> Third-party signatures from locally unknown certificates are arguably > not so useful, so how about using ?--keyserver-options import-clean?? > (Or even making it the default behavior?) Of course it's not perfect as > it still clutters network traffic and gpg(1) needs to clean up the mess > client-side (which is slow and CPU expensive), but at least it mitigates > the DoS attack: it doesn't prevent keyring updates, and limits the bloat > on disk.
Alas, this doesn't fully mitigate the issue, because it's not exactly difficult to get a key into somebody's keyring, especially with the existence of the auto-key-retrieve option. All I would have to do would be to sign the key of somebody in the strong set lots of times with the same key, and then send you an email signed by me, and an email with a body signed by the key I was attacking (I could find some sort of statement signed by that key online somewhere). Alternatively, I could construct a Git repository that would load the keys into your keychain in the correct order when you examined the commit signatures if I could find a commit signed by my victim somewhere. I'm sure it's easy enough to get a public key imported even without auto-key-retrieve, too. I imagine there are MUAs that would import a key attached to a message, maybe.
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
_______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
