Hi Miika, Maybe you already go a reply from Spencer anyway, however, he is not serving in the AD position anymore, so he might not reply.
Thanks for replying to his comments anyway. I think a way to encrypt candidate address was what Spencer was looking for. So I think his comment is addressed as well. I also just enter my ballot with “No objection” and I think Magnus Westerlund, Spencer’s successor, will also enter a ballot position in the next week. Mirja > On 19. Feb 2020, at 21:52, Miika Komu > <[email protected]> wrote: > > Hi Spencer, > > thanks for your comments, please see my response below. > > ke, 2018-05-09 kello 18:18 -0700, Spencer Dawkins kirjoitti: >> Spencer Dawkins has entered the following ballot position for >> draft-ietf-hip-native-nat-traversal-28: No Objection >> >> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all >> email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut >> this >> introductory paragraph, however.) >> >> >> Please refer to >> https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html >> for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. >> >> >> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: >> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-hip-native-nat-traversal/ >> >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------- >> --- >> COMMENT: >> ------------------------------------------------------------------- >> --- >> >> I'm balloting No Objection, but I'm watching the discussion in Eric's >> ballot >> thread about reusing pieces of ICE, and I look forward to some >> discussion about >> the provisions being made for middleboxes in this draft - I'm not >> denying that >> such things exist, only that it would be best if we understood why >> middleboxes >> are needed for this usage. > > I am not sure exactly what you mean by middlebox provisioning, but at > least a couple of things have been clarified in the draft related to > middleboxes: > > * STUN may be used for discovering address candidates; HIP Control > Servers are recommended > * The address candidates are encrypted to protect against middlebox > tampering > _______________________________________________ Hipsec mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/hipsec
