On 09/14/2014 02:04 AM, Markus Stenberg wrote:
On 13.9.2014, at 23.30, Brian E Carpenter <brian.e.carpen...@gmail.com> wrote:
All true (as are the subsequent comments by Acee and Michael).
But the fact remains that we can't assume L2 is secure in the
normal case, which is a much worse situation than we traditionally
assumed for wired networks.
Ok, so your stance is that we can’t assume secure L2, but neither can we do
anything useful without fully encrypted traffic.
As fully encrypted traffic is not an option (computational overhead,
not-so-littleconf on routers and probably impossible on current hosts), what,
exactly, do you propose then? Not deploy routed home networks at all until we
can assume L2 security?
I think you're throwing up your hands way too prematurely. I don't know
what "fully encrypted traffic"
means in this context. If you're talking about the router-router
signaling traffic itself (eg, ospf), symmetric
crypto (eg, aes+sha256 -- note all you might need is just integrity too)
adds trivial process load these
days. Public key operations are similarly a drop in the bucket these
days when used sparingly (eg, for
enrollment, session establishment, etc). Modern router boxes are not
microvax 1's with two fat ethernet
ports, after all.
Also: I think that HNCP needs to take care of HNCP and not worry about
boiling the homenet security
ocean. Even if we end up with layers of crypto via L2. That's ok.
Last, without actually knowing what threats/attacks we're trying to
defend against, it's *way* to early
to say how much configuration might be required. Remember: WPA2
requires the input of exactly one
passphrase per SSID. That is manifestly not an insurmountable burden.
And that's just for starters: we
may be able to get away with leap of faith kinds of enrollment depending
on the threats which may require
minimal user intervention (eg: "should I do this, Y|n").
So the real job here is to consider what the threats are first and
foremost before making blanket
statements about l2, l3, processor speed, etc, etc.
Mike
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