On 29.07.15 14:07, Neal H. Walfield wrote: > At Wed, 29 Jul 2015 01:03:53 +0100, > MFPA wrote: >> On Tuesday 28 July 2015 at 11:46:10 PM, in >> <mid:87vbd3nbnx.wl-n...@walfield.org>, Neal H. Walfield wrote: >>> At Tue, 28 Jul 2015 19:22:29 +0100, MFPA wrote: >>>> It also eliminates any attempt to to establish a link >>>> between the key and the email address in the UID. >> >>> I'm not so sure. Recall that we are not attempting to >>> protect against attacks by nation states. As such, >>> performing a week of computation each year is going to >>> be too much to maintain for those who upload fake keys. >> >> And too much for people with multiple email addresses. > > It doesn't have to be per-email address. It is sufficient to attach > it to the primary key.
This allows me to have patr...@enigmail.net verified OK. Then I add a new UID mall...@evil.com and delete patr...@enigmail.net from the key. And then I upload my key to the keyservers network, and I'll end up where we are now. >> This still seems less rigorous to me than having to receive an email >> sent to that address and decrypt it with that key. I guess it's a case >> of swings and roundabouts. > > Well, I don't like the CA model and that's what Nico is basically > proposing (with less rigorous checks). Another huge disadvantage is > that user's have to actively participate by replying to emails / > visiting a link. > > Using PoW, no human intervention is required and there is no central > authority. PoW relies on the assumption that conducting an attack is > too expensive to do / maintain. The whole point of this exercise is to verify that the key and the email address(es) belong _together_. I don't see how PoW could do this, or I didn't understand it well enough. -Patrick _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
