Dear colleagues,
I just came back from Montreal where they negotiated the new HCFC
agreement. Heady week! Having witnessed what happened there and how
exactly it happened, I hope some observations would be useful to you.
Below is also a commentary I drafted for an Earth Negotiations
Bulletin analysis. Two key questions: what made the agreement
possible? What are its implications, including for the climate process?
The negotiations went much faster than most people expected. Everyone
was taken aback how quickly things were happening. Some delegates did
not even expect full negotiations on HCFCs (the agenda was heavy with
other items). All of a sudden, the Chinese (biggest producer) went
along. The Russians (also opponents) disappeared from the room
altogether. A key driving force was the linkage with climate that the
US, EU and others kept stressing. Rumour had it that the US
delegation had marching orders to get an HCFC agreement before the
climate meetings this week. Bush has invited key countries to
Washington this week to discuss climate change. With the new HCFC
agreement within the ozone process, he is able to say: “Look, we are
taking serious action on climate OUTSIDE the Kyoto process, and this
action will achieve far more than all combined efforts under Kyoto.”
Technically, this is correct. If implemented, the agreement will
result in up to 25-30 billion tons of CO2 equivalent, that is,
several times more than under Kyoto (assuming full implementation).
Same for China. One informed insider told me that the Chinese made a
U-turn after the head of UNEP, Achim Steinar, contacted the Chinese
at a "high level" and explained to them at length the climate
benefits of dropping HCFCs. Now the Chinese, too, are in a stronger
position to oppose binding obligations under Kyoto. Some people I
talked to in Montreal openly said that the amendment is embarrassing
for the Kyoto process and undermines it.
Here is a fuller commentary I drafted for the ENB. It includes more
information about country positions, motivations behind positions,
and also ecological and political implications of the new agreement.
If you have more information, questions, comments, would love to hear
them.
ANALYSIS
The nineteenth meeting of the parties to the Montreal Protocol opened
to much fanfare. The meeting marked the twentieth anniversary of the
Montreal Protocol, a treaty that pundits regard as a spectacular
success in global environmental politics. In the keynote address,
former Canadian Prime Minster of Canada Brian Mulroney portrayed the
Montreal Protocol as “the single most successful international
agreement to date.” This sentiment appears to be widely in the policy
world, as various speakers from government delegations, international
organizations and environmental NGOs showered the process with
superlatives throughout the six-day meeting in Montreal. Newspapers
around the world ran articles that lavished the event with attention.
EXCEEDING EXPECTATIONS
The ozone process could easily have afforded to lie on its laurels
and bask in the approbation of the world. Instead, delegates moved
swiftly to forge out yet another key agreement, on accelerating the
HCFCs phase-out. Thus, instead of merely receiving the accolades, the
process produced a new substantive proof that it deserves them well.
The remainder of this analysis reflects on the dynamics and
achievements of the meeting, the considerable strengths of the ozone
process and the challenges that lie ahead.
The celebration provided the context of the meeting and infused it
with an upbeat and festive atmosphere. The well-organized and
productive meeting in Montreal demonstrated that the process is a
smooth and effective mechanism for decisionmaking. Delegates
maintained a positive and cordial tone during the negotiations,
displayed a constructive spirit of cooperation, and made mutual
compromises. None of the tectonic rifts and acrimonious debates that
characterize some other international policy processes were evident
here.
ANOTHER NEW HORIZON: HCFCs
Switching gears to move faster on eliminating these substances has
widely been regarded as the next logical step in the evolution of the
ozone regime.
What took everyone by surprise is how quickly events unfolded. Many
said that the issue came to the fore very quickly, perhaps too
quickly. Even veteran observers of the process said they had not
expected a decision before MOP21, and were astonished at the rapid
pace of progress in the discussions. When the idea of accelerated
phaseout was first raised six years ago, it had met strong opposition
by key players, and until earlier this year no one had expected a
decision was possible at this stage. Some delegations even admitted
that they were not fully prepared to engage in in-depth negotiations
at this meeting, and may have some explaining to do back home.
Various conducive factors converged to facilitate rapid progress.
China, the biggest country producer of HCFCs and main opponent of
accelerating the phase-out showed far more flexibility than anyone
expected. Another important player, while not supporting
acceleration, decided not to oppose it actively either and discretely
withdrew from the discussion in the middle of the week. Rumour had it
that their president’s signature on a recent G-8 declaration had tied
the delegation’s hands on the issue.
Among the remaining players, various country interests converged to
work favourably in the same direction. Industrialized countries
stressed the high global warming potential of HCFCs and the climate
benefits of their elimination. Developing countries saw new stronger
commitments as a mechanism for increasing financial resources
available through the multilateral fund. They insisted on a “total
package” involving agreements on HCFCs, increased Fund contributions
and access to alternatives. They stuck to their guns on linking these
issues, and succeeded in securing a commitment to stable and
sufficient funding. For everyone involved, accelerating the phase-out
was also necessary for maintaining stable levels of funding in the
multilateral fund. Insiders openly discussed the financial reasons to
seek acceleration: with 95 percent of other ODSs successfully
eliminated, the Fund had been drying up, and new policy commitments
were seen as a way to ensure continued funding. More fundamentally,
the successful implementation of the treaty had created a paradoxical
problem: with most of the goals achieved, the process faced the
prospect of having nothing left to do, and in need of a reason to
live. These diverse factors thrust a powerful tail wind in the sails
that propelled the negotiations forward.
TILLING NEW FIELDS: CLIMATE CHANGE
Many delegates in Montreal promoted the climate benefits of reaching
an agreement on HCFCs. According to some, Montreal Protocol
commitments for an accelerated phase out of HCFCs, will actually
serve to benefit climate change, more than for ozone depletion. Some
statistics indicate HCFCs could result in 18 billion to 30 billion
CO2 equivalent for phase-outs, much more than the Kyoto Protocol in
its first commitment period. One major country displayed particular
enthusiasm about taking climate-related action outside of the climate
process. Reportedly, their delegation had “marching orders” to bring
climate into the ozone process before an upcoming high-level meeting
on climate change next week, and thus draw attention away from the
UNFCCC. Many delegates and observers wondered if by committing
themselves to HCFC accelerated phase-out have parties reincarnated
the regime into one focused on climate. While everyone celebrated the
success on HCFCs, some questioned if this is a reincarnation, then
what about the illegally traded ODS and the continued use of methyl
bromide. They asked has the Montreal Protocol given up on getting its
own house in order. Others postulated that it served one particular
parties interest, who is not party to Kyoto and who has been
historically under fire for its continued use of methyl bromide, to
push for an agreement on HCFCs, to promote the climate benefits and
to undermine Kyoto.
TAKING STOCK: SUCCESSES AND FUTURE CHALLENGES
The outcome was what delegates referred to as a “historic agreement”
to accelerate the HCFC phaseout. This agreement opens a new chapter
in the life of the Montreal Protocol. The new policy commitments
strengthen the fight to protect the ozone layer, give the Montreal
Protocol process a new raison d’etre, and ensure “the sustainability
of funding” by providing new justification for fund replenishment.
Politically, the new agreement may take attention away from the
ongoing issues of methyl bromide use and illegal trade problems, and
reduce the pressure on key offenders in those regards. It also
provides an easy way to take action on climate change and shift the
focus away from the Kyoto Protocol.
The new HCFC agreement is yet another gem in a crown that is already
resplendent. Clearly, the Montreal Protocol process has much to
boast. It enjoys broad active participation, with most of the
countries in the world being parties to the treaty. The Protocol and
its amendments are ambitious policy instruments and stipulate
stringent regulations of many substances. The implementation of these
policies has been strong, and as many pointed out, ninety-five
percent of ODSs have been eliminated. The new agreement helps the
process remain on the pedestal of global environmental politics.
Still, problems remain and further challenges lie ahead.
Illegal trade of ODSs remains the weak spot of ozone policy, and
curbing the black markets will continue to be a struggle. One NGO
speaker publicly accused his government for supplying the black
markets. Methyl bromide also remains a contentious issue. In
Montreal, much energy was spent debating how to measure stocks. A
regional group kept challenging partners to match its own
achievements in phasing out MB, and succeeded in gaining additional
ground. The fact that a heavy-handed player yielded to the pressure
and accepted to reduce its methyl bromide quantities for critical use
exemptions could be taken as an indication that a complete phaseout
is a matter of time.
The eventual phaseout of HCFCs may have unexpected and undesirable
consequences, given that the negative impacts of HCFC alternatives
are of concern. Environmental NGOs stressed that one alternative in
particular, HFCs, have a global warming potential far greater than
HCFCs and reliance on them may create more problems than it solves.
Developing countries appeared to be most concerned with possible
negative impacts of alternatives and persistently called for studies
on the matter. After all, HCFCs that are now headed to the guillotine
were introduced as a solution to the CFCs problem. The logical
question is whether the next solution will also become the next
problem? Accelerating the phaseout at MOP19 is undoubtedly a notable
achievement. Yet, the choice of particular substitutes and policy
instruments used to implement it will be of equal importance.
The ultimate weakness of the process is that, despite all political
successes in international cooperation, the ecological problem of
ozone depletion has not been solved. As the scientific presentations
during the meeting revealed, current stratospheric ozone levels
remain low, the Antarctic hole is at its worst, and skin cancer cases
are expected to multiply several times in the next decade. The
international policy process established to restore the ecological
balance remains accountable for the end results and those are
ultimately measured in ecosystem and public health.
On 24-Sep-07, at 11:10 AM, Wil Burns wrote:
You're quite right, Sam. However, what the faster phaseout does do is,
potentially, buy us some time in terms of when atmospheric
concentration of
greenhouse gases would reach the point where forcings would push us
past the
2C threshold that everyone acknowledges as particularly foreboding,
and at
which point some of the non-linear forcings may occur. Such is our
lot in
life where that's the extent of the good news, but perhaps in the
interim
technological change, peak oil and political impetus can transform
climate
policy before the worse potential impacts of climate change are
visited on
us, and perhaps more importantly, the world's most vulnerable
populations.
wil
-----Original Message-----
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Samuel
Barkin
Sent: Monday, September 24, 2007 7:30 AM
To: gep-ed@listserve1.allegheny.edu
Subject: HCFCs and Kyoto
A thought on the new Montreal Protocol/HCFC agreement and climate
change, following up on the several emails on GEPED on the topic
yesterday. Various commentators have argued that this agreement does
anywhere from twice to five times as much for climate change as does
Kyoto. And this may well be the case for some periods of time in
between
the new baseline year and the old phase-out date of 2040. But in the
long term, it strikes me that the new HCFC agreement does not do all
that much for climate change. The parties to the agreement had all
already agreed to a phaseout - this agreement moves the dates
forward by
a decade. But a decade in climatological terms isn't all that much.
After 2040, this agreement makes no difference at all to climate
change.
Kyoto, on the other hand, was about setting new emissions levels, not
changing the schedule for emissions levels already agreed to. As such,
its achievements (however modest) could be expected to alter long-term
behavior by setting new baselines for expectations. As such, it
strikes
me that comparisons of the climate-change effects of the two
agreements
are misplaced, in that the HCFC agreement does not have new long-term
ameliorative effects on climate change. Thoughts?
Sam Barkin
Samuel Barkin
Associate Professor of Political Science
University of Florida
