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If you'd like to make a contribution to our costs, use these links for donations - Regular http://patreon.com/geoengineering - Single https://gofund.me/da586daa On Sat, 5 Nov 2022, 23:22 ayesha iqbal, <ayeshaiqbal...@gmail.com> wrote: > Poster's note: Old, but new to the list. > > > https://www.brookings.edu/research/preparing-the-united-states-for-security-and-governance-in-a-geoengineering-future/ > > By:Joseph Versen <https://www.brookings.edu/author/joseph-versen/>, Zaruhi > Mnatsakanyan <https://www.brookings.edu/author/zaruhi-mnatsakanyan/>, and > Johannes > Urpelainen <https://www.brookings.edu/experts/johannes-urpelainen/> > > Introduction > > Imagine the following scenario: it is the year 2035. One large country, > dealing with major issues of global warming, decides to take extreme > action. The government begins secret deployment of a geoengineering system > for pumping large amounts of reflective particles into the air, a technique > designed to mimic the cooling effect of a volcanic eruption, only on a much > larger scale and over a much longer time horizon. Although such behavior > has been discouraged by the international community, research has > continued, largely behind closed doors and without real regulation. Now > that the climate situation has become more dire, the country has decided > that it can no longer afford to wait; they see geoengineering as their only > option. > > At first, the decision seems wise, as the increase in global temperatures > start to level off. But soon other types of anomalous weather begin to > appear: unexpected and severe droughts hit countries around the world, > disrupting agriculture, and the ozone layer begins to decay rapidly, > exposing populations to harmful radiation. Global weather has become > politicized—delegates argue at the United Nations over new climate > complications allegedly caused by geoengineering, and diplomatic > relationships are strained. This new geoengineering crisis escalates when > another large country, under the impression it has been severely harmed by > the geoengineering, carries out a focused military strike against the > geoengineering equipment, a decision supported by other nations who also > believe they have been negatively impacted. This development, however, > becomes even more devastating, as once the geoengineering stops, global > temperatures dramatically rebound to the levels they would have reached on > their previous trajectory, prior to the use of geoengineering. The > resulting consequences of such a dramatic increase in temperatures are > disastrous. > > A scenario such as the one above remains unfortunately possible given the > current state of global geoengineering policy. As the increasingly severe > effects of global warming generate greater interest in geoengineering > technologies, the United States must prepare itself for the risks and > uncertainties that come along with their potential deployment. Preparedness > for such a world will likely be multi-faceted and will likely include > improved understanding of how the global climate will change both with or > without geoengineering, the ability to detect and monitor geoengineering > activity worldwide, an adequate policy roadmap for deterring certain kinds > of geoengineering activity and for responding in case of geoengineering > deployment by other nations, among other measures. > > The U.S. should also make a concerted effort to foster the development of > an international governance regime for geoengineering. In the short term, > that will involve leveraging existing international fora to legitimately > debate geoengineering issues on the international stage while also > championing a comprehensive code of conduct for geoengineering research > worldwide. In the long run, the U.S. should take the lead on creating a > geoengineering-specific international body, one with the appropriate scope > and flexibility to deal with the myriad challenges involved while also > promoting wide participation. > > > II. GEOENGINEERING OVERVIEW AND SECURITY CONCERNS > > We have already begun to see the effects of man-made climate change around > the world. As average temperatures climb, droughts become more frequent, > storms become more destructive, and sea levels rise, among other harmful > effects. The international community has made emissions mitigation its goal > to prevent catastrophic levels of climate change, but as nations habitually > fall short of targets deemed necessary by climate scientists, the risk of > climate emergency heightens. > > As a result, conversations around geoengineering have become more > frequent. Defined as “the deliberate large-scale manipulation of an > environmental process that affects the earth’s climate in an attempt to > counteract global warming,” geoengineering can broadly be divided into two > very different subcategories: 1) carbon dioxide removal, which seeks to > remove carbon from the atmosphere in order to lessen the greenhouse effect > and thus slow warming, and 2) solar radiation management, or solar > geoengineering, which attempts to increase reflection of solar radiation > away from the earth in order to slow warming. Various types of solar > geoengineering approaches include releasing reflective particles into the > atmosphere (known as strategic aerosol injection) or spraying sea water > into the lower atmosphere to generate brighter, more reflective clouds > (known as marine cloud brightening). > > It is important not to confuse carbon dioxide removal and solar > geoengineering, two very different approaches, under the umbrella term > “geoengineering.” Carbon dioxide removal as a climate solution has been > largely embraced, as the risk of unintended consequences is considered > minimal. Solar geoengineering, on the other hand, presents a variety of > complicating issues. > > For example, despite research on the matter, a consensus does not yet > exist around the ultimate overall climate impact of techniques like > strategic aerosol injection. Some alarming models have predicted that > certain schemes would cause droughts for a significant portion of the > earth’s population. Additionally, some predict the injection of aerosols > into the atmosphere to cause increased depletion of the ozone layer. A long > list of potential environmental complications like these exists in addition > to complications that have not even been considered. > > Artificially lowering global temperatures via solar geoengineering also > presents the unique risk of “termination shock,” meaning that if deployment > of such geoengineering technology were suddenly discontinued, the resulting > abrupt warming could become even more catastrophic than if warming had > simply continued on its previous trajectory. Unpredictable events such as > terrorist attacks, natural disasters, or political action all create risk > for the sudden discontinuation of solar geoengineering and thus risk of > termination shock. > > Beyond climate concerns, solar geoengineering technologies also present a > variety of new political and ethical questions. Although any ideal global > geoengineering scenario would involve substantial international > cooperation, some solar geoengineering techniques could be effectively > deployed by a single country or a small group of countries acting in > isolation. Even one extremely rich individual could conceivably deploy > their own solar geoengineering project if allowed to do so by their > respective government; in fact, a technique like strategic aerosol > injection is relatively inexpensive despite its potential for worldwide > environmental impact. Due to such great uncertainty and potential danger of > the global impact of these technologies, unilateral geoengineering > deployment is considered a very dangerous possibility. > > Even if some sort of global consensus emerges regarding solar > geoengineering deployment, the question of who controls the global > “thermostat” remains. Who would ultimately have the authority to decide > what kind and how much geoengineering should take place? How will decisions > weighing global benefit against local or regional risk be made? How can it > be ensured that geoengineering decisions aren’t made to cause regional > gains or losses? A world that features solar geoengineering use will need > to answer these questions. > > There is also the question of moral hazard—would the growing perception of > geoengineering as a solution to climate change harm mitigation efforts > around the world? The existence of moral hazard has been demonstrated > empirically in many areas. For instance, it has been documented that > increased healthcare insurance coverage results in increased demand for > healthcare. The international community must consider the danger that > geoengineering as global warming “insurance” could unintentionally generate > additional planet-warming behavior, which is also amplified by the risk of > termination shock. > > Some also express concern over potential military applications of > geoengineering techniques. In the past, militaries around the world have > shown interest in controlling the weather, and it may seem logical to fear > the weaponization of technologies designed for such purposes. However, > given the uncertain nature of the effects of such technologies in addition > to the international ban on military use of weather modification > techniques, this particular risk may be less of a priority. > > Given the potential threat that geoengineering could pose for the planet, > it is important that the global community take steps to establish order in > this space. While complete transparency among governments of the world > would be ideal in theory, it is the unfortunate reality that some actors > may pursue these activities unilaterally and in secret. The dangerous > unknowns of such behavior require the capability to detect geoengineering > activity wherever necessary. Early detection and localization of > unannounced and unilaterally deployed geoengineering activities, either by > private actors or states, requires adequate tools for rapid detection and > response to maintain global security. The United States must develop its > own realistic approach to preparing for emergency geoengineering scenarios. > Given the danger that foreign geoengineering could present, the U.S. should > establish proper security and deterrence mechanisms that can be carried out > quickly and efficiently in case of potentially harmful geoengineering > activity abroad. > > > Beyond surveillance, there is a dire need for a governance regime for > global geoengineering activity. The inherently international nature of > climate change and discussions of climate manipulation demand an > international approach to governance. As worsening climate conditions are > likely to generate continued worldwide interest in geoengineering > deployment, the world cannot afford to wait until an emergency arrives if > it hopes to navigate increasingly complicated climate and geoengineering > scenarios. States should collaborate to develop and refine international > norms and institutions to adequately prepare the world for the inevitable > stresses of continued climate change and the resulting reaction from states > and other actors. > > > III. UNDERSTANDING GEOENGINEERING GOVERNANCE > > The importance of an effective governance regime for global geoengineering > is clear, but what it will look like is undetermined. To adequately answer > this question, it’s important to examine all facets of the geoengineering > conversation. > > > Geoengineering governance is already the subject of academic research and > debate. Often referenced in scholarly approaches to this issue are the > Oxford Principles, a set of general guidelines created by a group of > academics which was commissioned by the U.K. House of Commons Select > Committee on Science and Technology. Although other similar efforts exist, > the Oxford Principles have become the most influential. The five principles > include 1) the regulation of geoengineering as a public good, 2) public > participation in geoengineering decision-making, 3) disclosure of > geoengineering research and publication of results, 4) independent > assessment of impacts, and 5) governance before deployment. While these > principles are useful in providing a theoretical lens for framing the > geoengineering governance debate, they do not offer much in terms of > realistic enforcement, a necessary component if norms like the Oxford > Principles can ever be upheld. > > > A preliminary discussion for any governance regime concerns the regime’s > goal of governance: what outcome does the regime seek to achieve? For > instance, a geoengineering regime might seek to facilitate or promote > further research into geoengineering. On the other hand, the regime could > be primarily concerned with preventing geoengineering from occurring > altogether if it considers the possibilities too dangerous. Establishing a > clear goal of governance will be essential to any regime-building process > for geoengineering and will shape all elements of governance. > > > Once the goal of governance has been determined, one of the most important > considerations of the regime will be the deterrence of geoengineering > activity without international approval. Until the risks of solar > geoengineering are better understood, an individual country, a small group > of countries, or even an individual acting alone could cause serious global > harm by engaging in solar geoengineering. While some argue that states are > unlikely to go this route given the strong reaction that it would engender > from the international community, the risk of unilateral deployment must > still be taken seriously and addressed given that continually worsening > climate change could cause states or other actors to act desperately. > > > An effective geoengineering governance regime must also adequately account > for the behavior of non-state actors, as even a wealthy individual could > theoretically perform solar geoengineering on their own. International law > applies to individuals only indirectly, as states are responsible for > implementing legislation within their own jurisdiction. Even more > complicated are areas beyond national jurisdiction; governing > geoengineering on the high seas or in the stratosphere would require > additional attention. Successful governance of geoengineering will require > substantial effort to incentivize and support states in preventing solar > geoengineering by non-state actors while also determining who has > jurisdiction over ambiguous areas. > > > A geoengineering governance regime needs to address geoengineering > research as well as deployment. Many scholars have already called for > “governance before research,” although how to achieve such a result remains > unclear. A moratorium on solar geoengineering field research, suggested by > some, would be nearly impossible to impose. Funding of geoengineering > research is also an important aspect of the conversation. International > lending institutions such as the World Bank can serve as important > governance tools via their ability to finance geoengineering projects. If > geoengineering projects are eventually scaled up, private actors, too, will > play a role in decision-making around geoengineering as they are called > upon more greatly to provide requisite materials for geoengineering. > > > As previously emphasized, monitoring and intelligence will also be key to > any geoengineering governance regime. Although an ideal governance regime > would include representation of all countries of the world, it should be > expected that some states will not cooperate, whether it be by joining a > regime but ignoring any resulting mandates or by ignoring the regime > altogether. For this reason, a reliable monitoring system that allows > states to track geoengineering activity will be an important enforcement > element of a successful regime. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty > provides a relevant example of an agreement featuring “wide-area > environmental detection methods to verify state compliance.” This will not > be an easy task, as successful monitoring of certain types of > geoengineering is extremely difficult, but the effort remains essential. > > > A potential geoengineering governance regime could take many forms in both > the near and long terms. For example, one near-term approach might seek to > use existing international institutions and agreements (listed in Table 1 > below) that have jurisdiction over elements of geoengineering. > > > Table 1 > > > Treaty or Convention Relevance for Geoengineering > > UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Seeks to prevent > dangerous interference in the global climate system > > Environmental Modification Convention (ENMOD) Prohibits environmental > modification techniques for military purposes > > UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Establishes a duty to protect > and preserve the marine environment > > London Convention Restricts ocean fertilization activities > > Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) Restricts ocean fertilization > activities > > Some advocate for leveraging these agreements to govern geoengineering in > the immediate future. However, others doubt that they will be sufficient as > none contains norms that clearly relate to geoengineering activity. One > prominent alternative short-term suggestion to address this gap in current > international law involves calling upon scientists themselves to govern > solar geoengineering research via voluntary codes of conduct. Some experts > have recommended a code of conduct requiring researchers to run thorough > environmental impact assessments alongside geoengineering research to > prevent environmental harm as well as to establish a standard of > transparency, perhaps via a voluntary registry of research projects in > which geoengineering researchers provide public updates on their work. > This, however, is unlikely to be a long-term solution as researchers in > autocratic countries may pay little attention to such voluntary governance > efforts. Yet given the improbability of a successfully implemented > moratorium on geoengineering research activity, a code of conduct may still > prove useful together with existing international law as part of a > short-term approach to governance. > > > When formulating a long-term approach to geoengineering governance, it is > useful to revisit other ambitious efforts in international governance that > can provide insight on aspects of governance structure. For instance, the > 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is highly relevant given the similar > global nature of the respective threats of nuclear proliferation and solar > geoengineering, especially if the goal of governance is largely > preventative. Analyzing the NPT’s treatment of non-participants India, > Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea could also be a useful exercise, as a > similar challenge may exist for a geoengineering governance regime. Such > non-cooperators have been a major problem for the international nuclear > governance regime, one a geoengineering regime should do its best to avoid > if possible. > > > Additionally, negotiations in the early 1980s under the United Nations > Environment Programme regarding ozone-depleting substances led to the 1987 > Montreal Protocol, widely considered a successful environmental agreement > that began with 24 signatories and was eventually ratified by 197 > countries. Its use of scientific assessment panels, clearly defined targets > and schedules, a dedicated financial mechanism, and a system to monitor > compliance are all features that will be important for a successful > geoengineering governance regime. Additionally, trade restrictions utilized > to deal with non-parties to the Protocol can serve as a model for a > geoengineering governance regime should any states decide not to cooperate. > > > The 1966 Outer Space Treaty and the 1959 Antarctic Treaty both provide > examples of international scientific cooperation and efforts to prevent > militarization of unexplored territory. These agreements differ from arms > control treaties in that a certain type of activity is being designated as > taboo, which could resemble an eventual approach to geoengineering > governance. Additionally, the flexible approaches to governance found in > the cases of these agreements due to a high degree of scientific > uncertainty around the issues at hand (as is the case in geoengineering, > currently) can provide useful insight for promoting commitment to > cooperation as collective understanding continues to evolve. > > > Borrowing the most useful and relevant elements of these governance > regimes while paying special attention to where they fell short can help > build a foundation for an eventual geoengineering governance regime. Such a > framework should be flexible and science-based, should have an extensive > technical and financial toolset to adequately manage the various aspects of > geoengineering, and should be capable of dealing with any non-participants > or violators with appropriate force. > > > IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION > > Just as the international community needs to prepare for a world where > geoengineering is more seriously considered as an emergency response to > global warming, the U.S. has a responsibility to its own citizens to do > what it can to prepare unilaterally for global geoengineering challenges. > We propose three key steps that the Biden administration can take to > protect against unauthorized geoengineering activities by other nations or > non-state actors. > > > Develop capability for monitoring geoengineering activity > > First, the United States should focus much of its effort on developing its > own capability to effectively monitor geoengineering activity at any given > location around the world. While the need for surveillance systems > specifically designed to detect solar geoengineering has not been widely > discussed, there are currently developing efforts to test a space-based > surveillance approach for tracking methane emissions. This could provide > important insight for geoengineering tracking given the similarities > between how methane emissions and how the substances involved in certain > methods of geoengineering will be detected. > > > Tracking solar geoengineering will also require a way to monitor the > amount and size of artificial particulates in the stratosphere and the > resulting climate effect. While climate change itself can be sufficiently > monitored by existing orbiting satellites, monitoring solar geoengineering > activity may need near-real time assessment and response to mitigate > potential threats to national security. A constellation of satellites with > persistent coverage could quickly detect and localize areas of interest > that may be affected by geoengineering activity. Development of new > satellite networks with new sensing capabilities will be essential to > securing effective geoengineering monitoring and detection. > > > Although much is still unknown about geoengineering, the United States > cannot afford to wait to act. > > > Local sampling will also be necessary to detect the chemical composition > of substances introduced into natural environments and quickly assess > expected changes in climate dynamics. Climate researchers have constructed > models that represent the results of techniques such as sulfate aerosol > geoengineering and technologies for countering the effects of > geoengineering, but these researchers need considerable additional data to > calibrate and improve those models. > > > Eventually, a multi-layered surveillance system with early detection > capabilities will be required, one which will need significant investment > to advance the necessary technologies. Important technologies include high > efficiency batteries and the exploration of alternative power sources as > well as applying an innovative systems approach to energy distribution and > recharging techniques. Also, the development of sensors and instruments > that can operate in challenging and extreme environments such as in the > Arctic, in the stratosphere, in the deep sea or during extreme weather > events. Other technologies involved will include imaging spectrometers and > lidar systems which have been proposed as methods not only to collect field > test data but also to be used to detect various other possible signs of > geoengineering activity. Additionally, investment in sensing technologies > is needed as well as investment in advancing AI algorithms and > computational systems which will be essential to enable near real-time > computations and organize automated responses. > > > These technical advancements will better allow the United States to detect > different types of geoengineering around the world early enough to allow > for an appropriate and timely response. > > > Develop methods to deter and respond to unilateral geoengineering without > international approval > > Beyond surveillance and before the creation of an effective international > governance regime with the capability to respond, the United States must > prepare its policy response to scenarios in which other actors deploy > geoengineering technologies without international approval. > > > To prepare an adequate response, the government needs increased scientific > research into the effects of various solar geoengineering practices. There > is still great uncertainty around how the deployment of various solar > geoengineering techniques around the world would impact the global climate > and affect the United States’ security situation, so developing an > appropriate response to the use of such technologies by foreign actors > requires deeper familiarity with the risks associated with their use. For > instance, if continued research and climate modeling strongly suggest that > a certain type of solar geoengineering elsewhere in the world presents a > serious threat to U.S. security or the security of its allies, the United > States can tailor its policy response to meet the severity of the threat. > > > Such a policy will have to include answers to questions like what an > example response might look like. The United States will need to develop a > comprehensive plan of action based on its developing understanding of solar > geoengineering technologies in the case that potentially dangerous activity > should occur. What sort of immediate responses should be triggered? To what > extent does it depend on who exactly is conducting solar geoengineering, or > which particular technique is being used? > > > The tools deployed in responding to a geoengineering crisis will likely > reflect the perceived threat of such geoengineering activity. If a foreign > state is engaging in activity that has been determined to pose a genuine > security threat to the United States or its allies, economic sanctions > could provide an appropriately serious response without resorting to the > use of military force. Research has shown that sanctions are most effective > when implemented multilaterally via international institutions as well when > major damage is inflicted on the target economy, two realities that also > further emphasize the importance of international cooperation on > geoengineering governance. > > > However, it is possible that the anticipated effect of foreign > geoengineering activity might require more immediate intervention than > counting on sanctions to eventually force the offending party to change its > behavior. Research on “counter-geoengineering” practices has begun to > explore possible efforts to actively counter the effects of geoengineering > being conducted by others. This could amount to the use of a warming agent > to balance the cooling effect produced by geoengineering or by physically > disrupting the technology itself. While the back-and-forth development of > geoengineering and counter-geoengineering technology would not reflect well > on the status of global climate cooperation, further investment in > counter-geoengineering could act as a geoengineering deterrent in itself. > > > Leverage existing international institutions and establish a voluntary > code of conduct to promote global governance of geoengineering > > Along with the development of robust surveillance systems and preparation > of a policy response to foreign geoengineering activity, it is critical > that the United States help drive and facilitate a global movement toward > geoengineering governance. Certainly the U.S. should be prepared to monitor > and respond to potentially harmful geoengineering activity. Yet given the > inherent danger, uncertainty, and difficulty in doing so, an ideal outcome > would involve no rogue geoengineering activity at all. Generating > successful short- and long-term international governance for > geoengineering, however difficult, is the safest way to achieve such an > outcome. > > > What can the United States do to best promote geoengineering governance in > the immediate future? First, use existing international institutions such > as the UNFCCC—Article 2 of which states that its objective is to prevent > “dangerous anthropogenic intervention in the climate system”—to legitimize > conversations around geoengineering governance. Second, embrace and promote > a universal code of conduct for research in the geoengineering space. > Quickly establishing an official forum such as the UNFCCC for discussions > related to geoengineering will be important in generating momentum towards > a more comprehensive governance mechanism. Simultaneously, ensuring > American scientists join other researchers around the world in adhering to > a geoengineering code of conduct may help promote responsible and > transparent research activity in this space in the near future, even if > these efforts do not provide a long-term solution. Such an effort may also > contribute to the development of relevant norms and processes that can > provide the foundation for continued governance. > > > In the long term, it is in the best interest of the United States to > promote the creation of a geoengineering-focused treaty under the United > Nations or another international body. Again, the use of the United Nations > provides an inherent sense of legitimacy to any governance effort, while a > multilateral decision-making process allows for greater likelihood that > wide participation may occur. Important elements of such a regime would > include a legal mandate for deployment, a technical agency, and a governing > body to set policy guidelines, among other elements. The agreement must > require that member states enforce the decision of the body within their > own jurisdictions while also determining jurisdiction over areas outside of > national boundaries. > > > V. CONCLUSION > > Although much is still unknown about geoengineering, the United States > cannot afford to wait to act. By investing in robust surveillance systems, > preparing internally for deployment of geoengineering technologies by > foreign actors, and leading the way in the development of a global > governance regime, the U.S. can greatly minimize the risk presented by > increased interest in a human-controlled global climate. > > > This research was sponsored by the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab > (JHU/APL). Joseph Versen is a Research and Communications Intern in the > Executive Office at World Resources Institute. Other than the > aforementioned, the authors did not receive financial support from any firm > or person for this article or from any firm or person with a financial or > political interest in this article. They are not currently officers, > directors, or board members of any organization. Prior to publication, this > work was reviewed by JHU/APL staff to ensure it does not include any > sensitive information related to national security. 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