[That's the very crux.

The scheme is not powered by mere anti-Muslim passion; it's central aim is
to wilfully trigger and perpetuate a civil war-like situation in India in
order to help mobilise the Hindus as "Hindus", drowning out all other
competing identities linked to gender, ethnicity, language, caste, class,
age-group etc., so very necessary to derive the requiste propulsion for the
journey towards a "Hindu Rashtra", undertaken and piloted by the incumbent
regime.
No price is too high to accomplish that goal.
Not even a chaos much larger than the one caused by demonetisation.

《In the normal course, we would be tempted to invoke Sir Walter Scott here
for the BJP: Oh, what a tangled web we weave/when first we practice to
deceive. But, there is a twist. The BJP also knows that the CAB, combined
with a fresh nationwide NRC process, is an idea that’s dead-on-arrival.
Where it lives on, however, is as a divisive, polarising instrument, as its
rivals have to take a position against it and thereby be exposed to the
charge of “Muslim appeasement” again. It could then be the Ram Mandir or
Article 370 of the next three decades.》
(Excerpted from the comment reproduced below.)

Also relevant:
《Assam proved to be an inconvenient experiment, showing us what the result
of a nationwide exercise could be. It took over four years and reportedly
cost the central government Rs 1,600 crore to update the National Register
of Citizens (NRC) in Assam. More than 55,000 people were employed, and more
than 3.2 crore people from Assam applied to register themselves.
...
Assam’s first detention centre is being constructed at a cost of Rs 46
crore spread over 2.5 hectares and will house 3,000 people. But there are
19 lakh people excluded from the final NRC. Here is the math: the cost of
simply building detention centres for all the excluded people will be
upwards of Rs 27,000 crore. And this is just in Assam. Imagine the cost of
constructing detention centres all over India. Also, how many detention
centres would the Modi government construct?》
(Excerpted from: <
https://theprint.in/opinion/amit-shahs-nationwide-nrc-will-be-the-same-as-modis-demonetisation/329372/?fbclid=IwAR0QCwwH3U0QEed43lJn5MbbeRLwK6eXQk7Z2vxjgl-5fleymjZQsIAz4F0
>.)]

https://theprint.in/national-interest/why-cab-plus-nrc-fantasy-is-bjps-next-ram-mandir-plus-article-370-gambit/331706/?fbclid=IwAR0rkdocxEZbRO5LgJQiJ2-22Iko1Qvnfq_LbTYX5ooz3szB8AqIWZbNJFI

Why CAB-plus-NRC fantasy is BJP’s next Ram Mandir-plus-Article 370 gambit
CAB-plus-NRC is an idea that’s dead-on-arrival. But it’s the BJP’s next Ram
Mandir that will be used to polarise and expose the party’s rivals.

SHEKHAR GUPTA
7 December, 2019 8:14 am IST

Illustration by Soham Sen | ThePrint

For seven decades now, the Pakistani establishment has had one mantra:
“Kashmir is just one unfinished business of Partition. You settle that, and
we (Pakistan and India) could live as friends, just like Canada and the US.”

The consistent Indian response has also been a mantra: Partition was final,
and is over. Only fools or suicidal revanchists would talk of reopening
that wound.

That script is now changing on the Indian side. Over the past several days,
we have heard many defenders of the latest amendments to the Citizenship
Act, 1955, or the Citizenship Amendment Bill, 2019 (CAB), hark back to
Partition. And while they do not use the expression “unfinished business”,
they leave nothing to chance by using expressions like full justice,
closure, fair deal to non-Muslim minorities. The CAB, they assert, only
redeems the promise implicit to the minorities in Pakistan and Bangladesh.

What that promise was, however, is debatable. There is no doubt that
Pakistan was imagined, fought for, and achieved as a ‘homeland’ for the
Subcontinent’s Muslims. It did not, however, follow that India could no
longer be their home.

It is also true that there was an extensive exchange of population on
religious grounds, and it was bloodied and embittered by massacres and
rapes. In a couple of years, however, on the western side, this exchange
was over and almost complete. Very few, if any, Muslims remained in Indian
Punjab, or Hindus and Sikhs on the Pakistani side.

Some trickles did continue until the mid-1960s. Cricketer Asif Iqbal, for
example, who captained Pakistan, migrated only in 1961. Until then, he was
playing in the Hyderabad team which was later captained by Mansur Ali Khan
‘Tiger’ Pataudi. There was a minor surge in the wake of the 1965 war, and
then it ended.

The picture in the east was quite different.

For a variety of complex reasons, the exchange of population between what
was then East Pakistan and India’s West Bengal, Assam and Tripura was far
from complete. Large sections of Bengali Muslims stayed back in India, as
did Hindus in East Bengal (Pakistan). But bouts of riots continued, each
followed by tit-for-tat exoduses from either side.

It was to stop this that, in 1950, Jawaharlal Nehru and his Pakistani
counterpart Liaquat Ali Khan signed a detailed agreement of great clarity,
known to history as the Nehru-Liaquat Pact. You can read the text here. The
pact rested on five essential pillars:

1. Both countries commit to not only protect their minorities but to give
them all the rights and freedoms, including in government jobs, politics
and armed forces.

2. Those who have been displaced/migrated temporarily because of the riots
and want to return to their homes will be given due facilitation and
protection.

3. Those who did not want to return will be accepted as citizens like any
other ‘migrants’.

4. There will, meanwhile, be freedom of movement on both sides and those
who still want to migrate will be given protection and help.

5. Both sides will sincerely try to restore order, so people feel secure
enough to stay put.

It was following this that India carried out an enumeration and built the
first (and so far the last) National Register of Citizens (NRC) in 1951.

In the CAB debate, we often hear BJP leaders refer to the Nehru-Liaquat
Pact to argue that while India kept its part of the commitments, Pakistan
didn’t. It is difficult to argue with this. Population data shows that
while in India, the overall population of Muslims has risen, even at a rate
marginally higher than that of the Hindus and Sikhs, the population of
minorities has declined steeply in what was East and West Pakistan. It is a
safe conclusion that the minorities have continued to leave Pakistan (and,
later, probably Bangladesh for some time) and settle in India.

Here is, therefore, the reason why the BJP now calls the CAB its answer to
what it sees as the unfinished business of Partition: Pakistan didn’t keep
its commitments under the Nehru-Liaquat Pact and, by implication, India
became the natural home of minorities still being persecuted there. And
there is no reason why a Muslim should feel persecuted for her religion in
Islamic states.

Then, we start running into complications. First, because Jinnah’s
two-nation theory is not what India’s founders wanted their secular
republic to be. Second, at which point does old history end, and the new
one begin? And third, is national synonymous with indigenous; or does
religion equal ethnicity and language?

Also read: What is 6th Schedule & why it allows parts of Northeast to be
exempt from citizenship bill

Since we raised the question of old and new history, it might be necessary
for us to go back a few decades to understand the nature and complexity of
migration in the east, especially Assam.

Assam was relatively much less densely populated and had endless, empty
expanses of vast, fertile lands with plenty of water. This led to an early
wave of migration from East Bengal in the 20th Century. A bulk of these
were economic migrants, in search of land and a living. Probably the first
person to use the expression ‘invasion’ for this was the British
Superintendent of Census Operations in Assam in 1931, C.S. Mullan.

“Probably the most important event in the province during the last 25
years…which seems likely to alter permanently the whole future of Assam and
to destroy the whole culture of Assamese culture (sic) and civilisation —
has been invasion of a vast horde of land-hungry immigrants, mostly
Muslims, from the districts of East Bengal and, in particular, from
Mymensingh,” he wrote. He then concluded with a dark flourish: “Wheresoever
the carcass, there the vultures will be gathered together. Where there is a
wasteland, thither flock the Mymensinghias.” This is how far back the
Assamese people’s ethnic and linguistic anxieties go.

If the Muslim economic migration became an issue in Assam so early on,
Hindus were added to it after Partition. While the pre-1947 Muslims
(Mullan’s Mymensinghias) mostly stayed on, hordes of persecuted Hindus
streamed in, changing the ethnic balance of the entire region.

It is the nub of the problem, and one of the main reasons why this CAB
fails to answer Assam’s anxieties. The overriding concern there hasn’t been
religion but ethnicity, culture, language and political power. The RSS and
BJP have tried to change this over the past three decades and I have
written about this. Muslim migrants are mostly old, pre-Partition and can’t
be denied citizenship. Bengali Hindus are more recent. Which explains why
more than 60 per cent of the 19 lakh still disqualified in the NRC process
are non-Muslim.

This is where the BJP catches itself in a deadly contradiction. If it
applies any principle of citizenship (25 March 1971 as the cut-off year, as
agreed between Indira Gandhi and Mujibur Rahman, and accepted in the Assam
Accord), it nets more Hindus than Muslims. If it goes further back, how far
can it go: 1931? 1911?

The BJP has now tried resolving this with this latest CAB. The Assamese
would not readily accept it, and the idea of protecting the Sixth Schedule
tribal states and districts of Assam is too clever by half, as it would
mean the ethnic Assamese accepting an even greater share of Bengali Hindus.

In the normal course, we would be tempted to invoke Sir Walter Scott here
for the BJP: Oh, what a tangled web we weave/when first we practice to
deceive. But, there is a twist. The BJP also knows that the CAB, combined
with a fresh nationwide NRC process, is an idea that’s dead-on-arrival.
Where it lives on, however, is as a divisive, polarising instrument, as its
rivals have to take a position against it and thereby be exposed to the
charge of “Muslim appeasement” again. It could then be the Ram Mandir or
Article 370 of the next three decades.
-- 
Peace Is Doable

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