> Efail-1 was what Werner is talking about here. It was a pretty bad > blow to S/MIME, but far less so to OpenPGP, since OpenPGP has had > countermeasures in place for almost twenty years. Efail-1's impact > on OpenPGP was, is, minimal. I actually spend a lot of time investigating the impact of EFAIL on S/MIME and it's my opinion that the real impact has been overblown. In all my experiments, and I can tell you I have done a lot of them, I have not been able to force a mail client to actually forward the decrypted content to a remote system.
The CBC attack is serious because modifying encrypted content is not something you expect from a security point of view. But the real life impact is not as big as they wanted us to believe (IMHO). I have asked the EFAIL authors for examples on real life attacks (of the CBC problem related to S/MIME) but I never got a real answer whether they were able to use the attack in real life situation. I think the problem with the paper was that they discusses two separate issues. The issue with Efail-2 was serious but that was more an mail client issue. Kind regards, Martijn _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
