC for discussions
related to geoengineering will be important in generating momentum towards
a more comprehensive governance mechanism. Simultaneously, ensuring
American scientists join other researchers around the world in adhering to
a geoengineering code of conduct may help promote responsible and
transparent research activity in this space in the near future, even if
these efforts do not provide a long-term solution. Such an effort may also
contribute to the development of relevant norms and processes that can
provide the foundation for continued governance.


In the long term, it is in the best interest of the United States to
promote the creation of a geoengineering-focused treaty under the United
Nations or another international body. Again, the use of the United Nations
provides an inherent sense of legitimacy to any governance effort, while a
multilateral decision-making process allows for greater likelihood that
wide participation may occur. Important elements of such a regime would
include a legal mandate for deployment, a technical agency, and a governing
body to set policy guidelines, among other elements. The agreement must
require that member states enforce the decision of the body within their
own jurisdictions while also determining jurisdiction over areas outside of
national boundaries.


V. CONCLUSION

Although much is still unknown about geoengineering, the United States
cannot afford to wait to act. By investing in robust surveillance systems,
preparing internally for deployment of geoengineering technologies by
foreign actors, and leading the way in the development of a global
governance regime, the U.S. can greatly minimize the risk presented by
increased interest in a human-controlled global climate.


This research was sponsored by the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab
(JHU/APL). Joseph Versen is a Research and Communications Intern in the
Executive Office at World Resources Institute. Other than the
aforementioned, the authors did not receive financial support from any firm
or person for this article or from any firm or person with a financial or
political interest in this article. They are not currently officers,
directors, or board members of any organization. Prior to publication, this
work was reviewed by JHU/APL staff to ensure it does not include any
sensitive information related to national security. The views expressed
herein are opinions of the authors and not official position of JHU/APL or
Brookings.

Source: Brookings.edu

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