Hi Jeff,

Top posting for brevity - does this commit in the edit buffer
incorporate your feedback?

https://github.com/job/draft-rpki-communities-harmful/commit/f7abd4baa858513fd73a1999b2a9b5964e4647d6

Kind regards,

Job

On Tue, Feb 10, 2026 at 06:49:09PM -0500, Jeffrey Haas wrote:
> On 2/10/26 16:54, Job Snijders wrote:
> > > The document highlights that if there's a need to include validation
> > > state in a transitive fashion that it capital SHOULD be removed upon
> > > propagation.  Such things are only readily possible when the
> > > implementations are aware of the feature to do such scrubbing.  This
> > > is generally documented in draft-haas-idr-bgp-attribute-escape (which
> > > I need to refresh and see if I can get IDR to consider publishing).
> > > Part of the issue being discussed in the document is a given AS's  (at
> > > a given router) perspective on validation.  Any such new feature that
> > > includes things transitively should consider including enough scoping
> > > material to permit things to be deconsidered outside of the scoping
> > > boundary.
> > With the above in mind, do you have a specific change you'd like to see
> > in the internet-draft under consideration?
> 
> This is the statement that is problematic:
> 
> "If local technical requirements or the implementation used by an operator
> necessitates the use of transitive attributes to signal RPKI Validation
> State, the operator SHOULD ensure that these attributes are removed in NLRI
> announced to EBGP neighbors."
> 
> The advice is correct.  However, being able to implement the SHOULD may
> depend on support for that feature consistently across an AS.  When that
> support is not present, leaking will happen.
> 
> My suggestion is to make note that such cleanup may not be consistently
> possible. It doesn't violate the SHOULD, but it leads to the conditions this
> draft is intended to discuss.

ack

> > 
> > PERHAPS:
> >     This document discusses signaling locally significant RPKI Validation
> >     States to external BGP neighbors through transitive BGP attributes.
> >     This includes operator-specific BGP Communities to signal Validation
> >     States, as well as any current or future standardized transitive
> >     well-known BGP Communities denoting Validation State. Furthermore, it
> >     is RECOMMENDED that operators also consider this guidance within
> >     their network, i.e., between their IBGP speakers when using
> >     [RFC8097].
> > 
> > Reasoning: while indeed RFC8097 communities aren't intended to be
> > transitive across domain boundaries, they still carry a potential for
> > causing (large?) churning events (a router losing its RPKI caches will
> > cause BGP UPDATEs for half the Internet routing table to signal a
> > different new non-transitive RFC8097 community to its IBGP peers) - some
> > of this might become externally visible depending on the exact
> > parameters in play.
> 
> I think I'd suggest leaving that bit of the text unchanged for the iBGP
> scenario.  While I agree there is churn that is associated with internal
> signaling changes, it should be happening because that's intentional
> operator policy.
> 
> This draft highlights the consequences when things go awry. (Yay!) However,
> trying to tell an operator "you can't do these things internally" goes
> exactly as one would expect when you tell an operator "you can't do that". 
> The easy example for validation being that ingress marking is done, and the
> results of that marking are intentionally used as part of redistribution
> policy at AS edges.
> 
> > Also, these non-transitive communities are encoded inside an optional
> > *transitive* bgp path attribute.... so turmoil supposed to be internal
> > might be somewhat externally visible, right? But I totally agree that in
> > this context RFC 8097 communities are _less_ of a problem than regular
> > transitve communities.
> 
> This is an attribute escape consideration.  If your implementation doesn't
> understand extended communities, then the marking communities will escape.
> 
> This is now where I must ask... what ASBRs are deployed these days that
> don't understand them?
> 
> > I'm also OK to tighten up this document's scope and focus exclusively on
> > EBGP and remove this sentence """Furthermore, it is RECOMMENDED that
> > operators also consider this guidance within their network, i.e.,
> > between their IBGP speakers using [RFC8097]""" entirely.
> 
> I think that helps clarity for the core scenario.

ack


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