Jeff, Thank you for the response. My comments inline.
>You can thus just get a FCFS extended community from a >transitive space TODAY and >it'd probably do most of what you want. One of the beneficial properties >that extended communities have is the transitivity is at least understood >and well deployed. I was hoping for a confirmation of that nature. So, that is good to hear. >That said, there's still no guarantee that some operator may choose to just >delete them all at an ASBR. Yep. It is not a perfect world. But are you suggesting that no community-based approach (EC or LC or ?) is worth pursuing? >...the headache you're going through is trying to avoid the work of creating a >new attribute. There is already a separate draft in IDR that has passed WGLC, and it uses a new transitive BGP Path Attribute 'Only to Customer (OTC)': https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-15 We view that as a longer-term solution, while the EC/LC-based approach is meant to be deployed quickly. >A discussion I'd suggest is that we've had a need for a "BGP routing >security" attribute where we can put these various proposals: >- It's not a victim of existing community practices. >- Policy might still interact with it, but the baseline maintenance expectations can be set for it. >- It can be extensible so new components can be added incrementally. In the above, are you suggesting BGP Path Attribute or a new type of Community that comes with transitivity guarantees? Sriram ________________________________________ From: Jeffrey Haas <jh...@pfrc.org> Sent: Wednesday, March 31, 2021 12:13 PM To: Sriram, Kotikalapudi (Fed) Cc: Susan Hares; i...@ietf.org; grow@ietf.org; draft-heitz-idr-w...@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Idr] Choice of Large vs. Extended Community for Route Leaks Solution Sriram, (Clearly I'm not Sue...) Extending the observation I've just made to Gyan, the headache you're going through is trying to avoid the work of creating a new attribute. A result of this is a lot of work trying to proscriptively change how people operate their networks for more general features. Extended communities have functionally behaved as more of a protocol control mechanism in their general history. They already have behaviors that permit them to be selectively transitive or non-transitive across ASes. Operationally, they MAY be stripped by policy, but sanitization practices for them are significantly less codified than RFC 1997 communities. You can thus just get a FCFS extended community from a transitive space TODAY and it'd probably do most of what you want. One of the beneficial properties that extended communities have is the transitivity is at least understood and well deployed. That said, there's still no guarantee that some operator may choose to just delete them all at an ASBR. A discussion I'd suggest is that we've had a need for a "BGP routing security" attribute where we can put these various proposals: - It's not a victim of existing community practices. - Policy might still interact with it, but the baseline maintenance expectations can be set for it. - It can be extensible so new components can be added incrementally. While I understand a motivation for putting this in communities is "faster deployment", take the other example from the life of large communities: when there's sufficient interest, the feature will show up pretty fast. -- Jeff (the best time to plant a tree is ten years ago. the second best time is now...) _______________________________________________ GROW mailing list GROW@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/grow
