HI,

This is my first email to the list. As part of my PhD work, I have
been analysing the latest routing storms and
come up with an alternative that would make life much easier for all of us.

Cheers,/PA
Pedro A Aranda
[email protected]





GROW  Working Group                              P.A. Aranda Gutierrez

             A Soft Error Notification Mechanism for BGP‐4

Status of this Memo
   This Internet‐Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.  This document may contain material
   from IETF Documents or IETF Contributions published or made publicly
   available before November 10, 2008.  The person(s) controlling the
   copyright in some of this material may not have granted the IETF
   Trust the right to allow modifications of such material outside the
   IETF Standards Process.  Without obtaining an adequate license from
   the person(s) controlling the copyright in such materials, this
   document may not be modified outside the IETF Standards Process, and
   derivative works of it may not be created outside the IETF Standards
   Process, except to format it for publication as an RFC or to
   translate it into languages other than English.

   Internet‐Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet‐
   Drafts.

   Internet‐Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet‐Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet‐Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id‐abstracts.txt.

   The list of Internet‐Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   This Internet‐Draft will expire on December 08, 2010.

 Copyright Notice
   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust’s Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license‐info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as



P. A. Aranda Gutierrez                                          [Page 1]





                    Soft Error Notification for BGP‐4        1 July 2010


   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Abstract
   This memo describes a Soft Error Notification Mechanism for BGP‐4. In
   2009, there were two major disruptions in the Internet due to BGP‐4
   routing storms. In both cases, malformed BGP‐4 updates were at the
   root of the disruption. This memo provides a root cause analysis for
   the routing storms and proposes an alternative way to treat malformed
   BGP‐4 packets which is less prone to start network oscillation.

Conventions used in this document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

 Introduction

   The transition from 2‐byte ASNs to 4‐byte ASNs is not being as smooth
   as foreseen by RFC 4893 [RFC4893]. This RFC, as defined in January
   2009, outlawed the use of AS_CONFED_SEQ and AS_CONFED_SET segments in
   the AS_4PATH in order to avoid routing loops and this decision was at
   the root of the first routing storm of 2009. As described by Watanabe
   [WAT2009], the first big routing storm of 2009 occurred because a
   BGP‐4 speaker started to leak AS_CONFED_SEQ segments in some
   announcements. The reaction to this incident was to soften the
   requirements on AS4_PATH attributes, with the result that some AS
   Confederations [RFC5056] started leaking their internal structure to
   routing repositories in the Internet [ICSN2010].

   Between the 17th and the 18the of August, 2009 another incident took
   place and was detected and publicised by the Renesys blog [REN2009].
   This incident is studied in [AICT2010].

   The root cause for this incidents lies in the definition of the
   behaviour of BGP‐4 when confronted with corrupted packets. It
   foresees an error notification packet coupled with a BGP‐4 session
   restart. This reaction might be correct in the presence of packet
   errors that occur very infrequently. But when an implementation of
   BGP‐4 consistently produces malformed packets, the session tends to
   oscillate:

   1. The router emitting a malformed update starts sending its routing
   table to his neighbour or neighbours.

   2. These update their neighbours with the information received in
   correct updates.




P. A. Aranda Gutierrez                                          [Page 2]





                    Soft Error Notification for BGP‐4        1 July 2010


   3. When the offending router sends the malformed packet, the BGP‐4
   sessions affected by it are reset.

   4. The neighbours affected withdraw the correct information received
   from the offending neighbour from their neighbours.

   5. The session will restart and we are back at step 1.

   This oscillation propagates through the Internet and is amplified by
   the Internet’s topology. Worst case scenario is a routing table of
   the Default Zone (DFZ) where the last update is corrupted.

 BGP‐4 Soft Notification

   Soft notification tries to eliminate these avalanches by defining an
   alternative behaviour when receiving malformed updates. This
   behaviour is less aggressive than the behaviour defined in [RFC4271].

   When a BGP‐4 speaker sends a malformed update to its neighbours:

   1. the neighbours MUST withdraw from their routing table the prefix
   or prefixes contained in the malformed update.

   2. the neighbours MUST send a soft error notification packet
   containing the malformed update.

   3. the offending router MAY resend the update information to its
   neighbours after a timeout.

   4. the offending router SHOULD notify the management system via a
   logging message or an SNMP trap.

 Soft Notification Packet format

   The following format is proposed for the soft notification packet:

   +‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐+
   |       SOFT NOTIFICATION CODE           |
   +‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐+
   |         TOTAL PACKET LENGTH            |
   +‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐+
   |                                        |
   |             OFFENDING UPDATE           |
   |                 ....                   |
   |                                        |
   +‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐+

   Security considerations MUST be addressed by the proposed solutions.



P. A. Aranda Gutierrez                                          [Page 3]





                    Soft Error Notification for BGP‐4        1 July 2010


   The behaviour described above has side effects on BGP‐4 sessions
   carried multi‐protocol information (e.g. IPv6, MPLS‐VPNs, etc.) In
   this case, the effect propagates to all address families supported by
   the BGP‐4 session. In the coexistence period of IPv4 and IPv6, this
   behaviour could be used to attack the IPv6 infrastructure from the
   IPv4 world.

 IANA Considerations
   This document has no actions for IANA.

 References

   [REN2009] J. Cowie. Staring Into The Gorge: Router Exploits.
   http://www.renesys.com/blog/2009/08/staring‐into‐the‐gorge.shtml,
   August 2009. Last visit, 12‐Oct‐2009.

   [WAT2009] Watanabe. AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE in AS4_PATH attribute.
   
http://irs.ietf.to/past/docs_20090218/IRS19_watanabe_AS_CENFED_SEQ_in_AS4PATH.pdf

   [ICSN2010] P. A. Aranda Gutierrez. Using RFC4893 violations to reveal
   the topology of AS Confederations. In The Sixth International
   Conference on Networking and Services; ICNS 2010. ICST, March 2010.

   [AICT2010] P. A. Aranda Gutierrez. Collateral Damage in the Last Big
   Internet Storm, In the Sixth Advanced International Conference on
   Telecommunications, AICT 2010, May 2010.

   [RFC4271] Y. Rekhter, T. Li, and S. Hares. A Border Gateway Protocol
   4 (BGP‐4). RFC 4271 (Draft Standard), Jan. 2006.

   [RFC5056] P. Traina, D. McPherson, and J. Scudder. Autonomous System
   Confederations for BGP. RFC 5065 (Draft Standard), Aug. 2007.

   [RFC4893] Q. Vohra and E. Chen. BGP Support for Four‐octet AS Number
   Space. RFC 4893 (Proposed Standard), May 2007.

 Author’s Address
   Pedro A. Aranda Gutierrez
   University of Paderborn
   Paderborn, Germany
   EMail: [email protected]










P. A. Aranda Gutierrez                                          [Page 4]


_______________________________________________
GROW mailing list
[email protected]
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/grow

Reply via email to