On 12/13/2010 11:16 AM, David Shaw wrote: > it seems to me you are focusing on one specific part of > the design (the secret key format), forcing it to remain unchanged,
FWIW, i don't particularly care about the secret key packet format. My focus in this discussion has been on the certificate format -- that is, the public primary key packet format and the certifications binding public primary keys to their User IDs, User Attributes, and subkeys. Avoiding a systemic change to the certificate format seems like it would be a Good Thing in that people could participate in a global smooth transition, without requiring a hard cut-over or a global interruption of existing networks of identity verification. > and (presumably) using changes elsewhere to accommodate this fixed > point in the design (for example, doubled PKESK packets, one for > each key ID). Given that the truncated keyid in the PKESK packet is only advisory material to help the recipient choose which key to use to try to decrypt (and not of sufficient length to provide cryptographic assurances even if it was intended to do so), i think this packet could stay as it currently stands, even if we choose to calculate the human-readable fingerprint in some other way. > As I see it, three major things need to happen to get OpenPGP using > something other than SHA-1: Wait -- i've been saying all along here that aside from non-cryptographic uses like the MDC, and the primary key fingerprint format itself (which is not vulnerable to weakened collision-resistance), we *can* use OpenPGP with something other than SHA-1 today. As far as i understand it, that was the point of building algorithm flexibility into OpenPGP in the first place. Do you think this has failed? The IETF discussion last year reviewing the OpenPGP spec for use of SHA-1 didn't turn up anything other than the parts we've been talking about in this thread, right? --dkg
signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
_______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users