Hello, I'm the maintainer of the Server Side TLS guidelines at Mozilla. I'm happy to help with the HTTPS setup of gnupg.org in any way I can.
Here's the configuration currently measures by the TLS Observatory, along with some recommendations to reach Modern level. --- Ciphers Evaluation --- prio cipher protocols pfs curves 1 DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2 DH,2048bits 2 DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2 DH,2048bits 3 DES-CBC3-SHA TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2 None OCSP Stapling false Server Side Ordering true Curves Fallback false --- Analyzers --- * Mozilla evaluation: intermediate - for modern level: remove ciphersuites DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA, DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA, DES-CBC3-SHA - for modern level: consider adding ciphers ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384, ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384, ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305, ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305, ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256, ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256, ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384, ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384, ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256, ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 - for modern level: remove protocols TLSv1, TLSv1.1 - for modern level: consider enabling OCSP stapling - for modern level: enable Perfect Forward Secrecy with a curve of at least 256bits, don't use DHE - for modern level: use a certificate of type ecdsa, not RSA Hope this helps, Julien On Thu 26.Jan'17 at 10:48:28 -0800, Glenn Rempe wrote: > Werner, you (or anyone setting up a web server themselves really) > might also find this config generator from Mozilla helpful as a > shortcut in creating what is considered a modern web server config for > TLS. > > https://mozilla.github.io/server-side-tls/ssl-config-generator/ > > https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS > > This config may not apply to gnupg.org directly since its not clear > what web server you are running. In any case it will tell you which > suites you are recommended to support for modern(ish) browsers. > > I would also note that there is room for improvement regarding the > security headers the gnupg.org sends with its content. > > https://securityheaders.io/?q=gnupg.org&followRedirects=on > > You are using HSTS, which is generally very good, but in this case it > forcibly breaks users experience since it requires me to connect with > TLS but that is not possible since you are not advertising a TLS suite > that shares common ground with my browser (or millions of other > potential visitors). > > Cheers. > > On 1/26/17 3:49 AM, Andrew Gallagher wrote: > > On 26/01/17 00:16, Andrew Gallagher wrote: > >> > >> gnupg.org *does* keep 3DES at the end of the supported suites, > >> so surely it should not be affected. I'm tempted to write this > >> off as a mistake by ssllabs. > > > > I've spoken to ssllabs and it appears that this was an ambiguity > > in the wording of their blog post. That means the downgrade to C > > next month is legit - not because 3DES is present, but because 3DES > > is present *and* GCM is absent. > > > > What both this and Glenn's Apple issue have in common is the lack > > of ECDHE+GCM suites in the cipher list. I generally use the > > following config in Apache: > > > > SSLCipherSuite \ "EECDH+ECDSA+AESGCM EECDH+aRSA+AESGCM > > EECDH+ECDSA+SHA384 \ EECDH+ECDSA+SHA256 EECDH+aRSA+SHA384 > > EECDH+aRSA+SHA256 \ EECDH EDH+AESGCM EDH+aRSA +3DES 3DES \ !aNULL > > !eNULL !LOW !EXP !MD5 !KRB5 !PSK !SRP !DSS !SEED !RC4" > > > > This uses all HIGH suites in a sensible order but still falls back > > to 3DES for XP compatibility. When retiring 3DES this simplifies > > to: > > > > SSLCipherSuite \ "EECDH+ECDSA+AESGCM EECDH+aRSA+AESGCM > > EECDH+ECDSA+SHA384 \ EECDH+ECDSA+SHA256 EECDH+aRSA+SHA384 > > EECDH+aRSA+SHA256 \ EECDH EDH+AESGCM EDH+aRSA !MEDIUM !LOW !aNULL > > !eNULL !PSK" > > > > Andrew. > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users > > mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org > > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > > > > _______________________________________________ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users@gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
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