On Mon, 13 Dec 2010 01:27, ds...@jabberwocky.com said: > The fix in OpenPGP is to hash the contents of the secret key, so any > tampering is evident.
FWIW: We verify a signature immediatley after its creation which also thwarts this attack. > I am also skeptical of this. I strongly doubt that new fingerprints > can be achieved without going to a V5 key format. There are just too > many interoperability gotchas with an upgraded V4. We might be able Switching to V5 will be a lot of work in GnuPG because under the hood we need to replace a lot of data structures which use a 160 bit hash. It will eventually be done but before we do that we need SHA-3; lets talk about this in 2 years. Recall that the rush towards SHA-256 is due to collisions on SHA-1 expected in the near future. There are no signs at all that we will have a pre-image attack on SHA-1 any time soon [1]. Shalom-Salam, Werner [1] #include <famous-last-words.h> -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users