[Of the last two remaining (known) major hurdles, one was cleared on Dec. 13 2018 (ref. point I&II. below). So, now, the cost - including the financial pacage, if any, would be the major consideration.
The article posted here draws our attention, also, to the safety aspects, which affect human lives straightaway. As regards the liability of the contractor it cannot but be linked to its precise scope of work, which has to be finalised, if at all, based on the techno-commercial offer on the table. The primary responsibility, however, in any case, lies with the "operator". That, arguably, makes things for the potential victims much simpler. The "contractor"/"supllier", if at all, would be accountable to the "operator". I. <<On Friday 14th of December 2018, CGN and EDF announced, at a joint press conference in Beijing, that unit 1 of Taishan nuclear power plant had become the world's first EPR to enter into commercial operation. This last milestone was reached on Thursday 13th of December 2018 after the final statutory functional test of continuous operation at full power for 168 hours. The successful outcome of this test marks the achievement of all prerequisite conditions for the reactor's safe operation.>> (Ref.: < https://globenewswire.com/news-release/2018/12/14/1667114/0/en/EDF-The-first-of-two-EPR-reactors-at-China-s-Taishan-nuclear-power-plant-enters-into-commercial-operation.html?fbclid=IwAR2VzG-_-k787URYLxqjChOeasX631DENVjdOc-NgMCDwbCbDTXv0EddLeo#.XBiDyJ1dTKQ.messenger >.) II. <<(Sekhar) Basu (the former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and Secretary, Department of the Atomic Energy, who superannuated this month) said there have been several factors that were hindering the power plant, which includes the “reference plant”. A reference plant is a functional power reactor and the Areva had then cited a power reactor at Flamanville. “That will only happen by 2020,” Basu said. Since Areva, and now EDF, was bringing in a new technology, the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), the country nuclear watchdog, asked for a reference plant. “They have to give a techno-commercial offer that is feasible and tariffs have to be viable,” Basu added. Tariff has been a key concern, Basu and Sinha said as it has to be within the acceptable limits before going ahead with the deal.>> (Ref.: < https://indianexpress.com/article/india/indo-french-nuclear-deal-10-years-after-its-signing-power-project-yield-little-success-5380153/ >.) III. <<France submits techno-commercial offer for Jaitapur nuclear power plant New Delhi: French company EDF has submitted a techno-commercial proposal to the government for the Jaitapur Nuclear Power Plant (JNPP), in a significant step towards the progress of the project, sources said. A techno-commercial offer is an important step in the negotiations process as it helps the two parties determine the cost of the project and tariff of the electricity generated from it. The offer comes less than a week after External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj and French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian agreed to expedite work on the project.>> (Ref.: < https://energy.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/power/france-submits-techno-commercial-offer-for-jaitapur-nuclear-power-plant/67224014 >.)] https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/jaitapur-a-risky-and-expensive-project/article25934123.ece?homepage=true&fbclid=IwAR1IUKmEVH8AH0zUQIEo0VK_UzYLEJ9WEXiiiLUJIAEUT3RlP_5uTW5PEJY Jaitapur: A risky and expensive project Suvrat Raju & M.V. Ramana JANUARY 08, 2019 00:15 IST UPDATED: JANUARY 08, 2019 00:12 IST “It is clear that electricity from the Jaitapur project will be more expensive than many other sources of electricity.” People marching against the nuclear power plant proposed at Jaitapur in Maharashtra's Konkan region in Mumbai in 2011.Paul Noronha “It is clear that electricity from the Jaitapur project will be more expensive than many other sources of electricity.” People marching against the nuclear power plant proposed at Jaitapur in Maharashtra's Konkan region in Mumbai in 2011.Paul Noronha *Unless the government is transparent about details, it will be engulfed in yet another controversy* In December, the French company Électricité de France (EDF) submitted a “techno-commercial proposal” to the Indian government for the Jaitapur nuclear power project in Maharashtra. The idea of importing six nuclear European Pressurised Reactors (EPRs) was initiated by the United Progressive Alliance government more than a decade ago, but the project had made little progress due to concerns about the economics and safety of the EPRs, local opposition, and the collapse of the initial French corporate partner, Areva. Despite these problems, in the past few months, the Modi government has taken several high-level steps towards actuating the project. In March 2018, EDF and the Nuclear Power Corporation of India (NPCIL) signed an “industrial way forward” agreement in the presence of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and French President Emmanuel Macron. Last month, after meeting the French Foreign Minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian, External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj announced that “both countries are working to start the Jaitapur project as soon as possible”. The urgency is inexplicable as it comes before the techno-commercial offer has been examined and as earlier questions about costs and safety remain unanswered. Moreover, with the Indian power sector facing surplus capacity and a crisis of non-performing assets (NPAs), a large investment in the Jaitapur project is particularly risky. Delays and cost increases It is clear that electricity from the Jaitapur project will be more expensive than many other sources of electricity, including solar and wind power. Using international estimates of capital costs for EPRs from the 2010-2012 period, and after adjusting for cost savings in India, we had shown in 2013 that first year tariffs from the project would be around ₹15 per kilowatt-hour (“Repeating Enron in Jaitapur”, June 21, The Hindu). Even this figure must be revised upwards to account for the construction experience with EPRs over the past five years. Across the world, EPRs have experienced delays and cost increases. The first EPR entered commercial operation in December 2018 at the Taishan site in China, five years later than originally projected. Its final capital cost was estimated by industry sources to be “40% over the original estimate”. The story in Europe is more dramatic. The EPR at Flamanville in France, for example, went from an expected start date of 2012 to 2020, and a cost estimate of €3.3 billion to €10.9 billion. Two EPRs have been planned at Hinkley Point in the U.K. Even before construction began, the estimated cost has risen significantly to £20 billion (about ₹1.75 lakh crore). The British National Audit Office assessed that the project “locked consumers into a risky and expensive project with uncertain strategic and economic benefits.” While nuclear costs have been rising, other low-carbon sources of electricity, especially solar energy, have become cheaper. In 2010-11, tariffs for solar photovoltaic (PV) projects under the National Solar Mission were between ₹10.95 and ₹12.76 per unit. But several projects approved under Phase II of the mission have been connected to the grid in the last year with tariffs below ₹5 per unit. In recent auctions for solar PV projects, winning tariff bids in the range of ₹2 to ₹2.50 per unit have become routine. The high capital costs of the EPRs are of particular concern because power-generating capacity in India has grown faster than demand causing projects to run into financial difficulties. In March 2018, the parliamentary standing committee on energy listed 34 “stressed” projects, including NPAs and “those which have the potential to become NPAs”, with a cumulative outstanding debt of ₹1.74 lakh crore. In this context, the government seems to be throwing caution to the winds by investing lakhs of crores in the Jaitapur project. Because the NPCIL’s debts would ultimately be underwritten by the Indian government, if the project encounters financial difficulties, the costs would fall on Indian taxpayers. Safety problems In addition to the high costs, safety problems with the reactor design and construction have emerged in several EPRs. The most serious of these pertained to the pressure vessel, which is the key barrier that prevents the spread of radioactive materials from the reactor. In April 2015, the French nuclear safety regulator, Autorité Sûreté Nucléaire, announced that some sections of the pressure vessel that the French Creusot Forge had supplied to the Flamanville and Taishan reactors had too much carbon in the steel. The Flamanville project was also found to have substandard welding in the reactor’s pipes. The EPR at Olkiluoto in Finland encountered problems with vibrations in the pipe that connects the primary coolant system with the pressuriser, which maintains the pressure of the water circulating in the reactor. These safety concerns are exacerbated by India’s flawed nuclear liability law. If and when completed, Jaitapur “will be the largest nuclear power plant in the world”. In the event of an accident, the nuclear liability law would require the public sector NPCIL to compensate victims and pay for clean-up, while largely absolving EDF of responsibility. The Indian law provides NPCIL with a limited opportunity to obtain compensation from EDF for the “supply of equipment... with... defects... or sub-standard services”. But the joint statement issued in March 2018 promises that the “enforcement of India’s rules” would be in accordance with the international Convention on Supplementary Compensation for nuclear damage, which severely limits the operator’s right of recourse. This raises the disturbing possibility that the NPCIL may have promised not to exercise its right to claim compensation from EDF as allowed by Indian law. In any event, there is a “moral hazard” here: since EDF can escape with limited or no consequences even after a severe accident, it has little material incentive to maintain the highest safety standards, particularly if the requirements of safety come into conflict with the imperative to lower costs. Such pressures might be accentuated by EDF’s poor financial state. The Modi-Macron statement “emphasized the need for the project to generate cost-effective electricity”. It is hard to see how this is possible. To begin with, the government must answer several specific questions: how much will the entire project cost, who will be accountable for cost increases and delays, and what is the precise arrangement that the government has reached with France on liability? Unless it is transparent about these details, the Modi government may well find itself engulfed in yet another controversy involving overpriced French equipment. Suvrat Raju and M.V. Ramana are physicists associated with the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace, and currently based in Bengaluru and Vancouver, respectively. Views are personal -- Peace Is Doable -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Green Youth Movement" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to greenyouth+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send an email to greenyouth@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/greenyouth. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
